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“The real secret to McDonald’s suc-
cessful operating system is not in its 
regimen but in the way it enforces uni-
form procedures without stifling the en-
trepreneurship of franchisees.”  
(Love, 1986: p. 150) 
 
 
PART A 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Background 
A critical function of economic organization is to allocate decision rights in a value-
maximizing fashion – those rights being defined as a person’s authority to decide on, and 
to take, action with regard to the accomplishment of a specific task (Picot et al., 2005: p. 
233).1 This function is subject to nontrivial trade-offs. On the one hand, the distribution of 
knowledge about market conditions and productive adaptation across the members of an 
organization, and society more generally, is a main factor calling for a partial decentraliza-
tion of decision rights (Hayek, 1945; Stiglitz, 1994). Alternatively, initially dispersed 
knowledge had to be gathered by a central planer. Yet, some information is prohibitively 
costly to communicate because, for instance, of its tacit component, implying that it cannot 
be codified for transmission at acceptable costs (Polanyi, 1958). Hence, whenever knowl-
edge is costly to convey, i.e., it is specific, decision rights need to be moved to knowledge-
able agents (Jensen and Meckling, 1992).2 The celebrated turnaround of General Motors by 
its CEO, Alfred P. Sloan, at the beginning of the twentieth century could thus be under-
stood as a result of Sloan delegating discretion to division managers who had the best 
knowledge about products and their marketing (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: p. 17).3  
On the other hand, decentralization also generates control, or agency, costs since the 
preferences of self-interested employees, the agents, frequently diverge from those of the
                                                     
1 According to Jensen and Meckling (1992: p. 9), “decision rights are the basis for saying that individuals 
have the ‘power’ to make decisions and to take actions with resources. Power means that a decision made by 
a party will be operative.” 
2 Other authors refer to knowledge which is costly to transfer as “specialized” (Demsetz, 1988) or “sticky” 
(von Hippel, 1994). 
3 Brickley et al. (2004: pp. 280-281, 302-303) provided further examples of successful turnarounds involving 
a decentralization of decision structures at Brabantia, a large European manufacturer of household products, 
and Honda Motor Company. Microsoft Corporation is a recent case of reorganization towards more decen-
tralized decision structures (Spiegel Online a, 11/13/2005).  
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organization, the principal.4 Agents will then display a tendency to use discretion to their 
advantage and at the expense of the principal. An effort-averse branch manager of a retail 
bank may, for example, choose hours of operations to allow for optimal leisure consump-
tion (see Nagar, 2002). In order to ensure that agents’ decision-making is in line with the 
principal’s objective function, companies may engage in monitoring (Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
In the case of General Motors mentioned above, the delegation of rights to divisions was 
accompanied by improved accounting data, helping the company evaluate managers’ ac-
tions (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: p. 17). Yet, monitoring is costly, especially when in-
formation asymmetries between the principal and the agents are significant (Brickley and 
Dark, 1987). Substituting for monitoring, agents’ interests can be aligned with the principal 
by offering incentive schemes (e.g., Zajac and Westphal, 1994). The most effective form of 
incentive alignment grants those with the right to fulfill specific tasks the residual claim on 
the net income from their decisions, thereby avoiding problems of misdirected effort 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). By making an agent the sole residual claimant, he bears the full 
wealth effects of his behavior without affecting the welfare of others.  
A widespread and increasingly popular organizational form to efficiently partition deci-
sion rights between a principal and the agents by assigning to each the appropriate level of 
residual claims is franchising (Rubin, 1978; Michael, 1996).5 Franchising denotes a con-
tractual distribution arrangement between an upstream parent corporation, the franchisor, 
and legally independent downstream firms, the franchisees. In return for an initial fee, the 
franchisor sells the right to market a product and/or service under his trade name at a spe-
cific location and for a pre-specified term to franchisees. Franchisees regularly concentrate 
their distribution activities exclusively on the franchisor’s goods. As opposed to product 
franchising, business-format franchising not only involves the transfer of the trademark but 
of an entire business concept to the local entrepreneurs, including operating manuals, mar-
keting plans, and quality control.6 Disposing of the system-specific know-how, the franchi-
                                                     
4 This must not always be the case. Organization theory has long argued that the divergence of interests be-
tween a principal and the agents can be reduced ex ante through, for instance, appropriate selection criteria 
(Ouchi, 1979). See, for the importance of selection in a franchising context, Jambulingam and Nevin (1999). 
Notwithstanding these policies, problems of adverse selection cannot be solved completely and some vulner-
ability to post-contractual self-interest seeking usually remains.  
5 See, for information on the growth of franchising in Germany, DFV (2005). See, for the U.S., Lafontaine 
and Shaw (1998). For special discussions of the origins and the evolution of franchising in Germany, see 
Tietz (1991: pp. 64-94), Altmann (1996: pp. 15-20), Küster (2000: pp. 7-12), and Steiff (2004: pp. 10-12). 
6 See Klein (1995: pp. 9-12) for differences and similarities between product and business-format franchis-
ing. Franchising literature has dealt primarily with the latter category. Academic researchers’ relative greater 
interest in business-format franchising may be a result of its increasing relevance in the economy over the 
A-I. Introduction  
 
3
sor ideally makes decisions with respect to the development and maintenance of the brand 
name (e.g., site-selection, store layout, product development). He captures the residual 
claims from these efforts mainly through monthly royalty payments made by franchisees. 
These royalties are usually calculated as a percentage of each outlet’s sales (regularly be-
tween four and 10 percent). Since franchisees, in turn, possess valuable specific knowledge 
about their local markets (Bradach, 1998; Shane, 2005), they typically decide on operating 
policies such as pricing, local marketing, hiring, and customer service (Windsperger, 2003, 
2004).7 In return, they claim the units’ residual profits net of fees. 
Making use of residual claims, franchising effectively counters those control problems 
found in unitary firms, particularly insufficient effort provided by agents (i.e., shirking). 
For this reason, it constitutes an attractive means to organize economic activity. Yet, fran-
chising is not a panacea either and creates other malincentives whose governance in the 
face of decentralized decision authority is the subject of this thesis as outlined below. 
2. Research question 
Residual claimancy implies that each franchisee maximizes his profits without taking into 
account any negative external effects accruing to the upstream company and other stores. 
More precisely, the use of a common business concept by all outlets in a chain fosters free-
riding by franchisees on investments in the brand expected to be undertaken by peers (e.g., 
Michael, 2000a). Since “everyone wants to “let George do it”, but no one wants to be 
George” (Goldberg, 1980: p. 349), any network’s brand value and therefore competitive-
ness ultimately risks getting eroded. These malincentives imperil the value which can be 
derived from leveraging specific knowledge through the delegation of decision rights.  
For the inconsistency in objectives cuts both ways, franchisees are also at a risk of op-
portunistic behavior by the franchisor. Controlling important parts of the system, the prin-
cipal can potentially redistribute ex post some of the quasi-rents flowing from franchisees’ 
specific investments by, for instance, raising the prices of goods sold to the outlets (Had-
field, 1990). In addition, the company could provide insufficient assistance to stores in 
order to minimize own costs (Sen, 1993). The risks of franchisor opportunism become 
                                                                                                                                                                 
past decades (see fn. 5). Consistent with earlier literature, I also focus on business-format franchising in this 
dissertation. 
7 Note that “casual observation would suggest that franchisees have little discretion and add few ideas be-
cause they are required to operate in the narrow confines of standardized products. (…) However, a closer 
look reveals that franchisees often have considerable discretion and are responsible for the introduction of 
many successful ideas” (Minkler, 1992: pp. 244-245). 
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more severe, the higher the company’s control over the chain’s operations since franchi-
sees then are increasingly dependent on the franchising firm. 
In a review of such inconsistencies in objectives, Ménard (2004: p. 8) recently formu-
lated the fundamental challenge to the management of hybrids – organizational forms such 
as franchising which pool resources from two legally separate entities and where the action 
of one actor affects the wealth of the other – as follows:  
“How can they secure cooperation (…) without losing the advantages of 
decentralized decisions?” 
In what follows, I seek answers to this question in a franchising setting. My main 
proposition, which I test empirically, is that firms rely on private enforcement mechanisms 
to assure an exercise of decision rights which takes the economic interests of the other ex-
change partner as a constraint. These mechanisms thus allow enforcing unwritten agree-
ments and informal expectations about cooperative conduct which, in turn, define a rela-
tional contract (Baker et al., 2002).8 In essence, these extra-legal mechanisms function by 
threatening the value of the future relationship as a punishment for opportunistic behavior. 
Cooperation then arises endogenously through rewards designed and decided upon within 
the exchange without resorting to the law.9 Three specific forms of private enforcement are 
analyzed: (1) the self-enforcement mechanism (e.g., Klein and Murphy, 1988; Klein, 
1995), (2) relational governance (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 2002), and (3) collective pun-
ishment (Greif et al., 1994). Each of these specific types is self-enforcing in the sense that 
the relationship between the contracting parties is sufficient to trigger cooperation without 
using the legal system. However, I stick to the terms self-enforcement mechanism, rela-
tional governance, and collective punishment to distinguish between them along the mean-
ings attached to each by prior literature. 
The focus on private ordering results from the observation that the formal contract – the 
only alternative form of enforcing the parties’ interests in franchising – is an ineligible 
                                                     
8 Since private enforcement mechanisms are necessary to make relational contracts binding, these two con-
cepts are intertwined. Therefore, I use these terms interchangeably throughout the text.   
9 Legally non-binding agreements sustained by the value of the future relationship are ubiquitous in business 
and not only relevant in franchising. For instance, informal organization structure, i.e., the way activities are 
effectively carried out within firms, often differs remarkably from the formal structure as reflected in organi-
zation charts (e.g., Blau and Scott, 1962). Japanese supply relationships are an example of between-firm 
relationships governed predominantly by relational contracts (e.g., Sako and Helper, 1998). Informal under-
standings also affect transfer pricing (e.g., Eccles, 1985), among other business practices. See, for a review of 
the role of informal agreements in protecting relationship-specific investments from ex post appropriation, 
Shelanski and Klein (1995: pp. 348-349). 
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candidate to answer the question articulated above.10 The legal document can only set the 
necessary conditions to leverage decentralized knowledge by allocating decision rights 
accordingly. It cannot, however, fully assure a cooperative exercise of these rights. This is 
for two major reasons. First, monetary incentives stipulated in the agreement, such as roy-
alties, are insufficient to fully align the actors’ interests. For instance, franchisees’ residual 
claimancy status is rather the source than a solution to many of the incentive problems, 
notably free-riding (Lafontaine and Raynaud, 2002). Second, leveraging the advantages of 
decentralized decisions necessarily requires some behavior being left unspecified in the 
written contract (Foss and Foss, 2002). Given that the precise accomplishment, along with 
the outcomes, of various tasks is then not agreed upon in advance, the role of courts in ef-
ficiently enforcing cooperative behavior is restricted. This is not to say that the formal con-
tract is not important to structure the relationship in broad terms and to supply boundaries. 
But its capacity to assure cooperation in light of dispersed decision rights is limited. There-
fore, the assignment of decision leeway necessitates, I suggest, private mechanisms of re-
ward and punishment. These rely on the information of the parties close to the transaction 
to evaluate and reward each other’s behavior. I forward that private enforcement mecha-
nisms avoid jeopardizing the advantages of decentralized decisions and thereby, though not 
being the main focus here, secure the strength of hybrid governance modes in the competi-
tion between organizational forms altogether (see, on this competition, Michael, 1994). 
With the simultaneous consideration of decision rights, as vehicles to leverage specific 
knowledge, and (relational) reward systems, this dissertation picks up two essential vari-
ables of organizational design commonly stressed by the “positive” branch of agency the-
ory (Jensen, 2001; see, for a review, Charreaux, 2002). In this theoretical framework, it is 
emphasized that the system for allocating decision rights and the system for rewarding and 
punishing individuals for their performance need to be properly aligned (see, also, Brickley 
et al., 2004). The specific reward and punishment systems considered here – namely, rela-
tional contracts – are by now also part of an agency-theoretic analysis of organizations (see 
Klein, 2002).11 
                                                     
10 Since franchising involves legally separate economic actors, enforcing the will of the principal by means of 
hierarchical fiat is excluded. See, on the functioning of the employment contract, Williamson (1996: pp. 97-
100). For an interpretation of inter-organizational contracts as hierarchies, see Stinchombe (1990).  
11 See, for textbook treatments of relational contracts, Milgrom and Roberts (1992: pp. 259-265), Richter and 
Furubotn (2003: pp. 276-284), and Picot et al. (2005: pp. 127-130). 
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3. Contribution to the literature 
This dissertation advances the franchising literature by bridging two central problems of 
economic organization (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: p. 25), namely, the domains of 
coordination (i.e., who makes decisions) and motivation (i.e., how to assure decision rights 
are not abused). Management and organization theory literature on franchising has thus far 
mainly contributed to the first domain.12 Bradach (1997, 1998) emphasized that the alloca-
tion of decision rights in chains is crucial to meet the management challenges of uniformity 
and local responsiveness. Relatedly, Kaufmann and Eroglu (1999) pointed out that suc-
cessful management of networks means striking a balance between standardization and 
adaptation. However, with their strong focus on coordination, these qualitative studies 
largely neglected the issue of motivation.  
Franchising research from an economics perspective has been mainly constrained to 
motivation.13 In this effort, the literature has given special attention to two types of ques-
tions. First, how do the characteristics of a chain, for instance, the effort requirements of 
each channel member, explain monetary contract terms such as royalty rates (e.g., Rubin, 
1978; Lafontaine, 1992; Sen, 1993; Vázquez, 2005)? More recently, researchers have also 
begun to empirically relate these characteristics to the existence of other, non-monetary 
contract clauses, such as exclusive territories (e.g., Mathewson and Winter, 1994), which 
distribute property rights and therefore motivational incentives. A second prominent re-
search stream in franchising from a motivation, namely agency, perspective has striven to 
explain the contract mix of franchised and company-owned outlets within any chain by 
framing franchising as a means to curb problems of monitoring and control (e.g., Brickley 
and Dark, 1987; Norton, 1988).14  
As regards the intersection of coordination and motivation, however, only little evi-
dence is available. An exception to this is Arruñada et al.’s (2001) study which provided 
some evidence on how the provision of quasi-rents to outlets related to the allocation of 
decision rights in franchised automobile distribution. By focusing on the interface between 
motivation and coordination as the basic features of organization, this dissertation responds 
to calls from franchising researchers “to examine empirically how decision rights should 
                                                     
12 For a review of the franchising literature from various disciplinary perspectives, see Combs et al. (2004). 
13 See Dnes (1996) as well as Lafontaine and Slade (1997) for reviews of the economics literature on fran-
chising.   
14 Other theoretical lenses have also been applied to this research question, including most prominently the 
resource scarcity view (e.g., Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1968-1969; Caves and Murphy, 1976), but also signaling 
(Gallini and Lutz, 1992), and search-cost theory (Minkler, 1992). See Dant and Kaufmann (2003) for an 
empirical test discriminating between these theories.   
A-I. Introduction  
 
7
be allocated to maximize performance” (Elango and Fried, 1997: p. 76). This is an impor-
tant question since prior evidence indicates that even though franchised systems rely heav-
ily on codification and standardization, tacit and locally dispersed knowledge continue to 
play an important role in determining success and failure (e.g., Kalnins and Mayer, 2004a).   
The empirical results of this thesis show that franchising firms align the system for re-
ward and punishment (i.e., private enforcement mechanisms) with the system for allocating 
decision rights throughout the chain. Taking the theoretical underpinnings into account, 
these findings suggest that this alignment is efficient. This is to say that though the empiri-
cal tests related to the research question do not include performance measures, normative 
conclusions may nevertheless be invoked by assuming the efficiency principle to hold. 
According to this principle, gains can be realized by channel members from changing inef-
ficient arrangements. These should therefore not prevail in the market for long (see Mil-
grom and Roberts, 1992: pp. 24-25). Even if inefficient firms remain in the marketplace for 
some time, possibly due to adjustment costs and/or slack resources slowing selection pres-
sures, organizational architectures associated with efficiency should be more frequently 
observed than inefficient practices.15 Supporting this view, Shane (2001) reported from a 
large sample of franchise chains that the management of contracting problems plays an 
important role for organizational survival. Therefore, the findings of this dissertation bear 
normative implications possibly of interest to channels currently being organized “ineffi-
ciently”, but especially for prospective economic actors in franchising. 
4. Approaches and perspectives 
The core of this dissertation (PART B) contains four modular chapters woven together by 
the idea of private enforcement effectively safeguarding against a non-cooperative exercise 
of decision rights. Figure 1 graphically displays the framework integrating these sections. 
The left hand side of the figure acknowledges the importance of analyzing rights assign-
ment from both the franchisor’s and franchisees’ perspectives separately. That is, the allo-
cation of rights to franchisees creates hazards, in need for mitigation, for the franchisor and 
vice versa. The column headings classify the studies in this dissertation by their research 
                                                     
15 Similar research approaches are used in the literature on strategy-structure fit. Van de Ven and Drazin 
(1985) as well as Venkatraman (1989) proposed that finding evidence of a covariation between strategy and 
structure types consistent with theoretical predictions implies a performance enhancing fit between both. 
Most empirical studies followed this empirical design by testing whether a particular strategy is related to a 
theoretically corresponding structure while abstracting from performance tests with respect to a criterion 
variable (see Schewe, 1998: pp. 195-196).  
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approach, i.e., cross-sectional vs. longitudinal. Cross-sectional and longitudinal methods 
provide fundamentally different insights which complement each other in our understand-
ing of the policies adopted by firms. A synopsis of the four studies’ research designs and 
results is provided in the following. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Integrative framework 
Chapter B-I. 
Consistent with the main proposition of this dissertation, chapter B-I. is based on the prem-
ise that franchisors can secure franchisees’ cooperation while leveraging the advantages of 
decentralized decisions by using the self-enforcement mechanism (e.g., Klein, 1995). This 
mechanism is one of the two most intensely studied private enforcement devices in fran-
chising (the second prominent mechanism, i.e., relational governance, is discussed in B-
II.). The self-enforcement mechanism operates by granting store-owners a compensation 
which exceeds what they could earn outside of the relationship (i.e., economic rents). The 
threat of relationship termination should then ensure behavior in line with the principal’s 
CHAPTER B-I. 
 
Enforcement mechanism: Self-enforcement 
? Economic rent 
? Monitoring 
? Threat of termination/non-renewal 
 
Main thesis: 
Ineffectiveness of self-enforcement (i.e., contract duration, 
renewal options) negatively affects the allocation of 
decision rights to franchisees. 
CHAPTER B-IV. 
 
Main thesis: 
Franchisors (and franchisees) learn about 
effective private enforcement and rights 
assignment over time. 
 CHAPTER B-III. 
 
Enforcement mechanism: Collective punishment 
? Franchisee councils 
? Reputation 
 
Main theses: 
? Franchisee councils are more likely being appointed, the 
more extensive is the franchisor’s control. 
? Monetary incentives provided to the franchisor 
negatively moderate this positive relationship. 
CHAPTER B-II. 
 
Enforcement mechanism: Relational governance 
? Harmonization of conflicts 
? Cooperation 
? Trust 
 
Main theses: 
? The higher is a franchisee’s autonomy, the more intense 
is relational governance. 
? Franchisee incentive characteristics (e.g., multi-unit 
ownership) moderate the positive relationship between 
franchisee autonomy and relational governance.
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PERSPECTIVE 
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economic interests since the premium stream would be lost by franchisees upon termina-
tion. In the German legal framework, however, mid-agreement termination of franchise 
contracts is constrained. Therefore, chains have to rely on the threat of non-renewal to pun-
ish opportunistic behavior by outlets. Depending on the duration of the contract, systems 
may then be affected differently by these constraints on mid-agreement termination (i.e., 
inter-chain level of analysis). That is, the longer the time to expiration, the less immediate 
are sanctions and the less effective is the self-enforcement mechanism. The main point of 
this chapter is that legal constraints on termination affect the vertical distribution of deci-
sion rights. Based on a sample of 159 German business-format franchisors, I found evi-
dence consistent with expectations that franchisors offering long-term contracts restrict 
franchisees’ rights more severely than chains issuing short-term contracts. Contractual re-
newal options, which impede the franchisor’s leeway not to renew a contract, had similar 
negative effects on delegation. Overall, the findings follow the logic that “if you cannot 
punish cheating, you need to reduce opportunities for cheating”. The analysis shows that 
though relational contracts seek solutions to trading hazards within the relationship, their 
effectiveness in securing cooperation is not independent of the law. 
 
Chapter B-II. 
In this chapter, then, instead of adopting an inter-chain level of analysis, I consider the dy-
adic relationships between a franchisor and each individual franchisee within the chain 
(i.e., intra-chain level of analysis). Again, in line with the main theme of this dissertation, 
chapter B-II. investigates how a franchisor can secure cooperation of individual franchisees 
when these are granted autonomy in decision-making as a means to leverage their specific 
knowledge. More precisely, I explore the role of relational exchange norms – or, more 
generally, of relational governance (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 2002) – as controls in light of 
downstream autonomy. Norms are patterns of actual behavior enforced through mecha-
nisms of reward and punishment within repeated interactions. I concentrate on three impor-
tant norms each reflecting the relational quality within any dyad: harmonization of conflict, 
cooperation, and trust. Since these norms are costly to set up, the franchisor’s demand for 
them should be intense only where franchisee autonomy is high, all else equal. The empiri-
cal results from a sample of 208 franchisor-franchisee relationships from 11 systems pro-
vided strong support for the presumption that chains accompany outlet decision-making 
independence by cultivating common expectations of behavior between the parties. More 
interestingly though, I also found that relational governance becomes more important to 
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accompany autonomy, the weaker a franchisee’s structural incentives are aligned with the 
franchisor. The moderating roles of five incentive characteristics which have previously 
been proposed to affect the divergence of interests in the dyad were considered: (1) multi-
unit ownership, (2) age of the franchisor-franchisee relationship, (3) geographic distance 
between the outlet and the company’s head office, (4) a franchisee’s past economic suc-
cess, and (5) the level of intra-chain competition perceived by the outlet-owner. The em-
pirical findings confirm the important role idiosyncratic channel members’ characteristics 
play in the appropriate design of control mechanisms. 
 
Chapter B-III. 
In the previous chapters, both the self-enforcement mechanism and relational governance – 
the most prominent private enforcement devices discussed in the literature – are analyzed 
as instruments serving the parent company to secure cooperation by outlets. But how do 
franchisees privately enforce the obligations of the franchisor given that the threat of pun-
ishment by a single agent is relatively inconsequential for the company? Acknowledging 
the fact that any network is characterized by top-down power asymmetries, I shall develop 
the argument that internal mechanisms to assure fair dealings by the franchisor need, if to 
be effective, coordinated and collective punishment by all franchisees within a chain. This 
coordination is achieved through institutions such as franchisee councils. These bodies thus 
enable outlet-owners to collectively sanction the franchise company and to trigger coopera-
tion in the first place. The private enforcement rationale stresses that traditional arguments 
pointing to franchisee councils as vehicles for monitoring are insufficient to explain how 
cooperative conduct of the chain is induced. The main reason is that the company’s obliga-
tions are usually not specified in the written agreement and are therefore non-verifiable and 
hence unenforceable by courts. Empirically, I expected the appointment of councils to be 
more likely, the more extensive the franchisor’s decision rights, hence his control over the 
operations of the chain, and therefore agents’ exposure to opportunistic behavior by the 
principal (i.e., inter-chain level of analysis). I also supposed the set-up of councils to be 
less probable when business-format providers have strong incentives not to abuse their 
discretion as conditioned by a high share in franchisees’ sales and a high proportion of 
outlets company-owned. Based on a sample of 131 German business-format franchisors, 
the empirical results in part supported the propositions. They show that monetary incen-
tives specified by the contract are not the only instruments amenable to enforce franchisor 
obligations but that institutional arrangements equally deserve attention. 
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Summing up the cross-sectional approaches of the first three chapters, self-enforcement, 
relational governance, and collective punishment constitute private enforcement mecha-
nisms which do not rely on third-parties such as courts (but may nevertheless be affected 
by the law as stressed in chapter B-I.). They are based on repeated interactions within a 
relationship and make use of the future value arising within the exchange to secure coop-
eration without loosing the advantages of decentralized decision rights. 
 
Chapter B-IV. 
In the chapters introduced above, I employ quantitative statistical techniques to test hy-
potheses about the interplay between the allocation of decision rights and private enforce-
ment on a cross-section of observations. Put differently, I observe common and thus effi-
cient practice as regards the mechanisms employed by firms at a single point in time to 
secure cooperative uses of decision rights. These cross-sectional approaches raise one im-
portant question: What do the processes leading up to the observation of efficient practice 
look like? Existing literature on franchise contracting assumes that people anticipate and 
address major hazards from the outset. Suboptimal arrangements are then not set up in the 
first place or, if accidentally so, quickly become selected out by market pressures. In chap-
ter B-IV., I challenge this view and provide longitudinal case study evidence on learning 
processes both as regards contractual rights assignment and private enforcement. The evo-
lution of formal contracts used by three chains from the restaurant, hotel, and retailing in-
dustry were explored. Additional data were drawn from interviews conducted with repre-
sentatives of each franchising company, thereby permitting insights on the motivations for 
specific contractual adjustments. The results show that major modifications were not trig-
gered in anticipation of changes in the magnitude of exchange risks (e.g., horizontal exter-
nalities) or the business-format. Consistent with evolutionary theories, the observed modi-
fications rather emanated as incremental responses to actual misbehavior in the day-to-day 
business. These findings suggest that common contracting practice corresponding to theo-
retical predictions may be observed not because inefficient firms are immediately driven 
out of the market, but because those who initially designed flawed policies adjust to more 
efficient solutions over time. As opposed to the previous chapters, I consider the evolution 
of private ordering and rights assignment separately because validity concerns about cause-
effect relationships are severe in case studies. 
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In the remainder of PART A (II.), I will review the relevant literature and motivate the 
fundamental issues of this dissertation in more depth. First (1.), prior literature on the allo-
cation of decision rights in franchising is summarized. This exercise shows that there are 
both major benefits yet also costs associated with different decision structures both for the 
franchisor and franchisees. Then (2.), I will derive the limitations of formal contracts and 
the promise of private enforcement to induce non-exploitative uses of decision rights. 
  
II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS  
1. Allocation of decision rights in franchising 
The assignment of rights requires cost-benefit analyses from the franchisor’s and franchi-
sees’ viewpoints, respectively. Below, I first discuss the franchisor’s perspective on the 
issues involved in allocating discretion to outlet-owners (1.1). Then, I adopt franchisees’ 
standpoint towards franchisor control over important elements of the system (1.2).  
1.1 Franchisor perspective 
1.1.1 Incentive effects of franchising vs. company ownership 
Franchising substitutes outlet-owners for hired employee-managers who generally receive 
a fixed salary with no or little claims on the store’s profits (see, for evidence in the U.S. 
fast food industry, Krueger, 1991: p. 78; see, also, Lutz, 1995: p. 108). Reaping the resid-
ual profits of their business (after payment of fees), franchisee-entrepreneurs have strong 
interests to constantly seek out, at times innovative, ways to match offer and demand. 
Comments from practitioners support the notion that employed managers have weaker 
incentives to put forth effort: “Corporate side store managers are less motivated, even 
though all corporate people have bonus programs” (statement by a senior franchise con-
sultant of a large U.S. pizza chain, cited in Yin and Zajac, 2004: p. 368). Responsiveness to 
local market conditions is particularly important for business-format chains. In these sys-
tems, stores are not simply distribution outlets; rather, the unit in its entirety is the product 
seeking fit with the environment (Bradach, 1997: p. 277). Therefore, franchisees respon-
sive to market pressures also enhance a network’s ability to adapt the whole business con-
cept to emerging threats and opportunities.  
Consistent with these theoretical arguments, Sorenson and Sørensen (2001) found em-
pirical support that the mean performance benefit of franchising (company ownership), in 
terms of total chain revenue, increased (decreased) with demand heterogeneity. This find-
ing suggests that franchisees engage to a relatively larger extent in the discovery of un-
tapped resources and technologies. In this sense, they act as Knightian (1921) entrepre-
neurs seeking new employment of existing resources based on personal, non-quantifiable 
judgment (see Foss and Klein, 2004: p. 8). Further, Pilling et al. (1995) applied a popula-
tion ecology perspective and uncovered the propensity of franchised versus non-franchised 
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units to react to changes in the environment. These authors reported that the franchise 
population was more responsive to external stimuli than their company-owned counter-
parts. Equally, Yin and Zajac’s (2004) study in the restaurant industry revealed that fran-
chised stores were more effective in pursuing complex strategies requiring local decision-
making than were corporate outlets. Evidence also suggests that franchisors engage in dis-
seminating the best practices that arise from specific stores such that responsive local units 
eventually benefit the whole network (Bradach, 1998: p. 129; Argote, 1999: chapter 5).  
1.1.2 The benefits from decentralized decision rights 
The evidence presented above substantiates the view that franchising bears tremendous 
advantages over hierarchical coordination in terms of local entrepreneurial effort (Minkler, 
1992).16 Since the provision of incentives alleviates the need for monitoring and control 
(Yin and Zajac, 2004: p. 368), benefits can be derived from allocating discretion over 
business decisions downstream to franchised-entrepreneurs (Bradach, 1998: p. 127).17 
Franchisees are not only motivated to put forth effort, but they also accumulate superior 
knowledge, relative to the franchisor, about their geographic area’s demand conditions and 
nearby competitors. To otherwise use that expertise, franchisees’ knowledge would have to 
be moved to the franchise company. This is, however, costly: First, “if we (…) agree that 
the economic problem (…) is mainly one of rapid adaptation”, quick reaction is important 
in taking advantage of “changes in the particular circumstances of time and place” (Hayek, 
1945: p. 524). Were knowledge (e.g., appropriate responses to local competitors’ actions) 
first to travel up the company’s hierarchy before being used, organizational failures due to 
information transmission leaks and time delays would be likely (see, generally, Colombo 
and Delmastro, 2004). This argument was stressed by a Pizza Hut franchisee: “Franchisees 
have a faster reaction time. With all the layers in the company, it takes a long time to get 
things done” (Bradach, 1998: p. 127).18 Second, outlet-owners’ local market intelligence 
                                                     
16 See Combs and Ketchen (2003) for a meta-analytic review of evidence on the relationship between the 
importance of dispersed managerial expertise and the incidence of franchising. 
17 The importance of appropriate incentives as a prerequisite to efficient decision-making was emphasized by 
Bradach (1998). The author explained that decentralized decision-making in company-owned stores was 
often not found in the chains he studied since “salaried company managers were not viewed as sufficiently 
motivated to make efficient local responses or for that matter to even attend to the external market environ-
ment” (p. 118).  
18 An illustrative example of slow corporate decision processes was reported from an interview with a fran-
chisor representative in Yin and Zajac (2004: p. 370): “There is a store manager, for instance, who says that 
we should buy the parking lot next door because we have a parking problem. Now by the time that decision 
goes through the area manager, goes through the director of operations, to asset development, to the regional 
VP, you know, two years have gone by. The parking lot could be gone. While in a franchise environment, he 
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(e.g., service depending on customer, time of day, product) cannot be easily transferred to 
the franchisor since it is generally of tacit and intangible nature, implying that it cannot be 
codified for transmission (Windsperger, 2003, 2004; generally, Nelson and Winter, 1982: 
p. 73). From case study research of five large restaurant chains, Bradach (1998: pp. 118-
119) highlighted the relevance of specific knowledge for efficient adaptation. The author 
pointed out that the centralized decision-making by headquarters observed for company 
units led to local responsiveness for these outlets which was relatively crude compared to 
the decentralized adaptation processes in franchised stores.19 In this vein, Shane (2005: p. 
3), in his guide to practitioners, recommends franchising for industries in which local mar-
ket knowledge and management discretion are important to performance.20  
Though adaptation to idiosyncratic demand is pivotal, the success of chain operations 
also rests heavily on standardization. Standardization is a prerequisite to consumer percep-
tions of uniform product offerings across outlets. Because of uniformity, customers know 
what to expect when making purchases with a chain, hence reducing search costs relative 
to standalone-stores. Therefore, franchisee decision rights need to be restricted to “tactical” 
(Bradach, 1998: p. 24) operational aspects. Elements indispensable for buyers to identify 
each store as belonging to the network, such as logos, trademarks, basic products, as well 
as quality levels, should be shared by all outlets (Kaufmann and Eroglu, 1999). Tactical 
decisions requiring dispersed specific knowledge, however, should be made at the store 
level and include areas such as hiring, hours of operations, local advertisement, inventory 
management, pricing, and selection of suppliers. Clearly, the benefits from delegating de-
cision rights increase at a decreasing rate with the number of system identifiers affected. 
The normative claim, here, is therefore not an allocation of decision rights to the extent 
found in standalone-stores where the owner is free, if not obliged, to decide on every as-
pect of his business.  
Besides the gains from leveraging specific knowledge, further arguments favor a decen-
tralization of tactical decisions. First, downstream decision-making on these elements con-
                                                                                                                                                                 
[the franchisee] is visiting his store on a regular basis. He is a decision-maker. He is much closer to his opera-
tions. He sees an opportunity, snap, he picks up the phone, and that might work well for his business.” 
19 But centralization of decisions concerning company outlets also brought about benefits, the author argued, 
which presumably compensated for the loss in local responsiveness. These gains were realized in terms of 
economies of scale and an accumulation of experience at headquarters. This suggests that company-owned 
stores and franchised units serve different and complementary functions within any franchise network (see, 
also, Ehrmann and Spranger, 2005). 
20 An example of foregone country-specific knowledge in marketing was recently provided by the fast food 
chain McDonald’s. Chinese state-owned media censored a McDonald’s television advertising spot after con-
sumers complained about its content. The spot showed a man on his knees begging for a price reduction. In 
Chinese culture, this expresses humiliation (Spiegel Online b, 06/23/2005).  
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serves precious time of chains’ management teams; time which is better allocated to tackle 
“strategic” (Bradach, 1998: p. 24) issues regarding the uniform business concept. Second, 
severely restricting franchisees’ operational realm negatively impacts their satisfaction 
within the relationship (Schul et al., 1985) and fosters intentions to leave the system (Dor-
mann and Ehrmann, 2005). Conversely, Dant and Gundlach (1999: p. 36) pointed out that 
increasing amounts of independence in decision-making are likely to produce higher levels 
of motivation (see, also, Maas, 1990; Bradach, 1998: p. 211; and Stanworth and Curran, 
1999: p. 335).21 Note that lacking effort at the outlet (i.e., shirking) is precisely the problem 
franchising seeks to solve in the first place.  
The discussion above provided rationales to understand why the success of the world’s 
most popular franchise chain, McDonald’s, is inexplicable, as Love (1986) remarked, 
without taking into account the entrepreneurship of independent business people. In Love’s 
words, the logic can be summarized as follows: “Without the freedom of franchisees (…) 
to exercise their entrepreneurial instincts, to test their own ideas on new products and pro-
cedures, and even to challenge the corporation head-on, McDonald’s might still have at-
tained its celebrated uniformity, but at a terrible price. It would lose the grass-roots creativ-
ity that diverse franchisees (…) provide. It would, in short, lose touch with the market-
place.” (p. 150). However, precisely this freedom to engage in the pursuit of dispersed en-
trepreneurial behavior also brings about costs which need to be contained. I now turn atten-
tion to the cost side. 
1.1.3 Inconsistent objectives and the costs from decentralized decision rights 
While organizing transactions based on the price system (i.e., by making use of residual 
claims) overcomes key shortcomings of hierarchies (i.e., shirking), it brings about costs 
from cheating (Hennart, 1993). In a franchising setting, cheating refers to the risk of fran-
chisees reducing the quality of their output. This behavior is potentially profitable for the 
common brand under which the stores of a chain operate allows each outlet to free-ride on 
investments in the trade name undertaken by peers. Those cheating on investments in the 
brand reduce their costs and thereby augment profits since they are unlikely to loose (short-
term) sales if other units follow through with obligations. The reason is that mobile cus-
tomers credit the goodwill they attach to the business-format to each store (see Klein and 
Saft, 1985: pp. 349-351). Brand value and the reputation of the chain will ultimately suffer 
given that none of the franchisee-entrepreneurs will want to undertake the necessary ex-
                                                     
21 See, on the notion of motivation crowding-out more generally, e.g., Osterloh et al. (2001). 
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penditures. Empirical evidence suggests that the horizontal externality related to a shared 
trademark combined with residual claims have a negative impact on system quality as ex-
perienced by customers (Michael, 2000a). These externalities apply to all investments that 
increase brand value, not only quality in a narrow sense of the term (e.g., cleanliness of 
franchisee’s premises). For instance, Michael (1999) reported that horizontal spillover ef-
fects in franchised chains lead to underinvestment in advertising, relative to networks 
owned by a single firm.22  
The horizontal externality problem related to a shared brand name in franchising was il-
lustrated by Blair and Kaserman (1994) with a simple model. Assume that there are n fran-
chisees operating under the trade name of a single franchisor. Franchisees control the qual-
ity of goods through decisions made at the outlet. The quality of products qi offered by 
each of the n outlets is described by the following vector: 
].,...,,[ 21 nqqqq =      (1) 
In case all franchisees choose an identical quality level, then qi = qj for all i and j. Due 
to the shared business concept, each store’s profits are presumed to depend on the quality 
levels offered in the entire network: 
.,...,2,1)( niqii =Π=Π     (2) 
The model posits that offering quality is costly for the franchisee delivering it. In addi-
tion, a unit’s sales increase at a decreasing rate with quality. There exists therefore a qual-
ity level qo which maximizes each franchised outlet’s profits: 
.0=∂
Π∂
= oj qqj
j
q
     (3) 
 The chain-wide externality problem is captured by the partial derivate of a franchisee’s 
profit function with respect to the quality levels offered by each of the other owners: 
.,0 jiwith
q j
i ≠>∂
Π∂       (4) 
That is, if any outlet j disappoints with respect to quality, consumers won’t be willing to 
patronize other units i at which they expect similar (low) quality levels and profits of these 
                                                     
22 For further evidence on free-riding in franchising, see Michael (2002). Note that underinvestment in mar-
keting efforts from the principal’s perspective must not only be a result of horizontal externalities. It may also 
follow from vertical externalities when the franchisor sells its products (or the entire business-format) with a 
mark-up over marginal costs to franchisees while these, in turn, also charge prices greater than marginal costs 
when selling to end customers. Franchisees, then, do not take into account the profit-margin of the company 
when choosing the supply of marketing or promotional services (see Klein 1995: p. 14; Tirole, 2000: pp. 
177-179). 
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stores decline. Now, the franchisor receives a fraction k of each outlet’s profits within the 
chain.23 The franchise company’s total profits from franchising then are: 
∑
=
Π=∏
n
i
i qk
1
)].([       (5) 
Optimization of the franchisor’s profits will show that his desired level of quality for 
each store lies above the quality level maximizing the profits of franchisees. Maximization 
requires the quality levels for each store j be set as to satisfy: 
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Equation (6) can be rewritten as: 
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Simplifying (7) yields the franchisor’s profit-maximizing level of quality qF: 
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Because ∂Πi/∂qj > 0 (see equation (4) above), ∂Πj/∂qj < 0. This implies that at the fran-
chisor’s profit-maximizing level of quality qF (as given per (8)), franchisees do not maxi-
mize their own profits. With the slope of franchisees’ profit function at point qF being 
negative, franchisees offer too much quality. This is because the relationship between qual-
ity and franchisee profits is inverse U-shaped, with profits initially increasing with quality, 
then reaching a maximum, and eventually declining at high levels of delivered quality. 
Hence, the profit-maximizing quality level for each outlet qo such that ∂Πj/∂qj = 0 (see (3)) 
lies below the level qF. 
Based upon these results of Blair and Kaserman’s model, I propose that the distribution 
of decision rights between the franchisor and franchisees determines the level of quality 
experienced by customers. In the first polar case, the parent company solely determines the 
quality of the products sold by the outlets. No decision rights will then be allocated to fran-
chisees. The franchisor, instead, issues very detailed operating procedures to make product 
descriptions, prescriptions as to which inputs to use, how many employees to hire, where 
and when to advertise, etc. Assuming that court-enforcement of these guidelines were cost-
                                                     
23 As mentioned before, royalty fees are usually based on franchisees’ sales, not profits. The model is based 
on profits, however, to simplify the exposition and notation. The qualitative implications do not differ if 
revenue-based fees are modeled.    
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less, the resulting quality level qF would maximize the franchisor’s profits. The second 
polar case describes a situation where the chain sets up no guidelines at all with franchisees 
deciding on every aspect of the business affecting quality. Then, we would observe a qual-
ity level qo maximizing franchisees’ profits. Formally, the continuum of realized qualities 
qR associated with different decision structures can be described by the following convex 
combination: 
       FoR qDRqDRq *)1(* −+=     (9) 
with the index for decision rights, DR, lying between 0 and 1 depending on whether de-
cision rights are completely allocated to the franchisor or fully residing with franchisees, 
respectively.24 Assuming that no private enforcement mechanisms are in place, greater 
assignment of authority to stores (DR = 0 ? DR = 1) leads to lower quality levels in the 
chain (qR = qF ? qR = qo). The cost side of decentralized discretion from the franchisor’s 
perspective is then determined by the difference qF - qR. These costs increase with decen-
tralization since, for instance, in selecting suppliers, franchisees may choose low-price and 
qualitatively inferior inputs than desired by the parent corporation (Shane, 2001: p. 141). 
Free-riding may also occur on labor quality by substituting qualified with little-skilled em-
ployees demanding lower wages (Michael, 2000a: p. 299 fn. 6). As a result, the reputation 
of the chain can even be affected by tactical decisions, such as hiring policies, which do 
not necessarily compromise the uniform business-format. As Hadfield (1990: p. 965 fn. 
160) explained: “It becomes essential to have (…) control over those activities delegated to 
the dealers as well. Without this, the dealers, by virtue of their independent status, are 
likely to exert their individual prerogatives to the detriment of the joint effort.” 
The problem of incentive incompatibility is, however, broader than the quality problem 
described above. For instance, since royalty fees are usually based on sales, the franchise 
company desires to maximize a store’s revenues whereas outlet-owners maximize profits. 
The vertical partners will then likely disagree about the appropriate price level for sales are 
generally maximized at lower prices than are profits (Phan et al., 1996; Lafontaine, 1999). 
Similarly, promptness of service may play a key role in generating revenue. Promptness of 
service, or the delivery speed of products, varies positively with inventory levels retained 
by the outlet. However, franchisees incurring costs for holding stock will likely choose, if 
entitled, inventory below the level which is optimal for the franchisor (Steiff, 2004: p. 36). 
The franchisor and franchisees may also disagree about the product mix of the business. 
                                                     
24 See, for different approaches to measure the degree of (de-)centralization, Beuermann (1992: pp. 2620-
2621) and Drumm (2004: pp. 182-183). 
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The principal may favor a low-margin yet high-volume product while franchisee-
entrepreneurs would prefer the reverse. Other examples of incentive incompatibility con-
cern the location of new outlets, underinvestment by often undiversified and therefore risk 
averse agents, and the adoption of new product innovations (Shane, 2005: pp. 53-61). 
Hence, granting franchisees authority over decisions potentially increases the costs result-
ing from goal conflicts (see, generally, Jensen and Meckling, 1992).  
1.1.4 Containing the downside of decentralized decision rights 
In review, assigning decision rights to franchisees is subject to a trade-off between the 
various gains, especially resulting from the use of specific knowledge, and the costs accru-
ing to the parent company from inconsistent objectives. Though the above section revealed 
that the cost side cannot be completely contained (i.e., there is empirical evidence for fran-
chisees cheating on quality), the fact that chains nevertheless rely on franchising implies 
that they find ways to extract net benefits. As a general rule, the more effectively chains 
safeguard against potential conflicts by achieving goal congruence between the dyadic 
partners, the higher is the value they can extract from decentralization (and franchised op-
erations more generally).25 Indeed, as the opening quotation to this introductory part sug-
gests, the most successful chains are precisely so as a result of realizing the benefits from 
entrepreneurship while effectively containing the downside. This dissertation seeks to shed 
light on the devices used by franchisors to achieve net gains from decentralized operations.  
In the prior portion, I argued that the allocation of decision rights to franchisees is asso-
ciated with a management challenge for the franchisor. I now discuss franchisees’ perspec-
tive on control exercised by the company.  
1.2 Franchisee perspective  
Franchisor control over important parts of the business concept, those he is more knowl-
edgeable about relative to franchisees, represents a risk for the latter in terms of exposure 
to opportunistic behavior. One instance of such behavior is when the company fails to pro-
vide the promised assistance to outlets in an effort to limit own costs. This incentive prob-
lem is alleviated by granting the franchisor a sufficiently large stake in the outlets’ success 
by choosing high royalty rates (e.g., Lafontaine, 1992; Sen, 1993). Yet, franchisor oppor-
                                                     
25 This reasoning mirrors the principle that the provision of incentives and the delegation of rights are com-
plements as each increases the value of the other (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: p. 17). 
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tunism comprises not only passive shirking on, often implicit, responsibilities.26 An active 
form of misbehavior relates to chains potentially seeking to redistribute rents from the out-
lets to the company once the contract is signed (i.e., hold-up). This reallocation of rents is 
possible since franchisees make investments which are to a large degree sunk and therefore 
specific to the system (see, generally, Klein et al., 1978).27 Knowing that outlet-owners 
will stay in business though not recovering their (sunk) fixed costs (but as long as the reve-
nue covers variable costs), the franchisor can, in principle, engage in hold-up by raising the 
prices of goods sold to stores, increasing fees, and placing new outlets in proximity of ex-
isting stores (see, for other ways to extract value from stores, Hadfield, 1990: pp. 967-969; 
Altmann, 1996: pp. 86-93). The expected costs from being held-up increase with company 
control over important aspects of the business. For instance, centralization of inputs im-
plies that franchisees are contractually restricted to purchase from third-party suppliers. 
They then cannot switch to alternative suppliers in case the franchisor raises prices (Shane, 
2001: p. 141). Ex post opportunistic appropriation of quasi-rents directly undermines the 
local entrepreneurs’ motivation for system adherence. As a result, Hadfield (1990: p. 952) 
remarked that “where franchisors seek to expand their control, franchisees seek to erect 
boundaries”.  
Past research showed that among individuals aspiring for self-employment, those highly 
valuing the benefits of a proven business concept choose the franchising option (Kauf-
mann, 1999). These benefits, however, directly result from franchisor control over a cen-
tralized system infrastructure enabling support of, and assistance to, outlets. This suggests 
that though extensive authority residing with the chain imposes an expected cost on stores 
in terms of specific investments being subject to hold-up, there are also major potential 
benefits involved. Hence, the more effectively franchisees shield against the risks associ-
ated with an unrestricted exercise of control, the higher is the net value resulting from 
franchising relative to operating an independent business. This dissertation analyzes means 
by which franchisees may realize this positive value from centralized control by enforcing 
proper conduct of the franchising firm. 
 
                                                     
26 The discussion of the franchisor’s costs from delegated decision rights was largely constrained to horizon-
tal externalities making free-riding on the brand name profitable. Cheating on investments in the chain’s 
reputation is generally considered a passive form of opportunism. Evidence suggests that opportunism by 
franchisees can also manifest more actively by extracting quasi-rents from the franchisor (see, for an example 
involving lease holds, Brickley and Dark, 1987: p. 407). However, since the parent corporation controls lar-
ger parts of the exchange relationship relative to franchisees, the problem of hold-up (Williamson, 1985), or 
post agreement jockeying (Goldberg, 1985), is more importantly seen to be emanating from the principal. 
27 See Bercovitz (2000: p. 20) for an estimate of the sunk portion of franchisees’ initial expenditures.   
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2. Enforcement mechanisms 
The review of the literature on rights assignment revealed that decisions to be made by 
either party necessitate safeguards by the other in order to balance the interests of the verti-
cal exchange partners. In franchising, two principal safeguards, or means of enforcement, 
can be distinguished (Klein, 1995: p. 17). The first is public in nature and relies on formal 
contracts regulated by the courts of law, as discussed in the next section (2.1). The second, 
reviewed in the subsequent section (2.2), is private and basically relies on the value of fu-
ture interactions within the relationship to secure cooperative conduct informally stipulated 
by relational contracts.  
2.1 (Incomplete) formal contracts  
The franchise contract and documents referenced therein such as operating manuals are 
formal institutions governing the relationship between the franchisor and the outlet-
owners. Generally, a formal written contract is characterized by the agreement of its sign-
ers to structure a business relationship as specified while relying on legal sanctions im-
posed by the courts to enforce obligations (Macaulay, 1963: p. 56; Macneil, 1974: p. 693). 
The structure of franchise relationships is, however, described only incompletely by the 
contract. Incompleteness means that it is not feasible to define in a legally enforceable 
document the parties’ desired behavior in all future circumstances (Klein, 1995: p. 17). The 
costs associated with accounting for all eventualities associated with uncertainties in the 
business environment (Hart and Moore, 1988: p. 755) as well as peoples’ fundamental in-
ability to foresee the future, i.e., bounded rationality (Williamson, 1985: pp. 45-46), pre-
clude state-contingent comprehensive contracting. More specifically, these factors imply 
that a mapping of actions to all future states of the world is infeasible. Against the back-
drop of this incompleteness, franchise contracts are considered to merely set a framework 
in which the relationship evolves over time by assigning basic roles and responsibilities 
(Martinek, 1987: p. 258).  
Yet, incompleteness is not only an unavoidable evil but a necessary condition to lever-
age the actors’ specific knowledge. A long-term contract regulating the exchange in every 
detail based on the limited information on future contingencies available at the initial con-
tracting date would constrain the parties’ flexibility in adjusting to the circumstances of 
time and place (Foss and Foss, 2002: p. 112). If behavior were explicitly prescribed by the 
chain, franchisees would have no incentives to respond to local market conditions and to 
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engage in explorative search. Their actions would be solely determined by the rewards 
linked to following the chain’s directives, thus minimizing against the penalties from 
breaching contractual duties (see, relatedly, Raith, 2004: p. 2). Conversely, if behavior is 
left unspecified, residual-claim franchisees will employ their specific knowledge to maxi-
mize against market pressures. Similarly, franchisor obligations vis-à-vis stores as to the 
future development of the system may also be specified in vague terms only to allow flexi-
bility in further developing the system depending on circumstances (Richter, 1991: p. 419). 
Hence, contractual incompleteness allows efficiently implementing bilateral adjustments to 
changing conditions without incurring costly renegotiations of detailed agreements (Klein, 
1985: p. 598).28 Each party can assume its responsibilities by making decisions quickly and 
efficaciously.  
Because a precise definition of desired behavior taking into account the actors’ specific 
knowledge is not feasible, an important function of franchise agreements is to allocate de-
cision rights in the chain to take advantage of the actors’ idiosyncratic skills. Decision 
rights are basically assigned to franchisees by not regulating certain issues specifically in 
the contract or the operating manuals (e.g., Arruñada et al., 2001: p. 264). As a result of 
such blanks, franchisees are empowered to deploy their productive resources in the man-
agement of the outlet as they see fit. That is, as owners of the stores’ assets, franchisees’ 
decision authority is unrestricted unless otherwise stated by the contract (Lutz, 1995: p. 
113; Jensen and Meckling, 1999: p. 82). Hence, in an effort to leverage the actors’ specific 
knowledge, the contract can be considered intentionally incomplete in the sense of not im-
posing complete constraints on behavior (Hadfield, 1990: p. 927; Foss and Foss, 2002: p. 
123). However, decision rights may also be assigned by specifying control in certain func-
tional areas, say local advertising, to one of the parties explicitly. In many contracts, these 
specified control rights especially accrue to the franchisor (see, for evidence, e.g., Arru-
ñada et al., 2001).  
Though contractual incompleteness bears advantages in terms of flexibility, it also cre-
ates risks for the continuity of the exchange relationship. More precisely, leaving blanks in 
the contract exposes the franchisor (franchisees) to franchisee (franchisor) opportunism 
since courts, obviously, cannot compare (mis-)behavior against unambiguously and explic-
                                                     
28 Another potential cost from complete contractual specification results from courts enforcing literal terms 
even in light of changed external conditions (see the General Motors-Fisher Body case for an illustrative 
example, e.g., Klein, 2000).   
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itly stated prescriptions in the case of conflict (Foss and Foss, 2002: pp. 112-113).29 Or, 
equivalently, it may then be difficult for the plaintiff to supply, at acceptable cost, verifi-
able evidence to courts that his business objectives were seriously harmed (see, on non-
verifiability, Tirole 2000: p. 38). Also, contractually specified incentives cannot fully as-
sure cooperative uses of decision leeway. In light of outlet heterogeneity, incentive clauses 
in contracts (restrictions on outside ownership, exclusive territories, etc.) would require 
customization to the particular circumstances of each franchisee (e.g., Bhattacharyya and 
Lafontaine, 1995) and high degrees of complexity (e.g., Bai and Tao, 2000). Both customi-
zation and complexity are, however, costly and difficult to achieve in practice (and thus not 
observed). In sum, contracts per se can set the necessary conditions for leveraging the ad-
vantages of decentralized, state-contingent decision-making but “typically provide the 
chain”, as well as franchisees, “with only limited authority and few practical sanctions” 
(Yin and Zajac, 2004: p. 369) to assure full cooperation. 
Besides public court-ordering of contracts, courts of arbitration may be used (Tietz, 
1991: pp. 611-613). Yet, since courts of arbitration function similarly to the courts of law 
in their emphasis on the principles of jurisdiction, arbitration is exposed to equal limita-
tions (see, for details, Lionett, 1987). Overt conflicts may also be dealt with by way of me-
diation through independent third-parties. But there, too, problems of non-verifiability of 
the complex transaction between franchise partners arise (Altmann, 1996: p. 75). In addi-
tion, conflict resolution mechanisms such as mediation imply that enforcement had been 
ineffective and that conflict has already grown into a serious issue. Ultimately, however, 
enforcement mechanisms need to assure that frictions do not arise in the first place. The 
promise of private ordering in achieving this aim in light of decentralized decision rights is 
discussed in the next section.  
2.2 Private enforcement mechanisms 
Private enforcement mechanisms are means to make unwritten agreements and informal 
expectations about a cooperative exercise of decision rights – in turn stipulated by rela-
tional contracts – binding. The literature on private enforcement holds that the relationship 
between the contracting parties may be worth enough to induce cooperation and to curb 
                                                     
29 As an alternative to enforcing literal terms, courts could complete incomplete contracts with judges inter-
preting the parties’ behavior and obligations (e.g., Schwartz, 1992). Among other problems, this strategy is, 
however, complicated by courts’ ignorance about the interactive nature of each specific franchise relationship 
such that “it is difficult to know whether one party’s refusal to adjust cooperatively in a particular case repre-
sents exploitative behavior, or a measured, retaliatory response to an earlier non-cooperative action by the 
other” (Scott, 1987: p. 96). 
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opportunistic behavior without resorting to the law (Hviid, 2000: p. 53). Each of the three 
specific forms of private ordering discussed in this dissertation (i.e., the self-enforcement 
mechanism, relational governance, and collective punishment) functions on these grounds. 
Cooperation arises endogenously if having the reputation to act in good faith, thereby 
avoiding punishment by the other, is sufficiently valuable. A cooperative outcome is 
achieved if, at any time, the expected discounted gains from violating (informally) agreed 
upon obligations are smaller than the expected discounted value from punishment. The 
Folk theorem for repeated games is useful to frame this reasoning more formally (e.g., 
Dutta, 1999: chapter 15). It states that with players being sufficiently patient (or, equiva-
lently, the probability of playing the game over a large number of periods being high), they 
can achieve a Pareto-improving outcome by cooperating compared to a non-cooperative 
Nash-strategy in a one-period game.30  
Similar to the functioning of the law (Shavell, 2003), future punishment upon non-
cooperation is what keeps opportunism in check.31 However, private enforcement devices 
overcome the problem of non-verifiability related to using the legal system for “no third 
party intervenes to determine whether a violation has taken place or to estimate the dam-
ages that result from such violation” (Telser, 1980: p. 27). Rather, the parties subjectively 
judge whether or not a violation of obligations has occurred. Judgment about the other’s 
uses of discretion can be based on either behavior or outcome (Eisenhardt, 1985). When-
ever specific knowledge is vertically dispersed between the franchisor and franchisees, 
punishment is likely to be based on outcomes. Evaluation of a franchisee (the franchisor) 
based on behavior is unlikely to be useful in these cases since the agent (the principal) has 
private information about how his actions contribute to the principal’s (the agent’s) objec-
tive (Arrow, 1985: p. 38). Yet, the franchisor can still decide whether the outcomes of 
agents’ behavior correspond to his interests; conversely, franchisees can judge the franchi-
                                                     
30 In franchising, the last period problem associated with finitely repeated games is attenuated when the fran-
chisee has the right to sell his franchise (see Klein, 1995: pp. 26-27; see, also, Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: p. 
266). The last period problem denotes the phenomenon that, within finitely repeated games, players do not 
have an incentive to perform in the last period because there is no future punishment to worry about. Since 
the players know that by the end of the game cooperative behavior will not be sustained, it cannot be trig-
gered in the middle and therefore in the initial stages of a game. If entitled to sell the store, however, franchi-
sees will have an incentive to cooperate even in the last period of interaction in order to be able to reap the 
discounted value of future outlet profits on the market.  
31 The most widely recognized form of punishment employed in relational contracts is termination of the 
relationship (see chapter B-II.). However, as will be seen explicitly in chapter B-III., other forms of punish-
ment can be devised by the exchange parties.  
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sor after observing the outcomes of headquarters’ actions (see, generally, Raith, 2004).32 
This suggests that using private enforcement mechanisms, the downside from allocating 
authority in an effort to leverage specific knowledge can be contained. For instance, fran-
chisors may choose quality as a relevant proxy for the outcome of franchisees’ behavior. 
The fact that it is difficult to find proxies for quality which are verifiable for courts (Mi-
chael, 2000a: p. 316) does not preclude the franchisor to know whether performance con-
formed to his economic objectives (Klein, 1995: p. 17).33 Even if courts could verify the 
outcome of agents’ actions, private ordering may still offer important efficiency advan-
tages over legal enforcement for it avoids the noise associated with contract interpretation 
by judges as well as the time lag involved in public sanctioning (Scott, 2003: p. 1652). In 
addition, private ordering economizes on the costs of formally specifying constraints on 
agents’ actions. The higher agents’ specific knowledge, the more difficult it becomes for 
the chain to ex ante draw the line between appropriate and disallowed behavior (see, gen-
erally, Jensen and Meckling, 1999: p. 83). As a result, franchisees may adapt too exten-
sively to local markets in the absence of relational steering mechanisms.  
Recent evidence from experimental economics makes a further case for the positive 
value of relational contracts. This strand of the literature shows that cooperative outcomes 
may be sustained even in situations where the theory of repeated games between selfish 
and opportunistic agents would predict non-cooperative behavior. Basically, experimental 
economics has provided robust results which directly contradict rational choice theory’s 
assumption of individuals being solely motivated by their material self-interest. A substan-
tial fraction of the population rather seems to be determined by social preferences such as 
reciprocity and fairness. These people attribute, at least in experimental settings, a value to 
matching the behavior of others independently of the material implications for themselves 
(see, for a review of this literature, Kirst and Ehrmann, 2005). Not surprisingly, coopera-
tive behavior among non-selfish strangers can then arise even if interacting only once. The 
theory of repeated games would predict non-cooperative action in such a situation. Given 
that the fraction of reciprocal agents is fairly high (between 40% and 60%) in any popula-
tion (Fehr and Gächter, 1998), the payoff function of self-interested individuals can also be 
                                                     
32 This result is well known from studies testing the impact of task programmability on the choice of com-
pensation strategies within firms (Eisenhardt, 1985; Stroh et al., 1996; Foss and Laursen, 2005). A program-
mable task is clearly defined and requisite behaviors can easily be monitored. Behavior related to tasks which 
are more complex cannot be evaluated at low cost and therefore necessitate outcome-based compensation 
(which comes at the cost of shifting risk to agents).  
33 See Baker et al. (2002) on this two-part assumption of non-observable action but observable, though not 
verifiable, outcomes in relational contracting.    
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modified in a way such that cooperative behavior, for instance in franchising (Ehrmann, 
2002), becomes more likely. Drafting legally binding obligations, by contrast, may crowd 
out the self-enforcing properties of the franchise relationship (see, generally, Fehr and 
Gächter, 2002).  
Yet, private enforcement mechanisms are not perfect either. For instance, using the self-
enforcement mechanism, the franchisor pays a premium stream to franchisees in order to 
induce cooperation. The future amount which can credibly be promised in exchange for 
current performance is limited however (Klein, 2002: p. 59). This amount is, along with 
the gains from deviation, moreover subject to changes in technology and market conditions 
(Klein, 1996). Imperfect private enforcement is evidenced by the observation that theoreti-
cally derived predictions about insufficient quality provision through franchisees translate 
into empirical facts (Michael, 2000a), franchisors engage in hold-up (Hadfield, 1990), and 
litigations between the vertical partners occur in practice (Michael, 2000b). Therefore, 
rather than claiming private enforcement mechanisms to perfectly align the incentives of 
the vertical partners, I follow Schanze (1987: p. 468) and argue that they only do so “by 
tendency”. It is also noteworthy that private ordering is not necessarily independent of the 
written agreement. Formal contracts often build a basis on which private enforcement op-
erates. Particular court-enforced terms can be used to sustain private ordering by both lim-
iting the gains from opportunistic behavior and increasing the gains from cooperation (see, 
for details, Klein, 1995; Lafontaine and Raynaud, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002).  
 
To sum it up, franchising offers important advantages over company ownership of out-
lets in terms of responsiveness to local markets. In order to leverage the specific knowl-
edge of residual claim franchisees, decision authority needs to be delegated. The delegation 
of decision rights, however, also increases the franchisor’s costs from agent misbehavior. 
While formal contracts can set the necessary conditions to leverage dispersed decision ca-
pabilities, they may not simultaneously provide for effective safeguards. Private enforce-
ment mechanisms can fill this gap and contain the downside from assigning decision lee-
way to stores. Evidence suggests that successful chains (e.g., McDonald’s) effectively con-
trol behavior while allowing for flexibility in decision-making. Similarly, franchisees can 
use these private mechanisms to take advantage of centralized franchisor assistance and 
brand development while containing the costs from opportunism emanating from the prin-
cipal. The analyses in the following chapters will focus on this interplay between rights 
assignment and private enforcement mechanisms in franchising firms. 
  
PART B 
I. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTRACTUAL SELF-ENFORCEMENT AND 
THE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF FRANCHISING FIRMS 
1. Introduction 
Transaction costs economics provides a received framework for understanding contractual 
choices in inter-organizational relationships (e.g., Saussier, 2000). One such choice is the 
duration of contracts. It specifies the time period over which renegotiation is excluded, 
thereby protecting relationship-specific investments from flagrant opportunistic expropria-
tion. In order to minimize transaction costs, increasing levels of asset specificity require 
agreements of longer durations (Joskow, 1987). Empirically, the validity of this general 
proposition is well-documented for the franchising context (Bercovitz, 2000; Brickley et 
al., 2003). For attracting buyers in a competitive market for franchises, franchisors must 
necessarily offer a contract which provides a time horizon sufficiently long to allow for 
amortization of initial investments. But whereas long-term contracts protect franchisees 
from hold-up and allow for cost-recovery, the franchisor’s subsequent ability to impede 
misbehavior by stores might be negatively affected. Specifically, the effectiveness of the so 
called self-enforcement mechanism may suffer. This incentive mechanism operates – in-
side a range of market conditions (Klein, 1996) – by granting franchisees a compensation 
which exceeds what they could earn with their productive inputs outside of the relationship 
(i.e., economic rents). The threat of ending the collaboration should then ensure behavior 
in line with the parent corporation’s business objectives since the premium stream would 
be lost upon termination (e.g., Klein, 1980; Klein and Leffler, 1981).  
Long-term agreements undermine the self-enforcement nature of the contract precisely 
where termination is legally constrained (Lafontaine and Raynaud, 2002: p. 21). This is the 
case in Germany, the institutional context of this study, where termination is subject to 
good cause requirements. Given that termination is difficult, threatening rents by immedi-
ately ending the relationship upon detection of non-performance is not credible. As non-
renewal of franchise contracts is less severely constrained by German law (Stein-Wigger, 
1999), deviant behavior is more easily sanctioned through non-renewal upon expiration of 
the initial term. Clearly, then, the longer the time horizon to expiration (i.e., contract dura-
tion), the less immediate are sanctions and the less effective is the self-enforcement incen-
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tive mechanism. Contractually specified renewal options equally harm its functioning since 
they raise the difficulty to non-renew agreements at expiration. 
In this chapter, I argue that franchisors deal with long-term contracts and renewal op-
tions by choosing a governance structure which limits their exposure to franchisee misbe-
havior. Put more simply, it is claimed that firms which cannot punish cheating reduce the 
scope for cheating. One important governance means to reduce malfeasance is the restric-
tion of franchisees’ decision rights (e.g., Arruñada et al., 2001). Decentralization of these 
rights in chains with long-term agreements and those providing a renewal option is thus 
expected to be lower as compared to those offering short-term contracts and those provid-
ing no renewal option. This claim, which is tested empirically, is based on the assumption 
that the effectiveness of incentive devices and the incidence of decentralization are com-
plementary (e.g., Nagar, 2002). A franchisor’s marginal benefits from delegating rights 
increase in the extent to which downstream moral hazard can be controlled, and vice versa.  
A second core element of the governance structure potentially affected by the duration 
of contracts and the presence of renewal options is the mix of franchised and company-
owned outlets in any one chain.34 I advance that, and test whether, long-term contracts and 
those including a renewal option render enforcement of proper behavior among franchised 
stores more costly such that the cost disadvantage of employee versus franchised opera-
tions declines and the company chooses to own more of the chain’s units on average. 
Moreover, by vertically integrating a larger fraction of the network’s stores, headquarters 
can more effectively exert indirect managerial control over the remaining franchisees (e.g., 
Michael, 2000b). Strong empirical support was found for part of the hypotheses. The data 
were more supportive of the hypothesized influence of contract duration and renewal op-
tions on the degree of (de-)centralization than on the incidence of vertical integration.   
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section (2.), related literature is briefly 
reviewed. The subsequent section (3.) describes the self-enforcement mechanism, legal 
constraints on its use, and implications for the governance structure of franchising firms. 
                                                     
34 The findings of an extensive literature suggest that dual distribution – a mix of company-owned and fran-
chised outlets within the same chain – serves specific governance functions. Empirical support for the rele-
vance of dual distribution to franchisors was provided by longitudinal studies which reported a stable propor-
tion of company-owned outlets significantly above zero and below 100 percent, differing across sectors and 
individual firms within a same sector (Lafontaine and Shaw, 2001). The example of the fast-food chain 
McDonald’s further illustrates the importance of finding an appropriate ownership mix (see Kaufmann and 
Lafontaine, 1994: p. 447): McDonald’s set a sealing of 25 percent company ownership after experiencing 
declining efficiency with a rise of this rate to 33 percent between 1967 and 1976. The proportion of stores 
company-owned thus seems to be a “decision variable” (Scott, 1995) and does not result as a passive out-
come of outlet heterogeneity as suggested by agency models (e.g., Brickley and Dark, 1987; Norton, 1988). 
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Then (4.), the sample on which the hypotheses are tested, the variables and methods em-
ployed, as well as the results obtained are presented. Section (5.) discusses the findings of 
the study and derives implications. The last section (6.) concludes and provides sugges-
tions for further enquiry. 
2. Related literature 
This study joins two streams of literature on franchising. The first of these analyzes the 
allocation of contractual rights. The second deals with antecedents of the simultaneous 
operation of franchised and company-owned outlets within one chain. The central tenant of 
these literatures is that the governance structure serves to mitigate exchange hazards result-
ing from a shared brand. Where the risk of free-riding is high as a result of a valuable trade 
name, more rights are assigned to the principal (Arruñada et al., 2001). Equally, evidence 
shows that the extent of vertical integration (i.e., the proportion of total outlets owned by 
the franchise company) in any one chain is positively determined by brand value, suggest-
ing that managerial control is leveraged by company ownership (e.g., Lafontaine and 
Shaw, 2001; Pénard et al., 2003). Conceiving of the governance structure as a safeguard 
against exchange risks also implies that the equilibrium proportion of outlets company-
owned and the degree of centralization should be higher, the more difficult it becomes to 
align franchisees’ interests with the firm. In this vein, Brickley et al. (1991) reported that 
the fraction of company stores maintained by the chains in their sample was affected by 
legal provisions surrounding termination of franchise contracts. The authors found that in 
U.S. states restricting termination, franchising was less common within any network in 
nonrepeat customer industries (i.e., where the risk of free-riding is high). Their study sug-
gests that constraints on ending the relationship affect chains to different degrees depend-
ing on the jurisdiction they confront. The present study complements Brickley et al.’s ap-
proach. By contrast, however, this chapter investigates how restrictions on termination and 
non-renewal affect systems operating within the same legal environment to various de-
grees, depending on contract duration and the existence of renewal options. By focusing on 
the German as opposed to the well-studied U.S. context, this study responds to a recently 
pronounced call that “still, much more work needs to be done if we are to truly understand 
how and why franchising works in various jurisdictions” (Blair and Lafontaine, 2005: p. 
297).  
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3. Theoretical foundations and hypotheses 
3.1 The self-enforcement mechanism 
In light of an incomplete formal specification of desired performance, firms cannot exclu-
sively rely on court-enforcement to ensure proper franchisee behavior (see A-II.). Instead, 
they rely on an informal contract which creates a self-enforcement mechanism. This 
mechanism requires (a) the provision of an ongoing rent to franchisees, (b) active monitor-
ing of their actions, and (c) the threat of termination upon detection of misbehavior (see, 
for the following arguments, Klein, 1995). The company must subjectively decide whether 
observed performance conformed to the desired level. In order for the agreement to be self-
enforcing, franchisees’ discounted extra gains from cheating (before being terminated 
and/or non-renewed) must be smaller at every point in time than the discounted rent stream 
that accrues from compliance in the long run. Since a formal contract can never fully de-
fine desired behavior and because monitoring is costly, gains from cheating are always 
greater than zero and so must be the rent to satisfy the above incentive constraint. The par-
ent corporation can credibly promise payment of the rent only if it is smaller than the cost 
disadvantage of using employee-managers instead of franchisees to run an outlet at a par-
ticular location. This cost disadvantage comes about for employee-managers have less an 
incentive to put forth effort (see A-II.). 
Direct empirical evidence indicates that franchising firms indeed leave economic rents 
downstream. Kaufmann and Lafontaine (1994) found substantial premiums for McDon-
ald’s franchisees both expected prior to signing the contract and once stores are opera-
tional.35 Michael and Moore (1995) calculated positive rents for members of a number of 
other channels.36 Although Dnes (1996: p. 321) called for caution in generalizing results 
from single-firm case studies, indirect evidence hints to rent streams in the larger popula-
tion of franchise chains. For instance, Mathewson and Winter (1985: p. 511) interpreted 
the existence of queues for the purchase of a franchise in many chains as evidence that 
rents are expected by applicants. Moreover, Lafontaine (1992: p. 276) found no statisti-
cally significant negative correlation between upfront fees and royalty rates in a cross-
                                                     
35 The authors estimated an ex ante expected value of rents over a 20-year contract period, i.e., after taxes and 
payment of fees and investments, ranging from $300.000 to $455.000 (in 1982 dollars). Ex post, these 
amounts additionally include the upfront fees and initial investments.    
36 They investigated franchisee earnings in 70 systems from four different sectors (i.e., auto services, busi-
ness services, restaurants, and retailing). They found both ex post and ex ante rents for the average franchisee 
in 49 of these systems. The average capital value of rents before taxes and after payment of fees (ex ante) 
amounted to $111.000-$160.000 over the contracting period.  
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section of systems. If franchisees’ participation constraints were binding, the fee would 
extract all future premiums given the royalty rate. For any level of sales, the higher the 
franchise fee, the lower must be the royalty rate in order to exactly meet franchisees’ reser-
vation profits. Were franchisors fully extracting downstream rents, a significant negative 
relationship would be observed. Finally, the results of Brickley et al. (1991), who found 
that franchising was less common in U.S. states restricting the termination of contracts 
compared to other states, can be interpreted as evidence for firms relying on a combination 
of rents and the threat of termination as a motivation device.37  
3.2 Legal constraints on self-enforcement: The case of Germany 
3.2.1 Termination vs. non-renewal: Implications for the role of contract duration  
The effectiveness of the self-enforcement mechanism in assuring franchisee performance 
rests on the franchisor’s ability to terminate store-owners upon detection of opportunistic 
behavior. Termination should optimally be at will, “that is, whenever the franchisor inde-
pendently judges that a franchisee has failed to comply with quality standards” (Hadfield, 
1990: p. 953 fn. 98). The reason is that termination subject to court litigation is costly and 
uncertain in outcome, hence reducing the credibility of the threat. 
The German legal framework relevant for the enforcement of franchise contracts im-
poses severe constraints on the use of the termination-at-will sanction (see, for a detailed 
analysis, Stein-Wigger, 1999). Specifically, reasons for terminating (but not for non-
renewing) an agreement must meet the good cause criterion (wichtiger Grund)38 compara-
ble to the provisions specified by the Franchise Relationship Laws in several U.S. states. A 
good cause requires that the continuation of the dyadic relationship until the expiration of 
the contract cannot be reasonably expected from the franchising firm.39 The ex ante long-
                                                     
37 If franchisors were not relying on termination to induce performance, the proportion company-owned 
would be unaffected by the ease of termination. 
38 §89a par. 1 HGB [Commercial Code] applies by analogical reasoning to franchise contracts (Stein-Wigger, 
1999: p. 149). Analogical reasoning is necessary since statutory law has not so far developed any specific 
answers to legal questions raised by franchising. Similar to some statutes in U.S. state level franchise laws, 
termination must be preceded by the franchisor giving a notice of default to the franchisee and providing an 
opportunity to cure the defect.  
39 The paraphrasing of a good cause according to German law differs from the Franchise Relationship Laws. 
According to the latter, a good cause implies a material breach of contractual duties. In practice, however, the 
catalogue of good causes in each of the legal frameworks is similar (non-allowed use of the brand, deviation 
from standards and operating procedures, etc.). Also, court decisions concerning the suitability of franchisor 
termination of franchisees have been based on resembling arguments across the two legal systems. See, for 
instance, the reasoning of the German Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice] concerning the McDon-
ald’s Decision (BGH NJW, 1985: p. 1894) and the decision of a U.S. court in the case Amerada Hess vs. 
Quinn. In both cases, the courts emphasized that the substantiality of franchisee non-compliance must be 
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term character of franchising collaborations also implies a strong mutual fiduciary duty 
(Treuepflicht) in German law (Martinek, 1992: p. 135). This fiduciary duty increases the 
requirements for a good cause. The importance of the fiduciary duty, in turn, increases 
with contract duration and decreases with the degree to which franchisee investments have 
been amortized (Stein-Wigger, 1999: p. 151). These legal provisions surrounding the good 
cause criterion deflate the franchisor’s ability to terminate a contract upon misbehavior. As 
Müller-Graff (1988: p. 127) remarked: “German courts (…) regularly reject the idea of an 
implied unilateral right to terminate a long-term contract at any time except in totally intol-
erable situations.”40 
In light of these constraints on the termination-at-will sanction, the threat of contract 
non-renewal serves as a substitute to mid-agreement termination in effecting the self-
enforcement mechanism. Although several legal provisions also constrain non-renewal41, 
these are much less severe – especially for fixed-term contracts (see below) – than the re-
strictions on termination outlined above. In consequence, then, short-term contracts are 
favored in terms of their self-enforcing properties since punishment through non-renewal is 
more immediate than for long-term agreements. 
3.2.2 Renewal options: Fixed-term vs. permanent contracts 
Franchise agreements containing a renewal option are, by law, classified as permanent con-
tracts whereas in the absence of such a clause they are referred to as fixed-term contracts. 
Fixed-term contracts automatically expire at the end of the initial term. A notice of cancel-
lation of either party is not required. Permanent agreements specify an initial term during 
which termination (without good cause) is excluded. Thereafter, a renewal option provides 
that the contract is renewed with identical conditions, or those the franchise company is 
using for new franchisees, for another specific term if none of the parties resigns prior to 
expiration. Contract non-renewal is therefore subject to a notice of cancellation. 
The consequences of contracts being qualified as fixed-term versus permanent are im-
portant with respect to the franchisor’s leeway not to renew an agreement.42 In case of 
                                                                                                                                                                 
gauged in light of the effect upon the franchisor’s ability to realize his business objectives (Stein-Wigger, 
1999: p. 286).    
40 Bradach’s (1997: p. 289) citation of one executive of a large U.S. restaurant chain illustrates this point 
from a practitioner’s point of view: “You need a dead rat in the kitchen, and preferably three or four, if you 
want a chance of winning [a court case against a franchisee].” 
41 Provisions by the civil- (§242, §307 BGB [Civil Law Code]) and antitrust laws (§26 par. 2 GWB [Act 
against Restraints of Competition]) dealing with the protection of franchisees’ investments apply to non-
renewal.     
42 Legal provisions with respect to termination equally apply to either type of contract.   
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fixed-term contracts, freedom to contract applies after the initial term. Franchisees have no 
legal guarantee on renewal or severance in the event of non-renewal. In case of permanent 
contracts, however, the good faith obligation43 (Gebot von Treu und Glauben) applies. This 
obligation severely constrains the franchisor’s leeway not to renew the contract (Stein-
Wigger, 1999: p. 253). Franchisees’ chances for renewal are therefore higher in the pres-
ence of a renewal option. Equivalently, punishing delinquent outlet-owners through non-
renewal is more difficult in the presence of a renewal option. As a result, contracts contain-
ing no option are favored in terms of their self-enforcing properties. 
3.3 Implications for the governance structure of franchising firms 
3.3.1 The costs of long-term contracts and renewal options 
How do the legal constraints on (mid-agreement) termination-at-will affect the costs of 
relying on the self-enforcement mechanism for contracts of different durations? As out-
lined further above, cooperation is achieved when the present value of the short-term gains 
from cheating is offset by the present value of the premium stream at every time over the 
life of the relationship. Given that termination is heavily regulated (or, equivalently, docu-
mentation of good cause to courts is expensive), long-term contracts extend the period over 
which store-owners can achieve returns from misbehavior. In order to fulfill the incentive 
constraint, the premium has to adjust upwards as well, relative to a short-term contract. In 
addition, even if a good cause can be proved to courts, franchising firms might be required 
to compensate franchisees more upon early termination of long-term compared to short-
term contracts. Severance payments render self-enforcement more costly since the incen-
tive compatible rent then also has to contain this amount in addition to the extra gains from 
moral hazard. In summary, the self-enforcement mechanism becomes more costly, the 
longer is the duration of agreements.   
By the same token, since renewal options make non-renewal more difficult compared to 
a contract which has to be renegotiated after the initial term, franchisees can realize extra 
profits over a longer period of time before being punished. In order to achieve incentive 
compatibility, i.e., such that the gains from deviation are more than offset by the rent, the 
                                                     
43 As specified by §242 BGB [Civil Law Code]. The distinction between the good cause criterion and the 
good faith obligation is in contrast to the Franchise Relationship Laws where a good cause standard applies 
to both termination and non-renewal. Franchisees are only protected by the good faith obligation stipulated 
by the Uniform Commercial Act (§1-203) if the contract contains no provisions concerning termination rights 
by the franchisor.     
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premium has to increase as well, relative to a fixed-term contract. Hence, reliance on the 
self-enforcement mechanism becomes more costly in the presence of a renewal option. 
The following implications for the governance structure of franchising firms emerge. 
3.3.2 Allocation of decision rights 
One means by which franchising firms can account for the costs associated with long-term 
contracts and renewal options is via restriction of franchisees’ decision rights. Figure 2 
illustrates that the effectiveness in solving incentive problems using self-enforcement in-
fluences the optimal degree of decentralization. The trade-off associated with allocating 
rights is framed in terms of agency and information costs (see Jensen and Meckling, 1992). 
Store-owners generally have specific knowledge about their local markets allowing them 
to make more profitable operating decisions than the franchisor. Thus, centralizing deci-
sion rights, despite that franchisees have better knowledge, creates information costs. 
These costs are referred to as the sum of the franchisor’s costs of acquiring information 
from the stores plus the costs of poor decisions given that it would be prohibitively expen-
sive (and time-consuming) to obtain all the relevant knowledge (see, for the benefits of 
decentralization or, equivalently, the costs from centralization, A-II.). Information costs 
therefore fall with the degree of decentralization. Agency costs are here defined as the 
costs of making the self-enforcement mechanism work; that is, the monitoring costs plus 
the payment of the incentive compatible rent at least equaling franchisees’ short-term gains 
from cheating. These costs rise with decentralization (for a given level of contract duration 
and in the absence of a renewal option, SE1) since franchisees have increasingly room to 
pursue their economic interests at the expense of the whole chain (see A-II.). Conversely, 
the franchisor’s costs from franchisee cheating can be contained by limiting outlets’ deci-
sion rights through contractual clauses.44 Specific clauses include input purchase require-
ments, minimum advertising levels, as well as education and training standards. Moreover, 
contracts may reference detailed norms and policies in the operating manual. Explicit pro-
visions limit the scope of downstream misbehavior as non-compliance with these stipula-
tions is easily verified by the courts (Lafontaine and Raynaud, 2002: p. 23).  
The franchisor will choose a degree of decentralization, D1, at which the marginal in-
formation costs equal the marginal agency costs, SE1. Now, a decrease in the effectiveness 
of the self-enforcement mechanism (i.e., longer contract duration and the existence of a 
                                                     
44 As legally independent businesses and owners of the assets employed for production at the outlet, franchi-
sees’ decision rights are unconstrained unless otherwise specified by the contract. Rights which are not ex-
plicitly restricted by the contract represent residual rights which make up franchisees’ decision space.  
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renewal option) shifts the agency cost curve upwards (SE2) for every given level of decen-
tralization.45 This is because franchisees’ gains from cheating and hence the incentive 
compatible rent surge, as discussed in the prior section. 
 
Costs
D1
C2
D2
C1
Total organization costs SE1
Total organization costs SE2
Information costs
Agency costs SE1
Agency costs SE2 
Degree of decentralization
0 1
   
Figure 2. Costs of organization as agency and information costs 
It is assumed that the information cost curve is independent of contract duration and re-
newal options as the characteristics of knowledge are exogenous to the effectiveness in 
solving the incentive problem. The figure shows that the minimum total organization costs 
for the ineffective (i.e., long-term, renewable) contract are reached at a lower level of de-
centralization, D2, than for the high-incentive contract (i.e., short-term, non-renewable), 
D1.46 In sum, franchisors are expected to attenuate the costs from long-term contracts and 
renewal options by restricting franchisees’ decision rights. The testable hypotheses from 
this analysis are:  
                                                     
45 Agency costs for the case of complete centralization remain identical. In case of complete centralization, 
franchisees have no rights assigned and hence no potential for making decisions which are inconsistent with 
the interests of the franchisor. It should be noted, however, that complete centralization is difficult to achieve 
given that contracts are incomplete. Some residual decision leeway and hence potential for misbehavior will 
then remain.   
46 Note that the total organization costs are higher for long-term contracts and those providing a renewal 
option, C2, than for short-term contracts and those providing no renewal option, C1. The implications from 
this observation are discussed further below.  
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H1: Contract duration is positively associated with centralization of 
decision rights. 
 
H2: The provision of a renewal option is positively associated with 
centralization of decision rights. 
3.3.3 Vertical integration 
Another means by which long-term contracts and renewal options can be factored back 
into the governance structure is by vertical integration. Franchisors will vertically integrate 
any particular unit when the gains from employee-management are higher than the gains 
from franchising, net of the payment of the incentive compatible rent to the independent 
entrepreneurs (Klein, 1995: p. 31). As asserted above, the incentive compatible rent in-
creases with franchisees’ expected extra-profits from cheating. These, in turn, vary posi-
tively with contract duration and the existence of a renewal option. Hence, franchising be-
comes more costly relative to company ownership with an increase in contract duration 
and in the presence of a renewal option, all else equal. Franchising firms should then own 
more of the network’s units in consequence. In sum, any unit for which the payment of 
rents is too costly will be vertically integrated, and incentive compatibility should hold for 
the remaining franchisees within the chain. Termination and non-renewal should then not 
occur. 
In practice, however, termination and non-renewal of franchisees occurs.47 A high pro-
portion of company-owned units may then additionally serve to better control operations at 
the remaining franchised units indirectly. The argument suggests a synergetic effect of 
owning and franchising units in parallel. By running own stores, franchisors gain informa-
tion about demand levels, costs of quality, and customer preferences. Data from company-
owned units also allow benchmarking of franchisees’ performance and thereby reduce 
agency risks due to hidden information. Bradach (1997: p. 290) remarked that it is easier 
for franchisors to take a franchisee to court for poor performance when favorable perform-
ance comparisons with company outlets are possible. Outlet-owners are likely to anticipate 
these costs from court-enforcement. In this vein, Michael (2000b) found empirical support 
that the reliance on company ownership increased franchisor bargaining power vis-à-vis 
                                                     
47 For instance, Dnes (1993: p. 373) reported that the franchisors he studied had terminated approximately 
half a percent of their franchisees over a ten-year period. Non-renewal seems to be a relatively more frequent 
phenomenon. The U.S. Department of Commerce reported a nine percent non-renewal rate for franchise 
agreements in the U.S. (cited in Dnes, 1993: p. 373 fn. 16). See also Beales and Muris (1995) for further 
evidence. 
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franchisees, thereby deterring quality degradation eventually reducing the need for litiga-
tion and termination. 
The arguments above interpreted company ownership as a device to curb franchisee op-
portunistic behavior, either directly or indirectly. Company ownership can also be framed 
in a two-sided moral hazard model in which the incentive constraints of franchisors are 
considered. Scott (1995) as well as Windsperger and Yurdakul (2004) argued that com-
pany-owned outlets may compensate for the diluted residual income rights brought about 
by the share contract. This suggests that in order to induce effort of the parent corporation 
where this is important for the chain as a whole, company ownership should increase. In a 
recent paper, Brickley (2002) studied the impact of U.S. franchise termination laws on the 
fee structure of franchise systems. He found that the royalty rate was higher in U.S. termi-
nation states requiring good cause for termination compared to non-termination states for 
franchisor effort would be more important in the former. Specifically, he argued that “fran-
chisors must keep better records to justify franchise terminations, expend resources in liti-
gation, and exert additional effort working with poorly performing franchisees to correct 
performance deficiencies” (p. 513). The importance of franchisor effort may also increase 
with contract duration and the presence of a renewal option. That is, long-term contracts 
are more difficult to terminate even for good cause and contracts incorporating renewal 
options make non-renewal more problematic. Enforcing quality through the threat of con-
tract termination (or non-renewal) then requires more franchisor resources being devoted 
to litigation and working with non-cooperative franchisees, hence increasing the need to 
compensate headquarters through company outlets.  
The three arguments from above support the following hypotheses: 
H3: Contract duration is positively associated with the proportion 
company-owned. 
 
H4: The provision of a renewal option is positively associated with 
the proportion company-owned. 
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4. Empirical tests 
4.1 Sample 
4.1.1 Data sources 
The hypotheses were tested on cross-sectional data from German business-format franchi-
sors. The Jahrbuch Franchising und Kooperation 2005 (Peckert et al., 2005) served as the 
main data source. Besides information on contractual terms (e.g., royalty rates), it contains 
measures of the degree of centralization within chains. The Jahrbuch Franchising und 
Kooperation is edited by the Forum Franchise und Systeme (FFS), a private information 
services company with the objective to independently report on franchising activities in 
Germany. The directory is primarily addressed to individuals interested in purchasing a 
franchise. No fee is taken from franchisors for inclusion in the directory. The data were 
gathered by the FFS through self-administered mailed questionnaires. As the directory is a 
valuable source of information for potential franchisees, one might raise concerns about 
response biases. For instance, companies may overstate the degree of decentralization in 
order to attract productive entrepreneurs with a preference for independent decision-
making. Scott (1995: p. 76) partially accommodated such concerns about publicly avail-
able franchise data and put forward that companies have an incentive to provide accurate 
information since candidates certainly verify the details of offers. The sampling approach 
chosen here is comparable to other studies on franchising in the academic literature which 
also used publicly available data, such as from the Sourcebook of Franchise Opportunities 
(e.g., Agrawal and Lal, 1995; Scott, 1995; Shane, 2001) and the Entrepreneurship Maga-
zine (e.g., Lafontaine, 1992; Shane, 1998). 
The mail questionnaires for the Jahrbuch Franchising und Kooperation 2005 were sent 
out by FFS to about 940 Germany-based distribution systems in autumn 2004. The mailing 
yielded a response rate of about 44 percent. Yet, 12.5 percent of the respondents had 
ceased operations (Peckert et al., 2005: p. 161). Out of the responding and still active 
firms, 301 used business-format franchising – the organizational form of interest here – 
while the remaining firms relied on alternative types of distribution, such as licensing. Ad-
ditional information was gathered from Forby’s Guide 2004 (Kessler, 2004) and Fran-
chise-Opportunities 2005 (Graf, 2004) to corroborate or complement the data found in the 
Jahrbuch Franchising und Kooperation 2005. Complete and consistent information on the 
variables in this study was available for 159 business-format franchisors, the final sample 
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size. In 2003, approximately 830 business-format franchisors operated in the German mar-
ket (DFV, 2005) and hence this study covered about 19 percent of the population. 
4.1.2 Characteristics of the sample 
Based on the classification scheme employed by Lafontaine and Shaw (2001: p. 35), fran-
chisors were distributed across specific sectors as shown in Table 1.48  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1. Distribution of chains across industry sectors (n = 159) 
Further, four characteristics are pertinent to describe franchise chains: (1) proportion 
company-owned, (2) system size, (3) age of the chain, and (4) years franchising (see Table 
2 for descriptive statistics). To verify whether this sample differed significantly from oth-
ers used in the literature, t-tests were computed where the relevant information was pub-
lished. 
The average franchise company operated 20 percent of all outlets itself. This value is 
comparable to the average proportion company-owned in samples used by earlier authors: 
Lafontaine (1992: p. 272) (mean = 17.25 percent), Scott (1995: p. 76) (mean = 22.70 per-
cent), Lafontaine and Shaw (2001: p. 6) (mean = 22.20 percent), and Windsperger and 
Yurdakul (2004: p. 37) (mean = 26.96 percent). The only significant difference was found 
with Windsperger and Yurdakul’s sample (t = -2.24). 
                                                     
48 Industry-specific effects were controlled for in the multivariate regression analyses. 
Industry sector % of chains 
in sample 
Automotive 5 
Business services 5 
Cosmetic products & services 1.3 
Eating places 12.6 
Education 5.7 
Health & fitness 3.1 
Maintenance 5 
Personal services 11.3 
Real estate 1.9 
Recreation 4.4 
Rental 1.9 
Repair 3.8 
Retail 37.1 
Travel 1.9 
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The average chain in the present sample had a total number of 84.89 outlets (franchised 
plus company-owned). This mean for system size is significantly smaller than in Lafon-
taine (1992: p. 272) (mean = 273, t = -12.65) and Lafontaine and Shaw (2001: p. 6) (mean 
= 207.69, t = -6.68), and significantly larger than in Windsperger and Yurdakul (2004: p. 
37) (mean = 30.32, t = 3.43). The differences are attributable to variance in the size of the 
national markets in which the studies were conducted, with the U.S. being the largest, fol-
lowed by the German, and last by the Austrian market.  
The average age of the chain in years (mean = 20.00) is similar and not significantly dif-
ferent from earlier studies, e.g., Lafontaine (1992: p. 272) (mean = 17.82, t = 1.31), Lafon-
taine and Shaw (2001: p. 6) (mean = 17.33, t = 1.71).  
Finally, franchisors in this sample had on average 10.70 years of experience in franchis-
ing. Lafontaine and Shaw (2001: p. 6) reported a similar value of 10.56 years franchising (t 
= 0.23). Overall, and with exception of system size, the sample is comparable to those used 
by other franchising researchers in the past.  
4.2 Variables 
4.2.1 Dependent variables 
In order to enhance the robustness of the results, two alternative operationalizations for the 
degree of (de-)centralization were employed. First, franchisor ratings on the following 
three questions were summed and averaged – using equal weights on all items – to form 
decision index I: (a) How intense is your support of franchisees concerning their entrepre-
neurial decisions?, (b) How important is uniformity among your franchisees?, (c) How 
strongly do you standardize/organize business operating procedures? Respondents classi-
fied the characteristics of their system into one of five ordered categories. Categories for 
(a) and (c) were minimal to very strong and not important to very important for (b). All 
three measures approximated franchisees’ decision-making independence in the day-to-day 
business. Support of franchisees concerning their entrepreneurial decisions captured the 
extent to which franchisors were involved in the decision processes of outlets and, there-
fore, to which degree they exercised control (see Phan et al., 1996: p. 399). Questions tap-
ping uniformity and standardization were inverse measures of the extent to which local 
actions were allowed to be customized by stores. Principal components factor analysis re-
vealed all items to load on one factor. All loadings were above 0.675, total variance ex-
plained was of 56.949 percent and scale reliability as assessed by Cronbach’s alpha was 
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0.62 (see Appendix A).49 The higher the index, the more was decision-making centralized 
and the lower was franchisees’ leeway to influence outcomes. Note that decision index I 
was a holistic measure capturing centralization without regard to specific dimensions (pro-
curement, price, etc.). 
Second, precise decision dimensions centralized with the franchisor were added up to 
build decision index II. Functional areas to be included were selected based on previous 
work by Windsperger (2003: pp. 309-310) and Shane (2001: p. 146): procurement, ac-
counting system, budgeting and controlling, regional advertising, regional public relations, 
recruiting and employee training, investment, quality management, site-selection assis-
tance, and inventory control. For each dimension, a dummy variable indicated whether the 
decision was centralized (1) with the franchisor or decentralized (0). In addition, two 
dummy indicators, assessing whether standardized operating manuals and marketing 
manuals within any chain existed, were added (these constrain franchisees’ decision lee-
way). The twelve dummy variables formed a single summated variable. The more tasks 
were performed by the franchisor, the higher was the degree of centralization. Convergent 
validity of the measurement instruments decision index I and II was assessed via inspec-
tion of their bivariate correlation (Hair et al., 1998: p. 118), which amounted to 0.42 (p < 
0.001). 
The second dependent variable, i.e., the proportion company-owned, was calculated as 
the number of company-owned over total outlets (franchised plus company outlets) in any 
sampled network in 2003. 
4.2.2 Independent variables 
The theoretical variables were operationalized as follows. The number of years over which 
the initial contract between franchisees and the franchisor was valid served as a measure 
for contract duration. A dummy variable indicated whether the agreement contained a re-
newal option (1) or not (0) and hence whether it was classified as permanent or fixed-term, 
respectively. 
4.2.3 Control variables 
To strengthen the empirical tests, variables which might additionally influence the alloca-
tion of decision rights and/or the proportion company-owned were controlled for. All con-
                                                     
49 The lower Cronbach’s alpha-value of acceptability is 0.6 for exploratory scales (Hair et al., 1998: p. 118). 
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trol variables have previously been employed in franchising research. Further justification 
for the inclusion of each is provided in the section discussing the regression models. 
System size. Following Lafontaine (1992: p. 276) and Shane (1998: p. 726), the total 
number of outlets (franchised plus company-owned in 2003) captured system size.  
Advertising fee. This fee was calculated as the percentage of monthly sales that franchi-
sees paid to the company for advertising purposes.  
Years franchising. This variable reflected the number of years since the firm first fran-
chised an outlet.   
Franchisee experience. To measure the degree of franchisee experience demanded by 
the chain, I followed previous studies which used a dummy variable indicating whether a 
franchisor required applicants to have previous experience in the business (e.g., Lafon-
taine, 1992: p. 273). For reasons of reliability, this measure was extended to include infor-
mation on whether further skills, each captured by a dummy variable, were necessary to 
successfully apply for a franchise. The variable took on the value zero for no skills and no 
experience required to seven if skills specific to the job, experience in the industry, general 
management experience, management education, selling skills, organization skills, and 
specific background knowledge about technology were demanded.  
Franchisor knowledge assets. Franchisor knowledge assets were measured as the num-
ber of franchisor services which permit the top-down transfer of (non-contractible) knowl-
edge. The variable ranged from zero if no services were delivered by the franchisor to four 
if experience meetings, outlet visits, compulsory training for franchisees, and general semi-
nars took place in a franchise system. This measurement approach is similar to Windsper-
ger (2003: p. 309) who used three separate continuous measures, namely the number of 
annual training days, the number of visits, and the number of annual meetings days. It is 
also related to Lafontaine (1992: p. 274) and Scott (1995: p. 77) who employed the number 
of initial training weeks.  
Percentage time not franchising. The variable percentage time not franchising captured 
the length of time between the founding of the company and the year it sold the first fran-
chise, divided by age of the chain. This measure was taken from Lafontaine (1992: p. 274), 
as were the following three. 
Age of the franchise system. Age was measured in years since founding of the parent 
company.   
Franchisor financing. A dummy variable indicated whether franchisor financing was 
available to franchisees (1) or not (0).  
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Capital required. A franchisor’s capital needs were reflected in the average projected 
amount of capital required (in €1000s) to open an outlet.50 Where franchisors indicated a 
range of values which could vary depending on outlet size, the minimum and maximum 
amounts were averaged.  
4.3 Methods and results 
4.3.1 Correlations 
Table 2 shows bivariate Pearson correlations between the various variables. Three of the 
four hypothesized relationships were supported in this bivariate setting – the exception 
being the link between renewal option and proportion company-owned. The correlations 
between contract duration and decision indices I and II were positive and statistically sig-
nificant (r = 0.34, p < 0.001 and r = 0.33, p < 0.001, respectively). Also, the presence of a 
renewal option positively influenced centralization of decision rights as indicated by deci-
sion indices I and II (r = 0.20, p < 0.05 and r = 0.23, p < 0.01, respectively). The correla-
tion between contract duration and proportion company-owned amounted to 0.17 (p < 
0.05). These unconditional correlations provided only preliminary support for the hypothe-
ses however. That is, inspection of unconditional correlations could not reject that co-
movements in the variables under study were due to movements in other variables. There-
fore, these correlations were considered conditional on the other observables in the data 
through multivariate regressions as reported below. 
   
 
                                                     
50 This amount includes, for instance, expenditures for equipment and fixtures, leasehold improvements, 
signage, uniforms, opening advertising, and several month of working capital. Initial fees were not included 
in the measure.  
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 Table 2. Pearson correlations and descriptive statistics (n = 159)
Variable mean s.d (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
(1) Decision index I 4.21 0.51                           
(2) Decision index II 7.30 2.58 0.42***                         
(3) Proportion company-owned  0.20 0.23 -0.05 -0.04                       
(4) Advertising fee 1.33 1.68 0.05 -0.07 0.06                     
(5) System size 84.89 182.74 0.02 0.19 0.19* 0.04                   
(6) Years franchising 10.70 7.36 0.12 0.14 -0.08 0.14 0.54***                 
(7) Franchisee experience  3.18 1.44 0.19* 0.25** 0.10 0.21** 0.13 0.00               
(8) Franchisor knowledge assets  3.02 0.96 0.32*** 0.41*** -0.09 0.05 0.18* 0.14 0.14             
(9) % time not franchising 34.96 29.35 -0.04 -0.04 0.29*** 0.01 -0.13 -0.24** 0.06 -0.04           
(10) Age of the franchise system 20.00 19.53 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.12 0.23** 0.48*** 0.10 0.03 0.43***         
(11) Franchisor financing 0.57 0.50 0.16* 0.31*** -0.11 -0.08 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.14 -0.02 0.04       
(12) Capital required  117.44 162.82 0.19* 0.25** 0.24** 0.23** 0.27** 0.20* 0.15 0.02 0.08 0.20* 0.05     
(13) Contract duration 7.90 3.27 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.17* -0.02 0.32*** 0.14 0.04 0.16* 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.47***   
(14) Renewal option  0.77 0.42 0.20* 0.23** 0.01 -0.14 0.02 0.06 -0.04 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.18* -0.04 0.02  
n = 159. Significance levels (two-tailed): *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
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4.3.2 Cross-sectional variance in the allocation of decision rights 
To test H1 and H2 in a multivariate setting, ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions were 
employed.51 Industry dummies were included as control variables to capture the influence 
of various business types on the need to delegate decision rights to franchisees. For in-
stance, service sectors typically require more downstream discretion than capital intensive 
industries. Furthermore, system size, years franchising, franchisee experience, and franchi-
sor knowledge assets were added as controls. First, larger systems may enjoy economies of 
scale in centralizing decision structures and therefore experience lower levels of delega-
tion. Another argument suggests that the value of the brand increases with the number of 
outlets that display it. In an effort to prevent free-riding, larger systems should then restrict 
outlets’ authority more heavily than smaller chains.52 Both arguments predict a positive 
relationship between system size and centralization variables. Second, the higher the num-
ber of years since the first franchise was sold, the longer the time period over which a cen-
tralized infrastructure could have been built up. Thus, a positive regression coefficient was 
expected for years franchising. Third, Windsperger (2003) suggested that knowledge assets 
of both franchisees and the franchisor influence the allocation of decision rights in chains. 
The more knowledgeable franchisors are, the higher the value which can be extracted from 
centralized authority. Franchisor knowledge assets should thus positively influence cen-
tralization. Conversely, franchisee experience should be negatively related to centraliza-
tion. However, Lafontaine and Shaw (2001: p. 32) found a positive relationship between 
franchisee experience and the proportion company-owned. The authors argued that more 
business experience is required in chains in which operations are complicated and franchi-
sors therefore seek to protect their brand names by exerting direct managerial control 
through company ownership. A similar argument can be advanced to predict a positive 
relationship between education requirements and centralization of decision-making, i.e., 
direct managerial control of franchisee behavior is enhanced through centralization.  
                                                     
51 Formally, the Likert-type items used to operationalize decision index I were ordinal scales which would 
have required categorical estimation techniques. However, in the literature, it is common to assume equal 
interval length and to use OLS regression techniques in consequence (Backhaus, 2000: p. XIX). Results from 
ordered probit and ordered logit models were not qualitatively different from the OLS results.        
52 In the regressions estimating the proportion company-owned, further controls for brand value, namely the 
percentage time not franchising, age of the chain, and advertising fees were included. These were not consid-
ered in the regressions estimating the degree of centralization since their inclusion reduced the adjusted R-
square and thus model quality. The results with respect to the variables of interest here, i.e., contract duration 
and renewal option, did not change when these variables were added to the models. 
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Obviously, system size, industry, and years franchising are predetermined with respect 
to centralization (i.e., franchisors have little control over these variables) and are thus ex-
ogenous. Also, the knowledge required to run an outlet is likely to follow from the special 
task requirements of the business activity. Independent variables in OLS regressions need 
to be exogenous to obtain consistent parameter estimates (technically, they must not be 
related to the error term). Yet, the degree of centralization may be simultaneously deter-
mined along with other, endogenous contract variables such as non-compete covenants 
(e.g., Brickley, 1999). These could serve the franchisor to increase franchisees’ costs from 
contract termination and therefore reduce the probability of decision rights being abused, 
hence increasing the incidence of decentralization. Since these data were not available, it 
was not possible to account for this simultaneity in a structural approach and therefore re-
duced-form regressions including only the exogenous control variables from above were 
estimated. 
The results from the OLS models are displayed in Table 3. Model 1 regressed decision 
index I on the independent and control variables. The standardized coefficient for contract 
duration was positive (Β = 0.343) and highly significant (p < 0.001). Renewal option was 
also positively and significantly (Β = 0.190, p < 0.05) related to decision index I. The esti-
mated model was highly significant (adj. R2 = 0.253, p < 0.001). Compared to the null 
model (not reported), the independent variables added 13.5 percent to the explanation of 
variance in decision index I. The results using decision index II as dependent variable were 
qualitatively identical with respect to contract duration and renewal option (see Model 3). 
The effect size of contract duration reduced somewhat while the influence of renewal op-
tion gained in strength and significance, relative to Model 1.  
The OLS models assumed that contract duration and the existence of a renewal option 
are exogenous to the degree of centralization. However, there is good reason to believe that 
these variables are simultaneously determined. That is, causality between centralization 
and contract duration (and the provision of a renewal option) could flow in both directions. 
For example, Bercovitz (2000: p. 36) found that contract duration is not only determined 
by the level of franchisees’ specific investments as suggested by transaction costs econom-
ics but also by the potential for free-riding (as measured by the value of the chain’s brand 
name times spillover potential). The higher franchisees’ potential to free-ride on the brand 
name, the shorter is contract duration. By the same token, centralization might condition 
contract duration (and the provision of a renewal option): 
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Table 3. OLS and 2SLS regression results
 Dependent variable: Decision index I Dependent variable: Decision index II 
Model 1  2  3  4  
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Industry dummies          
Automotive 0.068 (0.167) 0.068  (0167) 0.116† (0.820) 0.121† (0.863) 
Business services 0.104 (0.170) 0.104  (0.170) -0.012 (0.836) -0.013 (0.879) 
Cosmetic products & services -0.034 (0.322) -0.032  (0.327) 0.072 (1.581) 0.092 (1.690) 
Eating places  0.124 (0.121) 0.118  (0.143) 0.040 (0.595) -0.039 (0.743) 
Education -0.010 (0.161) -0.010  (0.161) -0.132† (0.791) -0.134† (0.831) 
Health & fitness 0.033  (0.212) 0.030  (0.224) -0.041 (1.041) -0.079 (1.154) 
Maintenance -0.008  (0.169) -0.008  (0.169) -0.069 (0.829) -0.069 (0.872) 
Personal services 0.097 (0.119) 0.096 (0.119) 0.084 (0.582) 0.076 (0.613) 
Real estate -0.052 (0.186) -0.050  (0.189) 0.056 (0.914) 0.076 (0.976) 
Recreation 0.185* (0.269) 0.188* (0.284) 0.076 (1.320) 0.115 (1.469) 
Rental 0.081  (0.263) 0.081  (0.263) -0.030 (1.293) -0.026 (1.360) 
Repair 0.050  (0.189) 0.050  (0.190) 0.028 (0.927) 0.017 (0.979) 
Travel 0.025  (0.270) 0.027  (0.281) 0.053 (1.328) 0.085 (1.453) 
Control variables          
System size -0.279** (0.000) -0.287* (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) -0.105 (0.002) 
Years franchising 0.199* (0.006) 0.200* (0.006) 0.024 (0.030) 0.045 (0.032) 
Franchisee experience 0.239** (0.028) 0.238** (0.027) 0.199* (0.136) 0.196* (0.143) 
Franchisor knowledge assets  0.246** (0.039) 0.244** (0.040) 0.316*** (0.193) 0.289*** (0.109) 
Independent variables         
Contract duration 0.343*** (0.012) 0.364† (0.032) 0.291*** (0.061) 0.587** (0.165) 
Renewal option  0.190* (0.087) 0.189* (0.088) 0.219** (0.430) 0.207** (0.455) 
n 159.000  159.000   159  159.000  
F 3.814*** 2.992*** 4.427*** 3.734*** 
Adjusted R2 0.253  .  0.292  .  
Beta coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels (two-tailed): *** p < 0.001; ** 
p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.1. 
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Decentralized decision-making structures – possibly made attractive through the properties 
of production technology – may be governed by relatively short contracts (and no renewal 
option) in order to induce franchisee compliance. The results of Hausman specification 
tests confirmed the presence (absence) of simultaneity of contract duration (renewal op-
tion) with both measures of centralization. Under conditions of simultaneity, OLS regres-
sions provide inconsistent parameter estimates.  
Therefore, two stage least squares regressions (2SLS), which produce consistent and ef-
ficient estimates, were estimated. In the first stage, contract duration was endogenized us-
ing capital required as an instrumental variable (as well as the other exogenous control 
variables; see Baltagi, 1998: p. 278). Capital required was used as an instrument since Ber-
covitz (2000: p. 36) as well as Brickley et al. (2003: p. 18) reported that contract duration 
was to a large degree determined by the magnitude of franchisee investments in the outlet. 
Since a major portion of these investments is specific to the franchise system, franchisees 
need assurance that they recoup these expenditures.53 In the second stage, the OLS models 
were re-estimated replacing the actual values for contract duration with the estimates from 
the first stage. The results of Models 2 and 4 in Table 3 emerged. The coefficient of con-
tract duration in Model 2 gained slightly in strength (Β = 0.364), relative to Model 1, but 
lost in significance (p < 0.10). The coefficient in Model 4 clearly gained in strength (Β = 
0.587, p < 0.01), relative to Model 3. The renewal option coefficients remained stable in 
both effect size and significance. Overall, the data provided very robust evidence for H1 
and H2.  
In order to assure reliability of these results, it was tested whether the assumptions of 
multivariate regression analysis were met. First, variance inflation factors for each of the 
regression models were investigated to test for multicollinearity among the explanatory 
variables. All values lay well below the usual threshold of 10 (the maximum observed was 
1.845 for Model 1), beyond which problems of multicollinearity can be considered severe 
(Hair et al., 1998: p. 220). This indicated that the results were not negatively affected by 
problems of multicollinearity. Second, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were run to assess nor-
                                                     
53 Brickley et al. (2003: p. 19) found that contract duration and capital investments were simultaneously de-
termined in their sample. This may be the case because the amount of cash required to open an outlet can 
partly be determined by the franchise company. For instance, the franchisor may choose the level of entry 
fees. Therefore, the models here were run without entry fees included in the total investments. However, 
there are other factors the franchisor can decide on and which influence capital required, for instance, 
whether buildings are to be bought or rented by franchisees. In this vein, the authors used the square footage 
of outlets’ premises as an instrument for capital required. Since similar variables which could have served as 
a priori valid instruments were not available for this study, capital required was assumed to be to a large 
extent exogenous and determined by the production technology.  
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mality of the error term distributions of the OLS models. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test’s 
null hypothesis is that the error term does follow a certain pre-specified distribution, here, 
the normal distribution. None of the tests across the models revealed an asymptotic signifi-
cance (two-tailed) of less than 0.974 (for Model 3) and thus failed to reject the null hy-
pothesis of normally distributed error terms. Finally, White’s test was used to assess the 
assumption of homoscedasticity. White’s general test sets the null hypothesis of homosce-
dastic variance (Greene, 2000: p. 508). The type I error of rejecting the null hypothesis of 
constant variances when actually it is true ranged from 0.860 to 0.978 across the models. 
Based on these values, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity could not be rejected.  
4.3.3 Cross-sectional variance in the proportion company-owned 
H3 and H4, relating contract duration and the presence of a renewal option to the propor-
tion company-owned, were tested using Tobit regressions. Since the dependent variable 
was left-censored (i.e., 22.01 percent of franchisors operated no company units), OLS re-
gressions would have provided inconsistent parameter estimates biased toward zero. Alge-
braically, the censored Tobit model takes on the following form: 
 
iii ßxy ε+=*            
 
with ),0(~ 2σε Νi  as a normally distributed random variable. iy* is a latent variable 
which can be observed for values greater than zero ( iy = iy
*  if iy* > 0) and which is cen-
sored for values below zero ( 0=iy ). ix  denotes a vector of independent variables, with ß 
as the estimated coefficients (see Greene, 2000: chapter 20). 
The Tobit estimates are displayed in Table 4. Industry dummies, system size, age of the 
franchise system, percentage time not franchising, advertising fee, franchisee experience, 
franchisor financing, and capital required were included as control variables. Two basic 
rationales relate these variables to the proportion company-owned. The first assumes that 
franchise companies choose to own more of their outlets when brand value is high because 
they then need to exert more managerial control over downstream operations in order to 
prevent free-riding. Since the value of the brand should increase with the number of outlets 
that display it, as already mentioned, system size was introduced as one proxy for brand 
equity. The trade name is also assumed to be more valuable for established franchisors and 
so age of the chain was additionally included. A further proxy for brand value is the per-
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centage time not franchising, assuming that more valuable business concepts are more 
time-consuming and expensive to develop. In addition, the amount of advertising fees paid 
by franchisees to the company served as a direct measure of funds invested in the brand. 
Finally, the experience and business skills required by franchisees reflected the emphasis 
of the franchisor on issues of quality and ultimately brand value, as outlined by Lafontaine 
and Shaw (2001: p. 31).54 The second argument acknowledges that firms are more depend-
ent on franchising for rapid expansion, the higher the capital needs to set up stores. Fran-
chisor financing provided to franchisees and capital required served as proxies for capital 
constraints of the company. Firms capable of financing franchisees have access to the capi-
tal markets and no need to rely on franchising for reasons of resource scarcity. Equally, 
franchisors should be facing a less binding capital constraint, the lower the capital neces-
sary to open a store.55 Model 5 regressed the proportion company-owned on the independ-
ent and control variables. The coefficient for contract duration was positive (b = 0.000) but 
not significant. This multivariate finding was in contrast to the significant, though weak, 
bivariate relationship (r = 0.17, p < 0.05) between contract duration and the proportion 
company-owned. Contrary to expectations, the renewal option dummy was negative (b = -
0.005) and not significant. Overall, the estimated model was significant (p < 0.01). 
After conducting conditional moment tests56, the null hypothesis of normally distributed 
errors for the Tobit model had to be rejected. Maximum likelihood Tobit estimates are 
highly sensitive to non-normality. The reason why maximum likelihood results are never-
theless presented is that this technique remains widely used in research on contract mixing 
in franchise channels and thus facilitates comparison of results (e.g., Lafontaine, 1992; 
Lafontaine and Shaw, 2001). From visual inspection of the residuals and by the fact of 
non-normality, it was suspected that the Tobit models also suffered from heteroscedasticity 
chiefly determined by the degree of censoring. Therefore, Huber-White robust standard 
errors (for Model 5) are reported. These are less likely to mislead about the significance of 
independent variables in the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
                                                     
54 Brand value is determined by past investments such that these variables should be exogenous with respect 
to the proportion company-owned. 
55 These two variables are also assumed to be exogenous. Past research presented evidence, however, sug-
gesting that the percentage company-owned and the royalty rate are simultaneously set by chains in response 
to incentive issues (Pénard et al., 2003; Windsperger and Yurdakul, 2004). Including the royalty rate in the 
regression would have implied an endogeneity bias. Therefore reduced-form regressions excluding the roy-
alty rate were estimated.   
56 The tobcm command in Stata 8.0 was used. 
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 Table 4. Tobit regression results
 Dependent variable: Proportion company-owned 
Model 5 6 
 Tobit Box Cox Tobit 
Industry dummies       
Automotive -0.142 (0.081) -0.607 (0.526) 
Business services 0.043 (0.106) 0.419 (0.517) 
Cosmetic products & services 0.175 (0.120) 1.164 (0.990) 
Eating places 0.018 (0.077) -0.005 (0.380) 
Education -0.013 (0.112) -0.208 (0.508) 
Health & fitness -0.198 (0.090) -0.230 (0.661) 
Maintenance 0.023 (0.089) 0.281 (0.529) 
Personal services -0.011 (0.053) 0.393 (0.364) 
Real estate -0.313** (0.120) -1.851** (0.675) 
Recreation -0.122 (0.125) -0.451 (0.846) 
Rental -0.014 (0.070) 0.764 (0.819) 
Repair -0.032 (0.092) -0.115 (0.603) 
Travel -0.068 (0.235) -0.798 (0.918) 
Control variables     
System size 0.003† (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) 
Age of the franchise system -0.001 (0.001) -0.005 (0.007) 
% time not franchising 0.338*** 0.089) 1.797*** (0.467) 
Advertising fee -0.003 0.016) -0.065 (0.074) 
Franchisee experience 0.017 (0.018) -0.008 (0.090) 
Franchisor financing -0.080† (0.045) -0.450† (0.236) 
Capital required 0.000† (0.000) 0.001† (0.001) 
Independent variables     
Contract duration 0.000 (0.008) 0.011 (0.042) 
Renewal option -0.005 (0.051) -0.204 (0.282) 
n 159.00  159.00  
Limit observations (PCO = 0) 35.00  35.00  
Nonlimit observations 124.00  124.00  
Likelihood ratio test 45.68** 43.31*** 
In parentheses: Huber-White standard errors for Model 5. Standard errors for 
Model 6. Significance levels (two-tailed): *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; † p < 0.10. 
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 To deal with these issues more fundamentally, a Box Cox transformation of the de-
pendent variable was adopted, thereby allowing for a Tobit estimation which, along with 
the non-normality problem, accommodated problems of heteroscedasticity (Greene, 2000: 
pp. 444-453). The estimated theta value used for transformation was 0.235 (p < 0.001).57 A 
Tobit model was re-estimated under the transformed dependent variable (Model 6). Con-
tract duration and renewal option remained insignificant. Therefore, H3 and H4 were not 
supported by the data. 
Several robustness checks were performed. First, Lafontaine and Shaw’s (2001) longi-
tudinal analysis of 4842 different chains revealed that after the first seven years of fran-
chising experience, there were no significant changes in the proportion company-owned 
over time within chains. Their results suggest that firms learn about an optimal proportion 
of company ownership, and, once reached an equilibrium level, actively manage to keep 
that level even in periods of system growth. The relationship between contract duration 
(and renewal option) and the proportion company-owned could be expected to be stronger 
among older franchise chains which have already learned about the costs of different or-
ganizational designs. Therefore, following the approach offered by Lafontaine and Shaw 
(2001: p. 24), the sample was restricted to those franchisors with eight or more years of 
franchising experience and 15 or more units in total. The remaining chains in this stable 
sample (n = 79) were likely to be those that have grown enough to have reached their tar-
get levels. The regression equations of Table 4 were re-estimated based on the stable sam-
ple.58 However, the results with respect to the variables contract duration and renewal op-
tion did not change. Second, robustness of the Tobit regression results was verified by 
comparing the maximum likelihood estimates to the estimates from a semiparametric cen-
sored least absolute deviations (CLAD) estimation method which was performed using the 
clad command in Stata 8.0. The semiparametric CLAD approach offers the advantage of 
being insensitive to non-normality and heteroscedasticity of the error terms (Greene, 2000: 
p. 916; see, also, Chay and Powell, 2001). Qualitatively similar results were obtained. Fi-
nally, Windsperger and Yurdakul (2004: pp. 21-22) found evidence that increases in resid-
ual decision rights of the franchisor relative to franchisees led to a higher fraction of fran-
chisor ownership rights, expressed by the proportion company-owned. Their results, fol-
                                                     
57 Before running the Box Cox regression, an arbitrarily small constant of 0.00001 was added to the depend-
ent variable, proportion company-owned, to meet the requirements of strictly positive values for the variable 
to be transformed. 
58 While the bivariate correlation between contract duration and the percentage company-owned was twice as 
high (r = 0.34, p < 0.01) than for the whole sample (r = 0.17, p < 0.05), the correlation between renewal op-
tion and proportion company-owned weakened.  
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lowing from property rights arguments, suggest that centralization of decision rights and 
the proportion company-owned are complements. But neither were the decision indices 
and the proportion company-owned significantly correlated in a bivariate setting (see Table 
2), nor were the error term distributions of the Tobit and OLS/2SLS regressions. Thus, 
complementarities between centralization and company ownership were either not present 
in the sample or not captured by the specific variables employed. 
5. Discussion 
5.1 Findings and null findings 
The empirical results were strongly supportive for the thesis that long-term contracts and 
those containing a renewal option negatively influence franchisors’ ability to self-enforce 
franchisee behavior and that in consequence, organizational design has to accommodate 
the potential costs from malfeasance by limiting the scope for independent franchisee ac-
tion. However, no evidence was found for the hypotheses relating contract duration and 
renewal options to the incidence of vertical integration. It appears therefore that the legal 
constraints on the self-enforcement mechanism are not important enough to offset the at-
tractiveness of franchising relative to company operations. More precisely, the incentive 
compatible rent of the least effective self-enforcing contracts (i.e., long-term, renewable) 
seems not to pass the threshold value at which employee-management of stores becomes 
more profitable than franchising.   
5.2 Implications for public policy 
The theoretical and empirical analyses in this chapter suggest two regulatory implications. 
First, the empirical models showed that franchising agreements allocate decision rights 
based on economic efficiency considerations: Franchisees’ rights are more restricted where 
inconsistencies in objectives cannot be otherwise controlled by headquarters. This implies 
that viewing contracts as one-sided and unfair agreements which favor the powerful fran-
chisor at the expense of “naïve” franchisees may be overly pessimistic. In particular, the 
rights of downstream channel members are apparently not constrained simply because 
franchise companies would have the bargaining power to do so. The findings of this chap-
ter provide further support that contract provisions should rather be perceived to serve the 
socially useful purpose of economizing on the costs of quality enforcement (e.g., Klein and 
Saft, 1985; Bonus and Wessels, 1994; OECD, 1994; Brickley et al., 2003; Lafontaine and 
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Slade, 2005). Public policy, whose role is “fighting unconscionably restricting clauses in 
franchise agreements” (Müller-Graff, 1988: p. 127), should take account of these effi-
ciency arguments. 
The second implication is theoretically motivated. Figure 2 showed that in light of the 
legal restrictions surrounding termination and non-renewal, long-term as well as renewable 
contracts are penalized with an extra cost of organization (C2 > C1). With all else being 
equal, in particular information costs, long-term and renewable contracts are associated 
with higher levels of agency costs at every given level of (de-)centralization. This cost dis-
advantage would not occur if mid-agreement termination and non-renewal were uncon-
strained. In light of these increased organization costs, legal restraints on termination and 
non-renewal may be overemphasized; especially when taking into account that franchisors’ 
reputation concerns are considerable (Beales and Muris, 1995). In a competitive franchise 
market, terminating franchisees opportunistically would decrease the price paid by new 
applicants and potentially reduce the level of effort of existing store-owners, thereby dam-
aging the brand value of the chain. 
5.3 Generalizability across jurisdictions 
It is important to note that the results may be highly specific to the German legal frame-
work. Differences across jurisdictions with respect to franchise contract termination and 
renewal exist. These certainly impact the effectiveness of the self-enforcement mechanism 
and thereby franchisee incentives to cheat. But more importantly, even where stipulations 
surrounding termination are comparable, such as between Germany and several U.S. states, 
the strength of the relationship between the effectiveness of self-enforcement (i.e., contract 
duration, renewal options) and the propensity to centralize and/or own operations may still 
differ across legal traditions. It was argued above that centralization is an efficient response 
in light of constraints on means of private ordering because, by specifying contractual ob-
ligations, it increases verifiability of franchisee performance through third-party enforcers 
(i.e., courts). Verification of behavior by reference to specified duties might be more im-
portant in Civil Law compared to Common Law countries. The Common Law tradition 
(such as in the U.S.) places emphasis on decision-making and contract interpretation by 
juries. Conversely, the Civil Law tradition (such as in Germany) relies more heavily on 
procedural codes in written form, rendering explicit contractual provisions more important. 
A recent work by Pfister et al. (2004) demonstrates the relevance of these conjectures. It 
showed how institutional parameters affect the proportion company-owned in any chain 
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across countries.59 The authors reported significant differences in the propensity to fran-
chise between countries following the German legal tradition (e.g., Austria, Germany, and 
Switzerland) and other countries. In addition, labor regulations and trademark laws signifi-
cantly affected the incidence of vertical integration in their sample. Given the above points, 
research on how franchising firms across jurisdictions deal with contracts of weak self-
enforcing properties appears to be promising. 
6. Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was to investigate whether legal constraints on contract ter-
mination and non-renewal affect the governance structure of franchising firms in terms of 
the allocation of decision rights and the mix of franchised and company-owned outlets. It 
was argued that because mid-agreement termination of franchise contracts is difficult in the 
German legal framework, the costs from franchisee malfeasance increase with the duration 
of agreements. Consistent with expectations, strong evidence was found that franchisors 
account for these costs by limiting their exposure to moral hazard in the first place by re-
stricting outlets’ decision leeway. Following a similar logic, the evidence revealed that the 
existence of renewal options inversely determined the delegation of rights to stores. Yet, 
contrary to the hypotheses, the prevalence of vertical integration within any network was 
unaffected by contract duration and renewal provisions.  
From a theoretical vantage point, some interesting implications can be drawn. First, 
unless alternative explanations for the empirical findings are put forward, these make an 
additional case for the self-enforcement mechanism being an important incentive device in 
franchising. This theoretical lens thus seems promising to explain other essential aspects of 
organization besides the degree of centralization. Second, the data provided support for 
complementarities to exist between incentives and decentralization in franchise networks, 
pointing to an issue which needs careful consideration by management. Thus, delegating 
rights to outlets is worth more when inconsistencies in objectives are effectively curbed. 
Finally, the theoretical underpinnings of this study imply that the performance of chains 
may depend on contract duration and renewal options where the law regulates termination 
and non-renewal. Figure 2 illustrated that total organization costs rise with a fall in the ef-
fectiveness to which agency conflicts are resolved, all else equal. Assuming that these 
costs cannot be compensated through other firm policies, franchising companies offering 
                                                     
59 See Oxley (1999) for an analysis of how the institutional environment, namely, national differences in 
intellectual property rights protection, affect governance features of alliances.  
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long-term contracts and renewal options suffer in relative performance, also because they 
cannot fully take advantage of franchisees’ specific knowledge. 
Several areas, which partially result from the limitations of this study, are worth being 
pursued further. First, this chapter studied the effectiveness of only one dimension of the 
self-enforcement mechanism, i.e., the threat of termination, while the other important ele-
ment, i.e., monitoring intensity, was not considered. However, franchisees’ short-term 
gains from cheating are a function of the resources headquarters devote to monitoring. In-
vestigating the interplay between termination conditions and monitoring frequency remains 
an interesting avenue for future research. Second, though the efficiency implications of 
aligning the governance structure with the duration of contracts and the provision of re-
newal options may be compelling from a theoretical perspective, they deserve empirical 
testing in order to gain a better understanding of the level of costs associated with mis-
alignments of these elements (see, for such an approach, Yvrande-Billon and Saussier, 
2005). Third, one might suspect that franchisors increase their investments in relational 
forms of governance (see B-II.) to substitute for constraints on the ability to punish fran-
chisees through the threat of termination as discussed here. Finally, it was assumed that 
decision rights of franchisors and the resulting obligations for franchisees were completely 
enforced by the courts. By contrast, Arruñada et al. (2001) found that automobile manufac-
turers’ completion rights in their contracts with franchisees (e.g., right to determine service 
target) were complemented with explicit termination rights (e.g., repeated breach of service 
target) acknowledging that “determining obligations without corresponding mechanisms to 
enforce these obligations is mindless” (p. 280). Analyzing how specific termination rights 
interact with contract duration (as an inverse proxy of the effectiveness of self-
enforcement) in franchise chains also represents an interesting topic for further analysis. 
  
II. LEVERAGING FRANCHISEE AUTONOMY: RELATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
IN IDIOSYNCRATIC FRANCHISE DYADS  
1. Introduction 
Franchising is an attractive organizational form to pursue growth strategies (Shane, 1996; 
Michael, 2003). It does not only permit realizing economies of scale through system-wide 
standardization in various functional areas such as marketing, purchasing, and product de-
velopment. Relative to company operations, franchising additionally allows profiting from 
the expertise and motivation of independent entrepreneurs to continuously adapt to local 
markets (see A-II.). For their specific knowledge to be leveraged and local market adapta-
tion to occur, franchisees should be granted autonomy in various operational aspects of the 
business.  
Leeway for independent action is furthermore important to the prospect of the whole 
chain since it upholds franchisees’ satisfaction in the relationship and hence their motiva-
tion to deliver performance (e.g., Schul et al., 1985). That is, franchisees often choose the 
franchise option in order to become their own boss and to run a business according to own 
decisions while profiting from a proven business concept (e.g., Peterson and Dant, 1990; 
Kaufmann, 1999). Placing too narrow restraints on outlets’ operations increases the risk of 
disappointing hopes for entrepreneurial behavior.  
Notwithstanding the above benefits, increasing levels of autonomy equally raise the po-
tential costs from agency problems present in any franchisee-franchisor dyad (see A-II.). In 
consequence, autonomous decision-making by downstream stores may or may not lead to 
increased performance from the franchisor’s perspective. Success eventually hinges on 
chains’ ability to counterbalance the loss in control inherent to autonomy with mechanisms 
that achieve goal congruence between the exchange partners. Only under conditions of 
common economic interests between the parties can the full economic potential of decen-
tralized dyadic decision-making be realized.   
A growing body of literature analyzes the importance of social interactions in the gov-
ernance of channel structures. In particular, the functionality of trust and relational norms – 
or, more generally, the role of relational governance – in coordinating vertical relationships 
has been subject to scholarly attention (e.g., Palay, 1984; Kaufmann and Stern, 1988; 
Noordewier et al., 1990; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). In this chapter, I empirically explore
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franchisors’ reliance on relational governance as a control mode to attenuate the agency 
problems resulting from franchisee autonomy. Most notably, it is hypothesized that rela-
tional governance becomes more important to accompany autonomy, the weaker franchi-
sees’ structural incentives are aligned with the franchisor. Hence, individual franchisee-
franchisor dyads from different networks are the units of analysis. The moderating roles of 
five franchisee characteristics which have previously been proposed to affect agency issues 
in the dyad are considered: (1) multi-unit ownership, (2) age of the franchisee-franchisor 
relationship, (3) geographic distance between the outlet and the company’s head office, (4) 
franchisees’ past economic success, and (5) the level of perceived intra-chain competition. 
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, although past work 
has investigated appropriate functional areas for independent action by franchisees (Kauf-
mann and Eroglu, 1999), little is known about the governance of behavior within these 
limits. Relative to Kaufmann and Eroglu’s conceptual study and earlier empirical literature 
which has been concerned with the question of “who makes decisions” in chains (e.g., 
Windsperger, 2004), this paper shifts the research focus to the question of “how to assure 
that decision rights are not abused”. The aim is therefore to investigate empirically how 
companies assure that franchisees use their autonomy in Pareto-improving ways such that 
it leads to better performance at the outlet while having a non-negative impact on the vi-
ability of the system. 
Second, by incorporating franchisee characteristics such as single- vs. multi-unit owner-
ship in the analysis, this study extends and corroborates earlier research which found in-
centive effects of these characteristics to be important for channel management (e.g., Dant 
and Nasr, 1998). From a practical point of view, asking how a chain can achieve coopera-
tion with outlet-owners of differing expectations and orientations is crucial (Grünhagen 
and Mittelstaedt, 2005). By focusing on the specific characteristics of each outlet, this 
chapter advances the theoretical understanding of agency issues in franchising. This 
knowledge might also provide conceptual guidance to managers in the field when structur-
ing decision rights and control mechanisms.  
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, the theoretical concepts and 
hypotheses are introduced (2.). Then, an empirical test of the hypotheses is reported (3.). In 
the subsequent section, the findings and limitations are discussed and implications for 
practitioners are provided (4.). The last section concludes and provides suggestions for 
further enquiry (5.).   
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2. Theoretical foundations and hypotheses 
2.1 Franchisee autonomy 
2.1.1 Defining autonomy 
Autonomy can be conceived of as the extent to which a party, here a franchisee, is uncon-
strained to independently make decisions (Kappler, 1992: pp. 272-280; Strutton et al., 
1995: p. 82; Dant and Gundlach, 1999: p. 37).60 Independence pertains to the practical ful-
fillment of a task as far as its content is concerned; more precisely, it relates to the search 
for different solutions, to the choice of one feasible alternative, and to subsequent actions. 
Autonomy entails leeway not only on how but also as to which task is performed – e.g., the 
latitude of franchised outlets to select a new project (Lewin-Salomons, 1998: p. 2). Thus, 
autonomy is referred to as franchisees’ entrepreneurial freedom to operate affiliated units 
according to own decisions. 
2.1.2 Structural sources of autonomy 
Basically, four structural sources of entrepreneurial autonomy can be identified: (1) alloca-
tion of contractual rights, (2) contractual incompleteness, (3) control costs as well as lim-
ited monitoring capacities, and (4) direct acceptance of deviant franchisee behavior by the 
franchisor.61 First, contractual clauses as well as obligations detailed in handbooks – in-
cluded in the contract by reference – can restrict franchisees’ decision rights. Varying de-
grees of explicit specifications explain idiosyncrasies in downstream operating independ-
ence across chains. Yet, these formal elements in the dyadic channel relationship fre-
quently cannot account for differences in autonomy across individual franchisee-
entrepreneurs of a same system, which is the focus of this chapter. The reason is that due to 
legal costs, concerns for equity, and franchisor moral hazard, contractual requirements are 
most often standardized within a network (Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine, 1995: p. 765). 
                                                     
60 Note that in chapter B-I., the extent to which franchisees were (un-)constrained to make decisions inde-
pendently was circumscribed by the term allocation of decision rights. In this chapter, the expression auton-
omy was consciously chosen for two reasons. First, the distinction in terminology intends to highlight that the 
present chapter is concerned with variance in decision-making independence across franchisees within any 
chain rather than with this variance across franchise chains. The implicit assumption in the previous chapter 
(B-I.) was that decision rights of an average outlet in every chain were measured and that these rights were 
residual, i.e., those not restricted by the contract remaining with franchisees. For the present context, this 
definition is insufficient because no variance in decision-making independence within any chain would be 
observed as all franchisees of one chain are usually governed by the same contract. Second, the use of the 
term autonomy is consistent with earlier studies on franchisee decision-making independence (e.g., Dant and 
Gundlach, 1999; Pizanti and Lerner, 2003). 
61 More indirectly, franchisor support services – for instance, in form of advices on operating decisions – also 
limit outlets’ autonomy (see Phan et al., 1996: p. 399).    
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Second, as a result of bounded rationality, unforeseeable contingencies, writing costs, 
and difficulties of verification through third-party enforcers such as courts (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992: pp. 129-130), franchise contracts do not completely specify each party’s 
obligations. As legally separate entities and owners of the assets employed for production 
at the outlets, franchisees’ decision rights are unconstrained unless they are restricted by 
the legal documents. Hence, contractual incompleteness conditions local de facto decision-
making authority (Stanworth, 1995: p. 165; Dant and Gundlach, 1999: p. 36). 
Third, outlets also possess a substantial amount of de facto autonomy because of limited 
control capacities of the systems’ head offices and prohibitively high costs of monitoring 
local activities. Since control costs may differ among units (Lafontaine and Slade, 1997: p. 
7), differential scopes for decentralized operations can emerge within any chain. Outlets 
which are more costly to monitor should then experience higher levels of autonomy com-
pared to stores which are less expensive to monitor and which are therefore controlled in-
tensely. 
Finally, the degree of autonomy across a focal network’s franchisees can as well fall 
apart for the company could accept deviations from contractually regulated business pro-
cedures if beneficial outcomes for the whole channel are expected. Lewin-Salomons 
(1998) argued and provided some anecdotal evidence that this kind of informal allocation 
of decision rights is a central source of franchisees’ operational realm. Also, one represen-
tative of a computer retailing franchisor explained in an interview that the average outlet is 
visited four times a year. Franchisees which are expected to behave appropriately, by con-
trast, are visited only once a year and are accorded more operating autonomy. This demon-
strates that “in a single franchising chain the level of control and autonomy exercised may 
differ from one franchisee to the next” (Pizanti and Lerner, 2003: p. 138) and that franchi-
sors are aware of the specific level of autonomy which is granted to each individual outlet.  
2.1.3 Agency issues related to autonomy 
Agency theory is concerned with the resolution of exchange hazards inherent to “a contract 
under which one or more persons (principals) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: p. 308). In distribution, the or-
ganizational form of franchising circumvents an important agency problem which would 
arise between a system’s head office and an employee managing an outlet (Rubin, 1978). 
In particular, franchisees’ residual claim on the profits of their unit (net of royalty pay-
ments) induces greater effort than is provided by a company employee who receives 
B-II. Relational Governance in Idiosyncratic Dyads 
 
62
mainly a fixed salary and who therefore seeks to minimize costs of effort. Notwithstand-
ing, residual claims create another goal conflict, namely incentives to free-ride on the 
chain’s brand name (Lafontaine and Raynaud, 2002). Examples of free-riding include un-
derinvestment in advertising, failure to comply with production standards, and insufficient 
supervision of staff. Franchisees cheating on investments in the brand name reduce their 
costs and thereby augment profits since they are unlikely to loose (short-term) sales if other 
units follow through with obligations. The reason is that consumers credit the goodwill 
they attach to the trade name even to stores which fail to deliver promised quality. The 
extent of autonomy allocated to franchised dealers positively determines the potential costs 
resulting from these goal conflicts (see A-II.).  
2.2 Controlling franchisees: Relational forms of governance 
2.2.1 Defining relational governance 
Relational forms of governance, also referred to as informal institutions (North, 1990: p. 
36), are defined as norms of behavior and unwritten codes of conduct which safeguard 
exchanges against potential conflicts. Norms, in turn, are defined as expectations of behav-
ior shared by dyadic partners (Heide and John, 1992: p. 34). They emerge from the social 
embeddedness of a contractual relationship (Macneil, 1980: p. 1; Granovetter, 1985: p. 
490; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994: pp. 102-106; Jones et al., 1997: pp. 924-925) and/or are 
conditioned by the prospect of realizing a higher transaction value in the future than would 
be possible without such norms (Baker et al., 2002). The existence of (cooperative) norms 
is thus not necessarily inconsistent with economic theory’s assumption of individuals being 
rational, self-interested utility maximizers.62 Rather, in the framework of relational con-
tracts self-enforced within the relationship, norms determine which kinds of behavior are 
to be expected – or, conversely, which type of behavior triggers punishment by others 
(Hviid, 2000: p. 56). Though not restricting the behavior of economic actors, norms in-
crease the degree of confidence of an actor that one type of action within the choice set 
available is chosen by the other actor, making cooperative (equilibrium) outcomes in a 
repeated interaction more likely (Voss, 2001).63 In this vein, norms are patterns of actual 
                                                     
62 For a review of the literature on social preferences (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2002), which acknowledges 
that people sometimes value reciprocal behavior independently of their own utility maximization, see Kirst 
and Ehrmann (2005).  
63 It does not follow, however, that norms automatically reduce opportunism for opportunism may be an 
established norm as well. The behavior of people ultimately depends on the specific norms sustained in a 
B-II. Relational Governance in Idiosyncratic Dyads 
 
63
behavior which are enforced by mechanisms of reward and punishment within repeated 
interactions. While formal governance arrangements such as explicit contract terms are in 
general discrete (i.e., they either exist or are absent), relational forms of governance are 
continuous since they differ in degree rather than in kind (Zenger et al., 2001: pp. 8-9). An 
intensification of the specific norms considered in the next section conforms to more pro-
nounced relational content in a business liaison (see Macneil, 1980: p. 65). 
Relational governance does not categorize exchanges by their institutional structure 
(e.g., markets or hierarchies), but describes actual behavior within modes of organization. 
Also, the institutional structure within which the economic transaction occurs does not 
determine prevailing norms (Ivens and Blois, 2004: pp. 242-263). Hence, relational gov-
ernance can be found in markets, hierarchies, and hybrids and to different degrees in each 
of these frameworks (Bradach and Eccles, 1989: p. 98). For instance, one can potentially 
identify high-trust hybrids and low-trust hybrids (Adler, 2001: p. 219). Furthermore, some 
hybrid organizational forms such as franchise systems are characterized by more than one 
dyad. In principle, one can then identify high- and low-trust franchisee-franchisor dyads 
within the same chain. 
The major reason why relational governance is suitable to control the behavior of dis-
persed franchisees is that control in the day-to-day operations is often guaranteed by means 
of persuasion – not authority (i.e., contracts). Bradach (1997: p. 288) cited one franchise 
consultant – franchisor personnel charged with managing the contact to outlets – who de-
scribed that “relationships are crucial and when they deteriorate it becomes extremely frus-
trating to try to get the company’s goals across”. Good dealings may be essential because 
formal contractual control is associated with legal and administrative costs as well as with 
motivational crowding out (e.g., Macaulay, 1963; Osterloh et al., 2001). 
2.2.2 Specific norms and autonomy 
In order to describe how relational governance functions as a protective device against 
opportunistic abuses of autonomy, concrete exchange norms have to be specified. Most 
studies on relational governance in distribution channels have drawn from the atmospheric 
dimensions initially proposed by Macneil (1980), though none considered all of the ele-
ments simultaneously (see, for a review, Ivens and Blois, 2004). Concerns about the con-
sequences of incompleteness in the consideration of codes of conduct can be partially ac-
                                                                                                                                                                 
relationship. Only those norms which conform to the criterion that they potentially safeguard exchanges 
against conflict are considered here.  
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commodated. Noordewier et al. (1990: p. 84) noted that individual norms tend to be highly 
related to one another and might thus be part of a single higher order “relational syn-
drome”. Therefore, no attempt was made here to be exhaustive in the enumeration of 
shared behavioral expectations as they are discussed in the literature. Attention was paid to 
(1) the harmonization of conflict, (2) the intensity of cooperation, and (3) the prevalence of 
trust in any dyad. The construct of relational governance encompasses these three aspects. 
As explained below, these dimensions are considered to be relevant in the context of fran-
chisee-franchisor dyads. 
The harmonization of conflict norm defines the extent to which a franchisee and a fran-
chisor find mutually satisfying solutions to conflicts (Macneil, 1980: pp. 67-68; Mohr and 
Spekman, 1994: pp. 139-140; Gundlach et al., 1995: p. 81; Brown et al., 2000: pp. 53-54). 
A dyad can be classified as being more relational, the better it achieves to settle conflicts 
such that the benefits of the exchange remain ex post for both the up- and the downstream 
firms.64 Because the long-term character of franchise agreements inevitably imposes needs 
for flexible change over the life cycle of the relationship, harmonization of conflict also 
presumes an intensification of the flexibility norm (Ivens and Blois, 2004: p. 247). The 
flexibility norm refers to the parties’ willingness to continuously negotiate and agree on 
mutual obligations. Flexibility is especially needed when franchisees gain in autonomy for 
decision rights are accorded to them precisely in order to engage in explorative and adap-
tive activities. Whereas the need for change may be obvious to both parties, there may be 
intense bargaining over the distribution of outcomes. Dyadic partners who share the har-
monization of conflict norm attempt, by definition, “to resolve their disagreements in mu-
tually satisfying ways, including refraining from opportunism” (Brown et al., 2000: p. 54). 
Cooperation is a second element capturing the relational nature in any franchisee-
franchisor dyad. It refers to the extent to which exchange parties carry out their respective 
tasks in a coordinated and cooperative way (Anderson and Narus, 1990: p. 45; Heide and 
John, 1990: p. 25; Lambe et al., 2000: p. 214). A dyad becomes increasingly relational, the 
more the operations and planning procedures of both parties are intertwined; namely, ex-
ceeding the minimum requirements of the contract. Anderson and Narus (1990: p. 45) 
stated that cooperation is effectuated in order to realize “mutual outcomes or singular out-
comes with expected reciprocation over time” (emphases added). The concept of coopera-
tion is thus related to Macneil’s norm of mutuality – which he later referred to as reciproc-
                                                     
64 Note that every transaction, whether discrete or relational, necessarily needs an ex ante minimum level of 
harmonization within the social matrix for the transaction to take place. 
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ity (Boyle et al. 1992: p. 464). Mutuality, although not requiring equality in the distribution 
of outcomes, does presume an even distribution of surpluses (Macneil, 1980: p. 44; Kauf-
mann and Stern, 1988: p. 536; Spinelli and Birley, 1996: p. 336). Cooperation and mutual-
ity establish when franchisors and franchisees learn that outcomes from joint effort exceed 
those achievable through self-interest seeking and opportunism. 
Third, trust is a necessary condition for relational governance to emerge (Zaheer and 
Venkatraman, 1995: p. 378). Drawing from past research on inter-organizational linkages, 
trust is referred to as the expectation of an actor that another actor can be relied on to fulfill 
promises and to act fairly where the possibility for opportunism is present (Zaheer et al., 
1998: p. 143); including situations where his or her own decisions are affected and moni-
toring of the others’ actions is impossible (Gambetta, 1988: p. 217; Adler, 2001: p. 217).65 
Trust between franchisees and the franchisor conditions a multitude of other exchange 
norms. Most importantly, trusting parties are expected to have a clear understanding of 
each others’ roles and associated promises and a mutual expectation of their respective 
enactments. This is what Macneil (1980: p. 40) refers to as the role integrity norm (see also 
Kaufmann and Stern, 1988: p. 536). Channel members who fulfill their roles do, by defini-
tion, not behave opportunistically (Brown et al., 2000: p. 54). Therefore, in trusting dyads, 
where the role integrity norm is intense, less opportunistic action is expected compared to 
dyads in which trust and role integrity are weak. The view of trust as a mechanism against 
the risk of opportunistic action is in line with previous research on the effects of trust on 
economic organization (e.g., Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Granovetter, 1985; Ring and Van 
de Ven, 1992; Bromiley and Cummings, 1995). 
As a common feature of norms, they define acceptable limits to behavior, taking the 
preservation of the relationship as a constraint. Elaborating on their binding character for 
the behavior of exchange parties, Heide and John (1992: p. 35) noted that relational norms 
inherently constitute a safeguard against the exploitive abuse of decision rights. The analy-
sis of the relationship between Avis Europe PLC (AVE) and its franchisees provided by 
Jacobsen (2004: p. 530) illustrates this argument: “AVE fully expects the franchisees to 
operate vehicles that meet Avis quality standards. This ‘no lemons’ principle refers to the 
                                                     
65 In the vast literature on trust, there is considerable debate over an appropriate conceptualization. Bigley 
and Pearce (1998: p. 408) put forward that a universal conceptualization of trust (and distrust) is unlikely to 
be successfully devised and that the definition should be tailored to the research question at hand. Therefore, 
I followed a definition employed earlier in the study of inter-organizational exchanges. I felt that the defini-
tion adopted here, which conceives of trust as a decision to cooperate under asymmetric information, con-
forms to the circumstances found in principal-agent relationships such as between franchisees and franchi-
sors. 
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exclusion of cheap, low-quality, high mileage cars. Whilst the maintenance of standards is 
emphasized in the contract, the particulars are not articulated. Hence, reliance is placed on 
an informal understanding as a means of preventing shirking or quality-shading on the part 
of the franchisee.” Since franchisees are expected to behave appropriately on the grounds 
of these informal understandings, they are given autonomy to independently decide on the 
car fleet. Other empirical results support this logic. In a laboratory experiment, Gundlach et 
al. (1995), for instance, found that the existence of shared expectations was negatively re-
lated to opportunism on both sides of an exchange. The parties use self-control based on 
internalized values (Heide, 1994: p. 74) and/or the value of future transactions in the rela-
tionship (Voss, 2001; Baker et al., 2002) to prevent opportunism. In light of the reasoning 
presented above, the relationship between autonomy and relational governance is formal-
ized in the following way: 
H1: The extent of franchisee entrepreneurial autonomy is positively 
related to the intensity of relational governance in any dyad. 
2.2.3 The moderating role of franchisee incentive characteristics 
Thus far, it was implicitly assumed that franchise networks accompany autonomous deci-
sion-making at the outlets with equal relational governance intensity irrespectively of fran-
chisees’ incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior. However, past research revealed 
idiosyncratic incentive characteristics across stores of a same chain (e.g., Gal-Or, 1995; 
Lafontaine and Slade, 1997). In addition, any costs being brought about by relational con-
trol were ignored. Yet, the setup of dense ties with focal partners consumes time and re-
sources (Larson, 1992: p. 91; Heide, 1994: p. 76; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994: p. 100; 
Poppo and Zenger, 2002: p. 710). It is a planned activity and may not only include costs of 
trust building but also those of failing to reach minimal levels of trust (Das and Teng, 
1998: p. 496). Thus, investments necessary to shape exchange norms constitute sunk certi-
fication costs (Mills and Ungson, 2003: p. 148) to be borne primarily by the systems’ 
headquarters. As a consequence, franchisors should commit resources to the development 
of intense linkages only in the presence of significant incentives of franchisees to deviate 
from the company’s interests. In sum, franchisees with incentive structures more closely 
aligned to those of the company should be awarded entrepreneurial autonomy with less 
counterbalancing through relational forms of governance.66 Formally: 
                                                     
66 Incentive characteristics are also expected to directly affect the need for relational governance. Therefore, 
the variables which describe these incentive characteristics were included as controls in the regression mod-
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H2: The degree of structural incentive congruence in a dyad will 
moderate the relationship between the extent of franchisee autonomy 
and relational governance intensity: specifically, the positive relation-
ship between autonomy and relational governance will be stronger, the 
weaker franchisees’ incentives are aligned with the franchisor. 
In the following, five incentive characteristics are considered with regard to their impact 
on the link between autonomy and relational governance: multi-unit ownership (2.2.3.1), 
age of the franchisee-franchisor relationship (2.2.3.2), geographic distance between a fran-
chisee’s outlet and the chain’s head office (2.2.3.3), past franchisee success (2.2.3.4), and 
the level of intra-brand competition faced by a unit (2.2.3.5). 
2.2.3.1 Multi-unit ownership 
Multi-unit ownership describes a situation where one franchisee owns more than one outlet 
(Kaufmann and Dant, 1996: p. 346). While some multi-unit franchisees start a single unit 
in the beginning and acquire the rights to operate additional outlets over time, referred to as 
sequential expansion, others are entitled to run multiple units from the outset, referred to as 
master franchising (Kaufmann and Kim, 1995; see, also, Garg et al., 2005). 
Empirical evidence suggests that franchise companies must be little concerned about 
opportunistic abuses of autonomy by multi-unit agents (Dant and Gundlach, 1999: p. 55). 
This is because the interests of multi-unit owners are closely aligned with those of the en-
tire network. Most notably, incentives to free-ride on the common brand name are weak, 
even in nonrepeat customer industries (Dant and Nasr, 1998: p. 14). By cheating on qual-
ity, multi-unit partners would jeopardize their own sales to a greater extent than would 
their single-unit counterparts. In other words, multi-unit ownership internalizes a large 
fraction of specific investments in the trade name. Furthermore, due to higher stakes in 
question, head offices are less likely to terminate or non-renew contracts of multi-unit than 
those of single-unit franchisees. Therefore, the former should project their channel mem-
bership farther into the future than the latter. Consequently, foregoing investments in qual-
ity would impair future sales of franchisees owning multiple units to a relatively large de-
gree (Dant and Nasr, 1998: p. 14). Dant and Gundlach (1999: p. 45) summarized the argu-
ment as follows: when allocated decision-making authority, multi-unit franchisees “are not 
likely to exploit such opportunities to deviate from the prescribed procedures because they 
                                                                                                                                                                 
els. No hypotheses about their main effects were built since the purpose of this chapter is to highlight the 
agency problems resulting from autonomy and how these are attenuated or exacerbated by incentive charac-
teristics of individual franchisees.  
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can directly appreciate the rationale for discipline and standardization within a franchising 
context from the franchisor’s perspective”. Anticipating this incentive structure, the mar-
ginal benefits from investments in relational quality with multi-unit owners should be 
smaller for every given level of autonomy compared to the benefits derived from invest-
ments in good dealings with single-unit operators. 
H2a: The number of outlets owned by a franchisee will moderate the 
relationship between the extent of autonomy and relational govern-
ance intensity: specifically, the positive relationship between auton-
omy and relational governance will be stronger among single-unit 
than among multi-unit franchisees. 
2.2.3.2 Age of the franchisee-franchisor relationship 
Age of the relationship defines the time period since a franchisee started operating his first 
outlet. Relationship length has been argued to positively influence the expectations on both 
sides of the dyad about the continuity of the exchange in the future (Dant and Nasr, 1998: 
p. 12). Franchisees’ incentives to invest in system-specific assets, thereby refraining from 
free-riding, increase as the future time horizon over which such investments can be amor-
tized extends. Also, potential pecuniary advantages from opportunistic deviation that 
would accrue in the short-run are more likely to be evened out by the gains from coopera-
tion, the longer the discounting period. 
From the perspective of the chain, the age of a relationship can also be interpreted as an 
indicator for past agent behavior, namely whether autonomy has been utilized construc-
tively (see, generally, Eisenhardt, 1989a: p. 62). Franchisors’ unilateral discretion about 
periodical contractual renewal provides a bond to punish opportunism. Thus, the track re-
cord of franchised partners which have been part of the system over two or more contrac-
tual periods should certify their quality (Dant and Nasr, 1998: pp. 12-13). 
Besides the risk of opportunism, downstream decision-making independence can also 
damage a system’s reputation due to a lack of knowledge about routines and procedures on 
behalf of inexperienced franchisee-entrepreneurs. In this sense, relational governance can 
be understood as a communication and cooperation mechanism amenable to assist the out-
lets as they gain in control over decisions. With the passage of time, the dispersed units 
acquire proficiency and specific knowledge about operations and assistance should become 
less important. 
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The preceding arguments support a negative relationship between relationship length 
and the need for shared behavioral norms. From the knowledge-based rationale above, 
however, one can also derive a positive relationship between age of the relationship and 
the severity of agency issues. Since, over time, franchisees gain in experience regarding 
specificities of local demand and efficient operating processes, they develop own beliefs 
about quality and behavioral standards and increasingly challenge the franchisor’s author-
ity (Knight, 1986: p. 13; Baucus et al., 1996: p. 373). Their willingness to comply with 
imposed standards may decrease as a result, augmenting agency conflicts. 
In sum, however, the motivation for franchisors investing less in relational governance 
at every level of autonomy when relationship length increases is more compelling and 
therefore the following hypothesis should hold. 
H2b: Age of the franchisee-franchisor relationship will moderate the 
relationship between the extent of autonomy and relational govern-
ance intensity: specifically, the positive relationship between auton-
omy and relational governance will be stronger among younger than 
among older dyads. 
2.2.3.3 Geographic distance 
Geographic distance denotes how far an outlet is physically remote from the franchisor’s 
monitoring head office. Distance raises the level of behavioral uncertainty about the agent 
and widens the information gap in the dyad (Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996: p. 424). This is 
because monitoring is costly. More precisely, the costs of sending a company representa-
tive to inspect a unit’s operations (e.g., cleanliness, product quality) increase in the number 
of kilometers between the system’s head office and the outlet. 
Monitoring costs are central to agency theory’s prediction about the choice of vertical 
integration versus franchising. The argument assumes that managers of owned units have 
weak incentives to perform efficiently since a large fraction of their salary is fixed. Al-
though financial performance of a store can be gauged by the company in each period, per-
formance may not be attributable to either the outlet’s manager or to other factors beyond 
his control, such as the general economic environment. Where behavior-based monitoring 
is difficult, the franchisor may, in consequence, franchise an outlet. Franchisees have 
higher incentives to perform since they claim the unit’s residual profits. Brickley and Dark 
(1987) as well as Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque (1995) provided empirical evidence in 
line with the agency-theoretic argument that physically removed outlets tend to be fran-
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chised whereas those in proximity to headquarters are company-owned. Monitoring costs 
thus have an important bearing on the organization of distribution channels. 
The behavioral uncertainty associated with increased distance should amplify agency 
problems associated with a shift of decision rights from the franchisor to the outlets. 
Agrawal and Lal (1995) showed that monitoring costs negatively affect the frequency of 
inspections by the franchisor and the level of service provided by franchisees. Since behav-
ior-based monitoring is costly, outcome-based controls may be a valuable substitute. How-
ever, electronic data transmission is often inadequate to communicate information that ac-
curately reflects the outlet’s operations (Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque, 1995: p. 1239). In 
addition, franchisees seldom integrate their information systems with the head office 
(Bradach, 1997: p. 288). If relational governance is a mechanism to reduce behavioral un-
certainties, the relationship between autonomy and relational governance would be ex-
pected to be stronger for distant franchisees than for those partners located close to the 
network’s head office. 
H2c: Geographic distance between a franchised outlet and the franchi-
sor’s monitoring head office will moderate the relationship between 
the extent of autonomy and relational governance intensity: specifi-
cally, the positive relationship between autonomy and relational gov-
ernance will be stronger among distant franchisees than among those 
located closer to the monitoring head office. 
2.2.3.4 Success 
Success pertains to franchisees’ satisfaction with past economic performance relative to 
comparison levels (Anderson and Narus, 1990: p. 44). Drawing from power-dependence 
theory, Dwyer and Oh (1987: p. 349) noted that because of their criticality for systems’ 
access to growing markets, franchisee-entrepreneurs operating in munificent environments 
(i.e., those who are generally successful) have power over the extent of control exercised 
by the principal. Conversely, poor performing outlets are more likely to actively seek cen-
tralized franchisor support (Peterson and Dant, 1990: p. 49). Indeed, empirical evidence 
indicates that munificence in local markets decreases bureaucratization (i.e., formalization 
and centralization) thereby favoring downstream independent decision-making (Dwyer and 
Oh, 1987: p. 355). In a similar vein, it could be argued that networks’ dependence on suc-
cessful franchised stores also increases these agents’ bargaining power in case of conflict; 
bargaining power which franchisees can exploit to their advantage and at the expense of 
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the chain. This line of reasoning would suggest relatively strong requirements for relational 
exchange norms to accompany autonomy of successful franchisees. 
Based on self-enforcement theory (see B-I.), I alternatively submit that high levels of 
satisfaction with past performance reduce the risk of opportunism. Self-enforcement oper-
ates by leaving sufficient rents downstream such that the threat of termination of the rela-
tionship ensures franchisee compliance. Chains must observe performance at stores 
through monitoring and subjectively decide whether it conforms to the desired level. Spe-
cifically, in order for the implicit contract to be self-enforcing, franchisees’ discounted 
extra gains from opportunistic behavior (before being terminated) must be smaller than the 
discounted rent stream that accrues from cooperation in the long run. The higher a fran-
chised outlet’s economic potential, the more important the returns foregone upon termina-
tion. At every given level of autonomy, opportunism should then be better controlled, the 
higher a franchisee’s performance. Therefore: 
H2d: Franchisee success will moderate the relationship between the 
extent of autonomy and relational governance intensity: specifically, 
the positive relationship between autonomy and relational governance 
will be stronger among franchisees which are less successful than 
among those which are more successful. 
2.2.3.5 Competition 
Intra-chain competitive intensity soars with the number and geographic proximity of affili-
ated outlets (Posselt, 1999: p. 358). The extent of rivalry a franchisee confronts with peers 
(and company outlets) of the same chain determines his incentives to free-ride. In this vein, 
Arruñada et al. (2001: p. 262) pointed out that the larger the network size (and thus likely 
the degree of intra-chain competition), as given by the number of dealers, the more impor-
tant the extent of horizontal externalities. Horizontal externalities emerge as a result of an 
individual franchisee’s inability to realize the full benefits accruing to his investments in 
improving the quality of products and the reputation of the chain. While the whole chain 
capitalizes on enhanced reputation in terms of rising sales volumes, the individual outlet 
will only extract a small fraction of these increases. Franchisee-entrepreneurs have an in-
centive to wait for other stores to commit the necessary resources, thereby keeping costs 
down and profits up. Now, competition has the effect of reducing a franchisee’s market 
size and thereby the fraction of returns from investments in reputation which can be inter-
nalized. Furthermore, market size affects the functioning of the self-enforcement mecha-
B-II. Relational Governance in Idiosyncratic Dyads 
 
72
nism. This mechanism, as outlined above, relies on the provision of an ongoing rent to 
franchisees. Market size positively determines the level of these rents and thereby the 
amount foregone by franchisees when the contract is terminated (Klein and Murphy, 1988: 
p. 207). The lower the level of rents lost upon termination, the higher the attractiveness of 
realizing short-term gains from moral hazard. Therefore, competition should amplify the 
need for relational safeguards. As a result, for every given level of autonomy, franchisors 
should invest more heavily in the quality of relationships to franchisees facing intense 
competition than to those facing low competition. 
H2e: The level of intra-chain competition perceived by a franchisee 
will moderate the relationship between the extent of autonomy and re-
lational governance intensity: specifically, the positive relationship be-
tween autonomy and relational governance will be stronger among 
franchisees which perceive higher levels of competition than among 
those which perceive lower levels of competition. 
3. Empirical tests 
3.1 Sample 
The hypotheses were tested on cross-sectional data collected from a sample of franchisees 
operating in Germany. The data were gathered through mail surveys and for purposes of a 
broader research project on franchisee satisfaction (see Schlüter, 2001) during the years 
1999 to 2003. A self-administered questionnaire was sent to the whole population of fran-
chised outlets within each of 11 different business-format franchise chains participating in 
the study.67 Franchisors provided the postal addresses of their partners to the researchers. 
Each mailing included the questionnaire, a cover letter describing the purposes of the study 
and guaranteeing anonymity to participants, as well as a postage-paid reply envelope. 
The specific formulation of the Likert-type questionnaire items emerged from a qualita-
tive-explorative pre-study involving franchisors, consultants, and franchisee focus groups. 
A total of four moderated focus groups gathered 15 franchisees from eight different chains. 
In the framework of these meetings, probands were given the opportunity to express im-
portant facets of the relationship to their franchisors. Balance and trust in the partnership 
were named central criteria regarding relationship quality. 
                                                     
67 The average chain was 13.87 years old, had 104.12 franchised outlets, and an entry fee of about 19.000 €.   
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In collaboration with the participating chains’ management teams, channel members 
had been informed about the study in advance of the mailings to assure that, following the 
key informant approach, the owners of the outlets personally answered the questionnaire. 
Despite collaboration with the systems’ head offices in conducting the survey, participation 
in the study remained voluntary. In order to enhance response rates, subjects were offered a 
copy of the survey results; no other incentives to participate in the study were provided. 
In total, questionnaires were sent to 1050 franchisees. After reminder notices, the survey 
yielded an overall average (weighted) response rate of 21 percent (system specific response 
rates lay between 13.68 and 42.85 percent). The final sample consisted of 208 observa-
tions. Table 5 provides a breakdown of the number of sampled units across chains. Based 
on the detailed classification scheme used by Lafontaine and Shaw (2001: p. 35), each of 
the networks operated in a different industry sector. The population the sample draws from 
is defined as the entirety of franchisees from these sectors in Germany. 
Table 5. Breakdown of franchisees across chains and industries 
Tests for nonresponse biases were conducted by comparing the average sampled obser-
vation in each system with the average outlet-owner computed from the population of each 
chain along the dimensions age, gender, number of years in business, and multi-unit own-
ership. To obtain information on the characteristics of the populations, officials in the 
chains were contacted. For system 4 (10 percent of cases in the sample, see Table 5), it was 
not possible to discuss the data with the chain’s management because the network has dis-
solved since the survey was conducted. No evidence of obvious nonresponse biases 
emerged for the remaining systems. 
System Sector Number of franchisees 
in sample 
System-specific response  
rates (in %) 
% of total number of franchisees  
across systems in sample 
1  Retail: Food 17  24  8.17  
2  Business services 5  20  2.40  
3  Retail: Home furnishings 3  43  1.44  
4  Retail: Pet food 21  32  10.10  
5  Retail: Building materials 34  18  16.35  
6  Retail: Computer equipment 18  30  8.65  
7  Repair 10  19  4.81  
8  Retail: Other 13  14  6.25  
9  Eating places: Full service 5  19  2.40  
10  Retail: Tobacco 13  16  6.25  
11  Travel 69  18  33.18  
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3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 Dependent variable 
Relational governance was operationalized using items alluding to the exchange dimen-
sions identified in the theoretical section: harmonization of conflict, intensity of coopera-
tion, and prevalence of trust (see Appendix B for the exact wording). 
The questions relating to the harmonization of conflict norm (5a-5c) evaluated to which 
degree dyadic partners engaged in problem solving as opposed to cultivating disputes (see 
Dant and Schul, 1992: p. 39). Items 5d to 5f assessed the most important element of coop-
erative behavior, namely, the extent to which mutual interdependence was appreciated by 
the channel members in their respective business processes (see Anderson and Narus, 
1990: p. 45). The trust specific items (5g-5i) tapped whether vulnerabilities on both sides 
were mutually exploited by the other, a central theme of trust research (see Bigley and 
Pearce, 1998: p. 406). 
The “syndrome” of relational governance was expected to encompass these partially 
overlapping norms. Results of a principal component factor analysis (see Appendix C) 
revealed that the three dimensions were indeed part of a higher order construct. All of the 
items loaded highly on one factor (all factor loadings ≥  0.577), suggesting that they were 
strongly associated with each other. A composite measure was built by summing and aver-
aging – using equal weights – the scores of the individual items. Reliability of the sum-
mated scale was assessed by Cronbach’s alpha. The alpha value of 0.87 was well above the 
lower limit of acceptability, set at 0.60 for newly developed scales (Hair et al., 1998: p. 
118). Also, item-to-total as well as inter-item correlations were investigated. The results 
confirmed sufficient reliability of the relational governance construct. Furthermore, con-
vergent scale validity was assessed by inspecting the correlation between the summated 
scale and a single item capturing franchisees’ overall satisfaction with the quality of the 
relationship to the provider of the business-format (exact wording: How satisfied are you 
overall with your relationship to the franchisor? 1-7; very unsatisfied-very satisfied). The 
strength of the bivariate correlation was substantial (r = 0.773, p < 0.001). Concerning va-
lidity, it must be cautioned that a single source key informant approach was followed. John 
and Reve (1982) noted that sentiments variables, such as exchange norms, may fail to con-
verge across respondents from the opposite sides of a dyadic relationship. However, it is 
claimed that relational governance was measured on the “right” side of the dyad (with 
franchisees) for relational governance only safeguards against conflict when the party 
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which has room for opportunism (brought about by franchisee autonomy) perceives the 
above norms to be relevant for his behavior. 
3.2.2 Independent variables 
Autonomy. Respondents assessed their perceived level of autonomy on four separate ques-
tionnaire items (see Appendix B). These intended to capture two notions of autonomy fre-
quently reappearing in the literature: (1) the leeway to make independent decisions, and (2) 
quasi as a result, the extent to which a franchisee feels to be his own boss (e.g., Schul et 
al., 1985: pp. 16-17; Feldstead, 1991: p. 83). Questions 6a and 6b grasped to what extent 
franchisees perceived to be unconstrained when making decisions, referring to the first 
notion above. Items 6c and 6d measured, corresponding to the second notion, whether the 
franchised partners considered themselves as primarily executing directives, being em-
ployees, or rather managing their outlet according to own decisions, being entrepreneurs.68 
Results of a principal component factor analysis (see Appendix D) indicated the four items 
to load highly on one common factor (all factor loadings ≥  0.645). The scores on the four 
items were summed and averaged – using equal weights. Cronbach’s alpha of reliability 
for the composite autonomy measure was 0.64. Reliability was further assured through 
item-to-total and inter-item correlations. With all inter-item correlations except one (being 
r = 0.29) exceeding the threshold of 0.30 and all item-to-total correlations above 0.50 (the 
smallest correlation being 0.55), I felt confident about the reliability of the scale. 
One caveat regarding this measurement approach must be highlighted. It is assumed that 
franchisors are aware of the level of autonomy each franchisee disposes of. It could be ar-
gued that measuring franchisors’ perceived levels of autonomy with regard to each indi-
vidual outlet would have been more accurate. However, John and Reve’s (1982) results 
accommodate this concern. The authors showed that perceptions on structural variables 
such as the degree of centralization of channel dyad decision-making converge across key 
informants from the different sides of a dyad.  
Multi-unit ownership. Consistent with earlier literature (e.g., Dant and Gundlach, 1999: 
p. 48), a nominal no/yes question, coded as a dummy variable (0 = no; 1 = yes), was used 
to ascertain whether a franchisee operated one or more outlets (see Appendix B). 
                                                     
68 These latter two questions position franchisees on an independence continuum as proposed by Knight 
(1984). 
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Age of the franchisee-franchisor relationship. Franchisees were asked to indicate the 
year in which they opened their outlet, from which the relationship length to the company 
was calculated. This measure is consistent with Dant and Nasr (1998: p. 17). 
Distance. Following Brickley and Dark (1987: p. 412) as well as Minkler (1990: p. 79), 
geographic distance was calculated as the number of kilometers (instead of miles) that lie 
in between a franchised outlet and the chain’s head office. In the questionnaire, respon-
dents specified the first two digits of their postal code. Although information about the full 
postal code, comprising five digits, would have added precision to the calculations, only 
two digits were requested in order to guarantee anonymity. To calculate distance, a stan-
dard route planning software was used; introducing franchisees’ two-digit postal code as 
the destination and the five-digit postal code of chains’ headquarters as the starting point.69 
Success. Franchisee success, or the extent of satisfaction with past performance, was 
measured by four separate questionnaire items (see Appendix B). The questions asked re-
spondents to evaluate their recent performance relative to different comparison levels. 
Comparison levels included (1) alternative activities, (2) average industry sales growth, (3) 
own income expectations, and (4) own sales objectives. Anchoring success by reference to 
comparison levels is in line with Anderson and Narus (1990: p. 44). The results of a prin-
cipal component factor analysis (see Appendix D) revealed the four items to load highly on 
one factor (all factor loadings ≥  0.633). A scale was built which averaged – using equal 
weights – the sum of the scores on the four items. Cronbach’s alpha of reliability was 0.83. 
Inspection of item-to-total and inter-item correlations provided further support for the reli-
ability of the scale. Convergent scale validity was verified via the correlation between the 
summated scale and a single item assessing franchisees’ overall satisfaction with perform-
ance (exact wording: How satisfied are you overall with your performance? 1-7; very un-
satisfied-very satisfied). The correlation could be classified as substantial (r = 0.713, p < 
0.001). 
Competition. The measure evaluated the intensity of competition between franchisees of 
the same chain, i.e., intra-chain competition (see Appendix B). Outlet-owners were called 
upon to report whether the number of franchised outlets in the chain exceeded a reasonable 
size. In the present context, a perceptual measure seemed more appropriate than an objec-
tive count of the number of outlets in the chain – as previously used by other researchers 
(e.g., Arruñada et al., 2001: p. 268). First, a simple count does not capture the geographic 
                                                     
69 A two-digit postal code covers a surface of approximately 6000 square kilometres. There are 99 different 
two-digit postal codes in Germany. 
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dispersion of outlets and thus the level of intra-brand competition faced by each individual 
unit. Although the measure here did not ask respondents to state whether the number of 
franchised outlets in their geographic area had exceeded a reasonable size, it is sensible to 
assume that answers were provided with this fact in mind. Second, actual free-riding be-
havior generally needs to be preceded by the perception of the potential to improve one’s 
own performance at the expense of peer franchisees and/or company-outlets. Validity of 
this measure was checked by correlating it with the number of sampled franchised outlets 
within each geographic area, as defined by the two-digit postal codes. This is a measure 
similar to Minkler’s (1990: p. 80) outlet density, calculated as the number of stores within 
a five mile radius. The correlation between the two measures amounted to only 0.19, but 
was significant at the 0.01 percent level. Given that I could only count franchisees which 
were included in the sample, I felt that the correlation with the perceptual measure indi-
cated sufficient convergent validity. 
3.2.3 Control variables 
In the empirical models, there was no need to control for contractual variables (e.g., royalty 
rates) usually considered by agency theorists in the study of franchising (e.g., Lafontaine, 
1992). This is because the study focused on variance in autonomy across outlets of a same 
chain. As an empirical fact, franchisees within any system usually face homogenous con-
tractual conditions. Variance in contractual terms across the 11 different chains in the sam-
ple was captured by 10 system dummy variables.70 The variables which describe franchi-
sees’ incentive characteristics were also included as controls since these were expected to 
affect the need for relational governance. 
3.3 Methods and results 
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 6 shows descriptive statistics on the variables used in this study (only arithmetic 
means and standard deviations are reported). 
Inspection of descriptive statistics on the dependent variable revealed that the average 
franchisee perceived high relational governance intensity in the past (mean = 5.35). Posi-
tive responses to questions tapping relational elements in franchising are not unusual. In 
                                                     
70 The system dummy variables may also capture the general or average level of franchisee autonomy within 
a chain and therefore be related significantly to relational governance. This average level of autonomy, in 
turn, is determined by the business the franchise system operates in, the level of competition the franchise 
system faces, environmental uncertainty, etc.    
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part, they may reflect structural characteristics of franchise chains; that is, franchising, by 
definition, implies an ongoing relationship and cooperative effort between dyadic partners 
(Dant and Schul, 1992: p. 49). However, with a minimum of 2.56 and a maximum of 7 
(s.d. = 1.06), the data also showed a high range of scores. The observed variance across 
franchisees assured that the measure captured “true” relational facets. This observation is 
not trivial since, for instance, Dant and Schul (1992: p. 50) found – reflecting structural 
conditions – virtually no variance on other atmospheric variables such as the degree of 
solidarity within any dyad. 
Descriptive figures for the independent variables are as follows. First, about one fourth 
of the franchisees in the sample owned more than one outlet (mean = 0.23). Second, the 
distribution of scores on the autonomy scale occurred around a mean of 5.45. This suggests 
that the average franchisee in the sample perceived relatively high degrees of autonomy in 
decision-making. Third, the mean age of franchisee-franchisor relationships in the sample 
was 7.5 years. Fourth, the average outlet was placed at a distance of 310 kilometeres from 
the chain’s head office (s.d. = 206.77). For an outlet which was situated within the same 
two-digit postal code as the system’s head office, I attributed a distance of zero kilometers 
separating the two sites – the minimum on this variable. The maximum distance recorded 
in the sample was 793 kilometers. Fifth, the observed scores on the success variable ranged 
from 1 to 7 (mean = 4.41). Hence, very successful franchisees were included in the sample 
but also some which were unsatisfied with performance given various comparison levels. 
Finally, the average franchisee-entrepreneur in the sample perceived rather low levels of 
intra-chain competition (mean = 2.98). 
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Table 6. Pearson correlations and descriptive statistics
Variable mean s.d. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) System Dummy 1 0.08 0.27                 
(2) System Dummy 2 0.02 0.15 -0.05                
(3) System Dummy 3 0.01 0.12 -0.04 -0.02               
(4) System Dummy 4 0.10 0.30 -0.10 -0.05 -0.04              
(5) System Dummy 5 0.16 0.37 -0.13 -0.07 -0.05 -0.15             
(6) System Dummy 6 0.09 0.28 -0.09 -0.05 -0.04 -0.10 -0.14*            
(7) System Dummy 7 0.05 0.21 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 -0.10 -0.07           
(8) System Dummy 8 0.06 0.24 -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 -0.09 -0.11 -0.08 -0.06          
(9) System Dummy 9 0.02 0.15 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04         
(10) System Dummy 10 0.06 0.24 -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 -0.09 -0.11 -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04        
(11) Relational governance 5.35 1.06 0.29*** -0.02 0.08 0.36*** -0.04 -0.07 0.07 -0.02 -0.18* 0.09       
(12) Multi-unit ownership 0.23 0.42 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.18** 0.38*** -0.09 -0.12 -0.09 -0.09 0.05 0.00      
(13) Age of relationship 7.50 5.76 -0.11 -0.05 -0.02 -0.17* 0.66** -0.06 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 0.36***     
(14) Distance 309.74 206.77 -0.12 0.21** -0.17* -0.18* 0.06 0.11 -0.09 -0.07 0.08 -0.23** -0.32*** 0.02 0.05    
(15) Success 4.41 1.35 0.26*** -0.03 -0.04 0.31*** 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.04 -0.14 0.01 0.51*** 0.13 0.09 -0.12   
(16) Competition 2.98 2.06 -0.14* -0.08 -0.04 -0.18* 0.12 -0.06 -0.11 -0.08 0.03 0.11 -0.33*** 0.08 0.09 0.04 -0.19**  
(17) Autonomy 5.45 0.70 0.23** -0.04 0.04 0.28*** -0.04 0.01 0.05 -0.25*** -0.38*** 0.10 0.55*** 0.03 -0.08 -0.20** 0.37*** -0.25*** 
n = 208. Significance levels (two-tailed): *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
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3.3.2 Regression results 
Table 6 shows bivariate Pearson correlations between the variables. A positive and highly 
significant correlation (r = 0.55, p < 0.001) between autonomy and relational governance 
was found, providing preliminary evidence for H1. But significant correlations among the 
independent variables suggested using multivariate regression techniques to examine the 
variance in the endogenous variable uniquely explained by the theoretical constructs of 
interest to the hypotheses. 
As a multivariate dependence technique, hierarchical ordinary least squares regressions 
were employed (OLS). For testing the implications of franchisee incentive characteristics 
on the relationship postulated in the first hypothesis (H2a through H2e), moderated OLS 
regressions were estimated (Aiken and West, 1991). These are appropriate to reveal 
whether a certain variable, the moderator, has an influence on the strength and/or form of 
the relationship between an independent and a dependent variable. 
To assure that the results are reliable, tests for the assumptions of multivariate regres-
sion techniques were performed. Variance inflation factors, Kolmogorov-Smirnov, as well 
as Breusch-Pagan tests gave no indications for any of the assumptions being violated. 
First, relational governance was regressed on the system dummies and the independent 
variables except for autonomy (Model 1 in Table 7). This estimation was found to be 
highly significant (adj. R2 = 0.418, p < 0.001). Distance (b = -0.001, p < 0.01), success (b = 
0.255, p < 0.001), and competition (b = -0.103, p < 0.01) came out significant.  
In a second step, autonomy was added to the regression equation (Model 2). The coeffi-
cient for this variable was positive (b = 0.489) and highly significant (p < 0.001). H1 was 
therefore strongly supported. With an adjusted R2 of 0.48, explanatory power of Model 2 
was high. Compared to the null model, Model 2 added 6.2 percentage points to the expla-
nation of variance in the data. Significance of the overall model lay at the 0.1 percent level. 
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 Dependent variable: Relational governance 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Constant 5.183
(0.114)
*** 5.158
(0.108)
*** 
 
5.153
(0.107)
*** 
 
5.152
(0.109)
*** 
 
5.168
(0.109)
*** 
 
5.204
(0.108)
*** 
 
5.184
(0.108)
*** 
 
System Dummy 1 0.749
(0.253)
** 
 
0.630
(0.240)
** 
 
0.648
(0.239)
** 
 
0.627
(0.240)
* 
 
0.633
(0.240)
** 
 
0.628
(0.237)
** 
 
0.652
(0.238)
** 
 
System Dummy 2 0.228
(0.385)
 
 
0.318
(0.364)
 
 
0.308
(0.362)
 
 
0.321
(0.365)
 
 
0.316
(0.365)
 
 
0.300
(0.361)
 
 
0.266
(0.363)
 
 
System Dummy 3 0.658
(0.496)
 
 
0.620
(0.469)
 
 
0.618
(0.466)
 
 
0.633
(0.470)
 
 
0.635
(0.470)
 
 
0.521
(0.466)
 
 
0.649
(0.465)
 
 
System Dummy 4 0.818
(0.247)
** 
 
0.685
(0.235)
** 
 
0.652
(0.234)
** 
 
0.674
(0.237)
** 
 
0.690
(0.235)
** 
 
0.778
(0.236)
** 
 
0.728
(0.234)
** 
 
System Dummy 5 -0.016
(0.228)
 
 
0.022
(0.216)
 
 
0.033
(0.215)
 
 
0.038
(0.219)
 
 
-0.022
(0.220)
 
 
-0.012
(0.214)
 
 
0.018
(0.214)
 
 
System Dummy 6 -0.135
(0.227)
 
 
-0.100
(0.215)
 
 
-0.072
(0.214)
 
 
-0.094
(0.216)
 
 
-0.106
(0.215)
 
 
-0.126
(0.213)
 
 
-0.071
(0.214)
 
 
System Dummy 7 0.265
(0.294)
 
 
0.263
(0.277)
 
 
0.262
(0.276)
 
 
0.270
(0.278)
 
 
0.271
(0.278)
 
 
0.186
(0.276)
 
 
0.295
(0.276)
 
 
System Dummy 8 -0.087
(0.260)
 
 
0.317
(0.259)
 
 
0.353
(0.258)
 
 
0.328
(0.260)
 
 
0.304
(0.260)
 
 
0.240
(0.258)
 
 
0.263
(0.258)
 
 
System Dummy 9 -0.593
(0.378)
 
 
0.160
(0.389)
 
 
0.305
(0.395)
 
 
0.158
(0.390)
 
 
0.204
(0.395)
 
 
0.434
(0.403)
 
 
0.175
(0.387)
 
 
System Dummy 10 0.466
(0.263)
† 
 
0.380
(0.249)
 
 
0.396
(0.247)
 
 
0.378
(0.249)
 
 
0.384
(0.249)
 
 
0.405
(0.246)
 
 
0.361
(0.247)
 
 
Multi-unit ownership 0.013
(0.155)
 
 
0.004
(0.146)
 
 
0.020
(0.146)
 
 
0.012
(0.148)
 
 
-0.001
(0.147)
 
 
-0.005
(0.145)
 
 
0.003
(0.145)
 
 
Age of relationship 0.007
(0.013)
 
 
0.009
(0.013)
 
 
0.009
(0.013)
 
 
0.007
(0.014)
 
 
0.010
(0.013)
 
 
0.010
(0.013)
 
 
0.008
(0.013)
 
 
Distance  -0.001
(0.000)
** 
 
-0.001
(0.000)
* 
 
-0.001
(0.000)
* 
 
-0.001
(0.000)
* 
 
-0.001
(0.000)
* 
 
-0.001
(0.000)
** 
 
-0.001
(0.000)
* 
 
Success 0.255
(0.052)
***
 
0.196
(0.051)
*** 
 
0.191
(0.050)
*** 
 
0.194
(0.051)
*** 
 
0.205
(0.052)
*** 
 
0.205
(0.050)
*** 
 
0.207
(0.051)
*** 
 
Competition -0.103
(0.028)
** 
 
-0.073
(0.028)
* 
 
-0.072
(0.028)
* 
 
-0.072
(0.028)
* 
 
-0.072
(0.028)
* 
 
-0.078
(0.028)
** 
 
-0.073
(0.028)
** 
 
Autonomy   0.489
(0.100)
*** 
 
0.485
(0.099)
*** 
 
0.490
(0.100)
*** 
 
0.479
(0.101)
*** 
 
0.498
(0.099)
*** 
 
0.477
(0.099)
*** 
 
Autonomy x  
Multi-unit ownership 
   
 
-0.397
(0.214)
† 
 
    
Autonomy x  
Age of relationship 
   
 
 -0.009
(0.018)
 
 
   
Autonomy x  
Distance 
   
 
  0.000
(0.000)
 
 
  
Autonomy x  
Success 
      -0.142
(0.062)
* 
 
 
Autonomy x 
Competition 
       0.083
(0.042)
* 
 
n 208.000 208.000 208.000 208.000 208.000 208.000 208.000
F 10.894*** 12.937*** 12.533*** 12.141*** 12.715*** 12.750*** 12.588*** 
Adjusted R2 0.418 0.480 0.486 0.478 0.479 0.491 0.488
Δ in adj. R2  0.062 0.006 -0.002 -0.001 0.011 0.008
F Δ in adj. R2  24.000*** 3.433† 0.293 0.501 5.206* 3.881* 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels (two-tailed): *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; 
† p < 0.1. Independent variables have been mean centered (all models) in order to circumvent problems 
of multicollinearity associated with interaction terms. 
Table 7. Regression results of direct and moderated effects 
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The results of the moderated regression models are presented in columns 3 to 7 of Table 
7. H2a stated that franchisors would invest less in shared exchange norms for every level 
of decision-making authority of multi-unit compared to single-unit franchisees since incen-
tives of the former are more closely aligned with the network. The coefficient of the inter-
action term was expected to be negative, attenuating the strength of the positive relation-
ship of H1. Model 3 displayed a negative (b = -0.397) and marginally significant coeffi-
cient (p < 0.10) of the interaction term between autonomy and multi-unit ownership. 
Hence, H2a was weakly supported by the data. The unique variance explained by the inter-
action term amounted to 0.6 percentage points. 
H2b supposed that the older the franchisee-franchisor relationship, the weaker would be 
the need for relational safeguards. Although the coefficient of the interaction term was 
negative (b = -0.009), as expected, it was not statistically significant (see Model 4). The 
data therefore did not support H2b. 
H2c suspected geographic distance between an outlet and the chain’s head office to 
positively moderate the strength of the relationship between autonomy and relational gov-
ernance. While the sign of the coefficient was in the direction expected (see Model 5), the 
influence was not different from zero on statistical grounds. H2c was therefore not sup-
ported. 
The data however lent support for H2d which presumed that it would become less im-
portant to accompany decision-making independence with relational control mechanisms, 
the more successful the franchisee (see Model 6). The coefficient of the interaction term 
was negative (b = -0.142) and statistically significant (p < 0.05). The amount of unique 
variance explained amounted to 1.1 percent. 
H2e suggested a positive coefficient of the interaction between the level of intra-chain 
competition perceived by a franchisee and autonomy. Indeed, Model 7 revealed a positive 
(b = 0.083) and statistically significant (p < 0.05) coefficient. H2e was therefore supported. 
The interaction term explained 0.8 percent of unique variance in the dependent variable. 
3.3.3 Post hoc analyses 
For Models 3, 6, and 7, which revealed significant coefficients of the interactions between 
autonomy and multi-unit ownership, success, and competition, respectively, post hoc 
analyses were conducted. I followed the approach prescribed by Aiken and West (1991) 
which suggests testing for the significance of the simple slopes of the regression line be-
tween the independent and the dependent variables at low, medium, and high values of the 
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continuous moderators. Multi-unit ownership, success, and competition influenced, as pro-
posed by the hypotheses, the strength but not the form of the relationship between the 
autonomy and the dependent variable. It is especially noteworthy that autonomy was, con-
sistent with the predictions, not related at all to relational governance for the group of 
multi-units owners. In addition, while the simple slope at low levels of competition was 
insignificant, it was statistically different from zero at mean and high levels of rivalry. 
4. Discussion 
4.1 Findings and null findings 
The empirical results were fully supportive of the main thesis that franchisors would con-
front agency problems triggered by franchisee autonomy with relational forms of govern-
ance. However, mixed evidence was found for franchisee incentive characteristics to affect 
the severity of these problems at every given level of local decision-making independence 
such that the intensity of observed exchange norms would differ accordingly. While multi-
unit ownership and success attenuated, and competition exacerbated the need for relational 
control as expected, age of the relationship and geographic distance did not emerge as sig-
nificant moderator variables. 
Concerning age of the relationship, one important shortcoming of the measurement in-
strument may provide an explanation for the null finding. Measuring age of the relation-
ship as the number of years elapsed since the first outlet was opened by every single fran-
chisee does not capture the full length of the relationship for every sampled dyad. It is a 
frequent phenomenon that the career path of franchisees involves employment by the com-
pany prior to starting an outlet (Bradach, 1997: p. 292). In addition, even if the full rela-
tionship length had been grasped, the measure would not plainly reflect the severity of 
agency issues at hand. For equal relationship lengths, the goal discrepancies are more se-
vere for a franchisee not previously working at the chain’s head office compared to a for-
mer employee. In this regard, prior socialization into an organization can be an effective 
way of aligning interests (Ouchi, 1980).71 From a theoretical perspective, the insignificant 
interaction term may stem from the two conflicting incentive effects possibly resulting 
                                                     
71 A statement of the COO of one chain studied by Bradach (1997) illustrates this point: “The company peo-
ple know the system. They are proven operators and they appreciate the importance of maintaining standards 
and running the business right” (p. 292). Hence, former company managers understand the requirements to 
operate an outlet and their experience as company managers allows them to appreciate the importance of 
maintaining standards. 
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from an increase in relationship length as outlined in the argument leading up to H2b. On 
the one hand, age of the relationship positively influences the expectations about the conti-
nuity of the liaison in the future and thus the time horizon over which system-specific in-
vestments can be amortized. On the other hand, franchisees gain in experience over time 
and may therefore be increasingly reluctant to comply with imposed standards. 
As regards distance, a methodological problem related to its operationalization was al-
ready acknowledged for I relied only on the first two out of five digits of franchisees’ 
postal codes to determine the geographical position of each outlet. Put into perspective, 
however, the inaccuracy of the measure did not appear to be a serious concern as plausible 
and significant correlations of distance with other variables emerged from the data; for 
instance with autonomy (see Table 6). One theoretical account for the insignificant interac-
tion term is that information asymmetries may have become more independent of physical 
distance with the rise in information technology over the past decade. As a result, the se-
verity of agency issues for remote and nearby outlets and the subsequent need for relational 
safeguards are likely to have converged to some degree. 
4.2 Implications for managers 
The present study bears clear implications for the management of franchised distribution 
channels. First, since the results revealed that multi-unit franchisees necessitate less gov-
ernance intensity in light of decision-making independence, limiting the number of single-
unit partners could lead to efficiency gains.72 As a consequence, the extent of intra-chain 
competition faced by each outlet would also be reduced. Benefits may be derived from 
lower intra-chain competition as the regressions indicated that those franchisees facing few 
competing outlets require less control. Furthermore, the data made a case for the presump-
tion that high performance relative to comparison levels fosters incentive alignment with 
the company. Hence, it may potentially pay-off to leave rents downstream to induce effi-
cient decentralized operations. 
Second, against the backdrop that the incentive characteristics of franchisees are not 
easily modifiable in the short-run, franchisors should carefully pay attention to selectively 
grant decision rights to those partners which are expected to behave appropriately. This 
could increase returns from local adaptation as smaller control costs should be incurred to 
                                                     
72 Note, however, that multi-unit ownership also reintroduces some of the problems franchising seeks to 
solve in the first place, namely shirking on effort on behalf of employed outlet managers. These agency prob-
lems then occur between the (non-managing) multi-unit owner and his employee-managers at the stores un-
der his control.    
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achieve Pareto-improving results. More generally, managers should be aware of the link-
age between structural (i.e., autonomy) and behavioral (i.e., relational governance) proc-
esses in the management of channel members. 
Finally, the research draws attention to the value of relationships in governing dispersed 
outlets. Though no empirical evidence on the performance effects of relying on relational 
governance to control decentralized decision-making structures was provided, the findings 
suggest that norms of behavior provide a powerful safeguard against opportunistic abuses 
of decision rights. Companies which invest in the relationships to their dyadic partners in 
the presence of exchange hazards brought about by downstream autonomy should outper-
form those chains foregoing close ties, all else equal. 
4.3 Limitations 
This study is subject to several limitations. First, standard criticisms of data from percep-
tual survey-type measures such as ambiguity of questions, nonresponse biases, and com-
mon methods variance apply. The ambiguity of questionnaire items was sought to be 
minimized by means of extensive pre-tests with franchisees and experts. Comparison of 
average sampled franchisees in each chain with the average computed from the systems’ 
populations revealed no evidence for obvious response biases. To deal with common 
method variance from social desirability, guarantees of anonymity were provided to re-
spondents. Normally distributed summated scales were indicative of social desirability 
effects being negligible. 
Second, it has to be noted that this study relied on newly developed items to operation-
alize the constructs. However, care was taken in the construction of the scales. The formu-
lation of the questionnaire items arose from a qualitative-explorative pre-study with fran-
chisee focus groups. In addition, the results from principal component factor analyses as 
well as inspection of Cronbach’s alpha, item-to-total and inter-item correlations, all re-
ported earlier, accommodated concerns about reliability issues.  
Finally, the implications presented herein should only carefully be generalized to an in-
ternational setting since they are likely to be dependent on the German institutional frame-
work. The costs as well as the effectiveness of formal and informal control mechanisms 
may significantly vary across countries with different institutional parameters such as legal 
traditions, levels of procedural formalism, and trademark protection laws (see Pfister et al., 
2004). 
B-II. Relational Governance in Idiosyncratic Dyads 
 
86
5. Conclusion  
Relying on franchised outlets for decision-making in various functional can bring about 
important efficiency gains and enhance system-wide adaptability. These positive effects 
from entrepreneurial autonomy are threatened to be offset by agency costs which arise 
from imperfect alignment of interests among the vertical channel partners. Here, it was 
inferred from theory that franchise companies would use relational forms of governance to 
counterbalance their loss in control associated with allocating decision-making independ-
ence to individual outlets. The results from an empirical analysis based on German franchi-
sees strongly supported this presumption. Furthermore, the data partly confirmed the claim 
that franchisee incentive characteristics alleviate or intensify the need for relational safe-
guards in light of downstream decision control. 
Though this study was conducted within the context of franchising, its implications may 
be extended to other inter- as well as intra-organizational relationships between principals 
and agents (e.g., venture capital firm-portfolio company, employer-empowered employee). 
While organizations make extensive use of formal control mechanisms such as contracts, 
monitoring, and certification, some degree of residual vulnerability to individual self-
interest seeking and organizational goal conflicts often remains. As a consequence, realiz-
ing the full economic value of agents’ specific knowledge is put into peril. Relational 
forms of governance can play a prominent role in reducing the costs from exchange haz-
ards thereby paving the way for successful decentralized decision structures. 
There are at least two promising areas for further research. First, Table 7 displays two 
system dummies (1 and 4) which were positively and significantly related to relational 
governance. This raises an interesting question: Is relational governance a dyadic phe-
nomenon or does it affect the chain as a whole? Furthermore, what is curious about the 
positive coefficient of System Dummy 4 is that the chain has gone bankrupt three years 
after the survey had been conducted. One would expect channel climate to be rather ad-
verse than benign. Second, it was not possible to empirically distinguish between economic 
and sociological explanations for the emergence and functioning of exchange norms. Sepa-
rating economists’ rational view from sociologists’ understanding based on familiarity 
would help to clarify how relational sentiments can be built to confront trading hazards. 
  
III. INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS TO FRANCHISOR OPPORTUNISM:  
COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT THROUGH FRANCHISEE COUNCILS 
1. Introduction 
Franchising relationships involve an upstream parent corporation, the franchisor, selling 
the right to market a product and/or service using a proven business-format to local down-
stream firms, the franchisees. The local entrepreneurs’ success within these relationships 
crucially depends on the business decisions made by the franchising firm as regards the 
management of the overall system and its brand name as well as the vertical distribution of 
surpluses. Solutions to incentive and hold-up hazards emanating from the principal (see A-
II.) therefore need to be devised. Agency-theoretic literature has thus far been exclusively 
concerned with contractual mechanisms as solutions to problems of franchisor opportun-
ism, namely revenue sharing (e.g., Rubin, 1978; Lafontaine, 1992; Sen, 1993).  
More recently, scholars have pointed out that chains also use franchisee councils as in-
stitutional solutions to improper franchisor conduct (e.g., Arruñada et al., 2005: pp. 162-
163).73 In addition, the best practice literature has devoted considerable attention to these 
arrangements (e.g., Seideman, 1997; Anderson, 2002; Grueneberg, 2004). Yet, both a theo-
retical rationale concerning the precise mechanism by which such institutional bodies may 
curb malfeasance as well as empirical evidence on antecedents of their appointment are 
lacking.  
This chapter seeks to fill these gaps. Advancing upon the theoretical understanding, I 
draw from the political economy literature on institutional design (Greif et al., 1994) to 
submit that franchisee councils chiefly provide channel members a means to collectively 
sanction the franchisor for misbehavior, thereby triggering cooperation in the first place. 
This private enforcement rationale stresses that traditional arguments pointing to franchisee 
councils as vehicles for monitoring and participation in headquarters’ decision processes 
are insufficient. The main reason is that the company’s obligations are usually not speci-
fied in the written agreement and are therefore non-verifiable and hence unenforceable by 
courts (Hadfield, 1990). Empirically, the appointment of councils was expected to be more
                                                     
73 As a working definition, a franchisee council denotes “an elected or selected group of franchisees who 
meet with representatives of the franchise headquarters to discuss and provide advice on issues of importance 
to all franchisees” (Dandridge and Falbe, 1994: p. 43). Franchisee councils are also referred to as franchisee 
advisory councils (or FACs), franchisee advisory boards, and franchisee-franchisor advisory councils. 
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likely, the more extensive the franchisor’s decision rights, hence his control over the opera-
tions of the chain, and therefore agents’ exposure to opportunistic behavior (e.g., Arruñada 
et al., 2001). The set-up of councils was also supposed to be less probable when business-
format providers have strong incentives to use their discretion in line with the partners’ 
interests as conditioned by a high share in franchisees’ sales and a large proportion of out-
lets company-owned. The data provided partial support for these propositions. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the next section (2.), related literature is 
briefly reviewed. Then (3.), the theoretical framework and the hypotheses are developed. 
The fourth section (4.) presents the data, operationalizations of variables, as well as the 
empirical results. The fifth section (5.) discusses the findings, provides implications for 
practitioners, and derives limitations of this work. The chapter is concluded in (6.).  
2. Related literature 
Rubin (1978) was the first to advance franchisor incentive constraints as an explanation for 
the sharing of store revenues between franchisees and the company. Upstream firms are 
thereby granted incentives to continuously put forth the necessary effort to assure the vi-
ability of networks, such as monitoring outlets and maintaining brand strength. His argu-
ments were later formalized by Lal (1990), who used a game-theoretic approach to show 
that royalty payments set appropriate incentives to uphold brand value (see, also, 
Mathewson and Winter, 1985). Lafontaine (1992), Sen (1993), and Vázquez (2005), in 
turn, empirically tested Rubin’s proposition and found that the importance of franchisor 
input in the production process positively influenced the fraction of franchisees’ sales 
claimed by headquarters. Additional evidence on the need to provide incentives to the 
principal came from Scott (1995). He argued that franchisors can also use company owner-
ship – instead of royalties on sales – to internalize investments in the brand name. Accord-
ingly, Scott reported from his sample that company-owned units served as a bond to guar-
antee continuing performance to outlet-owners. On the theoretical side, Bhattacharyya and 
Lafontaine (1995) developed a model based on moral hazard by both up- and downstream 
firms to explain a number of stylized facts concerning absent contract customization, such 
as the stability of linear sharing rules over time (see, for empirical evidence, Lafontaine 
and Shaw, 1999). Mathewson and Winter (1994) showed how incentive requirements of 
the vertical partners affect non-monetary contract provisions. These authors studied 25 
franchise agreements and reported that the property rights to add a new outlet to an exist-
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ing territory were allocated to either the franchisee or the franchisor, depending on the rela-
tive importance of each party’s effort. In sum, literature has focused on contractual ele-
ments, either monetary or non-monetary, as mechanisms to reduce the risk of opportunistic 
behavior of chain headquarters. This study advances the field by focusing on a non-
contractual, but institutional solution to these problems. Given the widespread diffusion of 
franchisee councils in practice (see, for evidence, McCosker et al., 1995), the analysis of 
such institutions within the organizational form of franchising seems to be equally impor-
tant to understand the governance of exchange risks between the dyadic partners.  
3. Theoretical foundations and hypotheses 
3.1 Franchisee councils: A solution to franchisor opportunism 
3.1.1 Direct monitoring and participation 
Franchisee councils are composed of both franchisee and franchisor representatives. As is 
often specified in councils’ statutes (Hartmann, 1997: pp. 129-132), these bodies serve as 
communication platforms where (1) channel members can verify that the system’s head 
office applies control mechanisms in a fair and non-discriminating way, (2) new ideas con-
cerning the network’s value proposition can be discussed, (3) compromises on precarious 
issues can possibly be negotiated in mutually beneficial ways, and (4) otherwise dispersed 
franchisee interests are grouped. Through direct and personal interactions, councils reduce 
information asymmetries between up- and downstream firms. Hence, they provide an inter-
face for store-owners to monitor the company and thereby potentially attenuate risks from 
hidden actions (Arruñada et al., 2005: pp. 162-163; Vázquez, 2005: p. 454).74 In conse-
quence, franchisors have less room to deviate from contractual obligations where these are 
specified ex ante. 
Moreover, councils not only enable franchisees to better observe the principal’s behav-
ior but also to participate in the company’s decision-making processes and to provide – on 
an informal basis – input into different operational aspects. For instance, franchisee coun-
cils may influence the franchisor’s recruitment outcomes. As an executive of American 
Speedy Printing, a U.S. franchisor, recalls: “We actually had the chairperson of the advi-
sory council help us interview and select our director of sales and marketing” (cited in Sei-
                                                     
74 Given that the returns from monitoring the company accrue to all outlets independently of their contribu-
tion to monitoring efforts, horizontal externalities exist. As a result, it would hardly be in the economic inter-
est of outlet-owners to monitor the franchisor individually. 
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deman, 1997: p. 14; see, also, Grueneberg, 2004 on this issue). Hence, where franchisees’ 
input is perceived as valuable by the company, management may seek participation. 
Through participation, councils may thus influence chains’ business decisions to better 
represent franchisees’ interests. 
Yet, franchisees’ ability to observe franchisor behavior through councils does not nec-
essarily imply that the company has an incentive to forego misbehavior. Equally, participa-
tion of council representatives may be allowed only when firms perceive benefits to them-
selves from involving the outlet-owners in their decision processes. Two fundamental rea-
sons suggest that monitoring and participation cannot fully explain how councils enforce 
cooperative behavior when serious conflicts between the company and the local entrepre-
neurs emerge. First, franchisors’ obligations are regularly ill-specified by the formal con-
tract and are therefore non-verifiable for outsiders (Hadfield, 1990: pp. 946-948). Court-
enforcement of proper behavior is then difficult even if opportunistic action is made ob-
servable for store-owners through councils. Second, franchisee councils generally have no 
formal rights making their decisions legally binding for chains (Nebel and Gajewski, 2003: 
pp. 445-446). The absence of formal rights follows from German antitrust law, according 
to which councils are not allowed to determine business decisions of either the franchise 
company or the franchisees (see Hartmann, 1997: pp. 100-109).  
Councils may therefore be successful in preventing franchisor opportunism not primar-
ily because they allow for monitoring and/or participation but because they provide a de-
vice to self-enforce franchisor obligations by collectively confronting the franchisor. The 
claim that institutional interest groups reduce the power disadvantage of individual fran-
chisees vis-à-vis the parent corporation is not new to the literature (e.g., Knight, 1986: pp. 
14-15; Picot and Wolff, 1995: p. 233). However, precise mechanisms by which this shift in 
bargaining power comes about have not previously been explicated. I attempt to describe 
one plausible mechanism in the following.  
3.1.2 Enforcement through collective punishment 
Franchisee councils may strengthen enforcement through the threat of collective punish-
ment of deviant franchisors by all or at least a majority of franchisees within the chain. In 
this regard, councils offer a platform to diminish not only vertical information asymmetries 
but also those between franchisees horizontally. Specifically, councils provide the frame-
work to agree on common interpretation of the company’s obligations and to gather infor-
mation on conflicts occurring in the channel. Coordination of individual outlet-owners is 
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facilitated as a result. Council leadership can then decide when to impose what kind of 
sanctions and can communicate actions to individual franchisees.  
Within this line of reasoning developed by Greif et al. (1994) to explain the function of 
merchant guilds in the medieval period, several conditions have to be met for councils to 
emerge and to successfully enforce proper behavior of franchisors through the threat of 
collective sanctions: (1) collective punishment must be more effective than bilateral sanc-
tioning, (2) collective punishment must be severe in its consequences for franchisors, (3) 
franchisee councils must hold regulatory power over franchisees to make collective pun-
ishment credible, and (4) franchisors must be aware of the self-commitment function of 
councils since otherwise they could avert their appointment. These conditions are dis-
cussed in the following. 
First, for councils to emerge, collective punishment must be more effective than bilat-
eral punishment by single units or by a betrayed franchisee potentially acting in concert 
with a few peers. Indeed, literature generally attributes little power (or, equivalently, no 
threat potential) to individual franchisees and emphasizes their dependence on the principal 
instead (e.g., Hunt, 1972: pp. 36-37). Thus, in the face of franchisees’ weak bargaining 
position, to the company the costs resulting from punishment by only a fraction of outlets 
are likely to be marginal compared to the potential gains from defection.  
Notwithstanding the fact that individual franchisees have little impact, collective sanc-
tions coordinated through councils may render the adverse effects of punishment severe for 
franchising firms. This severity of sanctions is a second condition for effective enforce-
ment through councils. A variety of costly sanctions can, in principle, be imposed by fran-
chisee councils. For instance, Dant and Nasr (1998: pp. 10-11) stressed the franchisor’s 
dependence on upward information flows from dispersed stores. These are valuable to the 
firm for control purposes since hiding information might enable stores to opportunistically 
shirk their responsibilities. Furthermore, information from local units reveals details about 
consumer needs and consumption patterns. By withholding this proprietary data, franchi-
sees stand to gain from reducing the probability (real or subjectively perceived) of owner-
ship redirections (see, for evidence, Dant and Kaufmann, 2003) since they are chosen in 
part due to their superior knowledge about local markets (see A-II.). Conversely, detained 
information represents an opportunity cost to franchisors because this negatively affects 
their ability to monitor the local entrepreneurs’ behavior75 and to successfully open new 
                                                     
75 Even if information were fully delivered to the head office, it may not usefully serve the intended control 
purposes by allowing benchmarking the outlets. This is for example the case when agents collectively (e.g., 
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units by providing downward information flows. That is, franchisors play a crucial role in 
codifying and disseminating among the population of stores the knowledge that arose from 
specific units (Argote, 1999: chapter 5; Knott, 2003). Whereas the threat of keeping back 
specific knowledge by one or a few franchisees is relatively inconsequential for the fran-
chisor, the impact would be more serious if the council were to organize a “systematic 
blockade”. Another example by which councils can put pressure on the corporate parent is 
by credibly divulging in the franchising community details about franchisor abusive behav-
ior. National franchisee associations such as the Deutscher Franchise-Nehmer Verband in 
Germany, which grants quality labels to fair-dealing chains, may play an important trans-
mitter role in this regard. More directly, since applicants for the purchase of a franchise 
usually gather information from existing stores, franchisees could negatively influence 
their willingness to join the chain. In consequence, chains’ ability to sell new franchises 
(assuming a competitive market for productive franchisees) would be threatened while 
strengthening the position of incumbent outlet-owners.  
Note that actions undertaken for punishment must be profitable of themselves to fran-
chisees. Otherwise, the threat of punishment would not be credible. Knowing that sanc-
tions will not be effectuated, franchisors would have nothing to fear and no reason to 
forego misbehavior. Council leadership will constantly compare the costs from not impos-
ing these sanctions with the resulting benefits. Franchisees will then choose, for instance, 
not to withhold information though this would bring about short-term gains (see above), if 
store-owners can enforce cooperative behavior of the franchisor in return. The benefits 
from proper franchisor conduct may then outweigh the costs from transmitting valuable 
intelligence about local markets. Once the franchisor defects, however, the net benefits 
from cooperative franchisee action evade and non-cooperative behavior in form of collec-
tive punishment will be triggered.    
                                                                                                                                                                 
through councils) agree on lower levels of performance. From a strict game-theoretic perspective, the threat 
of collectively agreeing on lower performance to punish misbehavior of the franchisor is not credible since 
franchisees would harm themselves (i.e., free-riding is only profitable to individual franchisees if others up-
hold brand value). However, lower performance of all channel members can be rationalized by assuming that 
each outlet bears only a small fraction of the punishment costs – a strategy Coleman (1990: chapter 11) refers 
to as incremental sanctions. In an interview conducted with a representative of a computer hardware franchi-
sor, an example of such incremental sanctions was provided. The franchisor might want to boost sales by 
offering, on a temporal basis, a product package combining different hardware components. Whereas the 
aggregate gain for the franchising firm would be important, the benefits to the individual franchisees may be 
marginal if they are to bear the costs from changing product lines. In such a situation, though some opportu-
nity costs are incurred by franchisees, they may gain more by putting pressure on the franchisor by threaten-
ing to blockade the special offer. That is, they may enforce franchisor obligations on other issues which are 
worth more to them in the long-run than the foregone sales.    
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A third necessary condition for effective collective punishment is that franchisee coun-
cils hold regulatory power over franchisees to make threats credible. For instance, out of 
fear of contract termination and/or non-renewal (see B-I.), it may be in the economic inter-
est of individual channel members not to participate in the collective action. Though a 
council has generally no legal power over individual franchisees who do not comply with 
its propositions, indirect monetary sanctions may be inflicted. For instance, while franchi-
sors are important for knowledge dissemination in the network, franchisees also share cost 
and profit data among them and discuss best practices, ultimately enhancing stores’ effi-
ciency (Darr and Kurtzberg, 2000: p. 37). Units which are excluded from the community 
incur an opportunity cost in terms of foregone improvements in their own operating effi-
ciency since regular communication, personal acquaintances, and meetings are particularly 
relevant for effective knowledge transfers (see, for a practical example, Darr et al., 1995: 
pp. 1751-1752). In addition, franchisee commitment to the decisions made by the council 
can be gained through democratic elections of representatives, usually being opinion lead-
ers, in the council (Nebel and Gajewski, 2003: p. 446). Besides, councils usually report to 
franchisees on an annual or biannual basis to promote acceptance of their decisions. Opti-
mally, chains’ head offices are not involved in the selection process of franchisee represen-
tatives. Empirically, franchisees’ understanding of councils’ benefits is well established. 
Steiff (2004: p. 232) found that franchised units from 13 networks with a council in place, 
on average, ranked this institution among the top ten out of 30 instruments to control head-
quarters’ conduct. Also, from a study including four franchise companies, Stanworth 
(1995: p. 170) reported that franchisees saw the council’s main role in protecting their in-
terests: “Some franchisees believed the effect of the association had been to achieve a more 
favorable contract than would have otherwise been the case.” 
A fourth condition to make collective punishment work is the franchising firm’s aware-
ness that commitment to honest behavior by setting up a franchisee council is advanta-
geous. Otherwise, franchisors could simply avert their appointment. There is considerable 
evidence that chains are indeed aware of the important self-commitment function fulfilled 
by such councils since they are usually deeply involved in initiating and financing these 
bodies (McCosker et al., 1995: p. 23; Arruñada et al., 2005: p. 163). At PC-Spezialist, a 
German computer retailing franchise firm, the council is even termed “honesty commit-
tee”, reflecting its main function to assure fair dealings (Ostmann, 1995: p. 27). The con-
siderable attention paid to franchisee councils by best practice franchising literature further 
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underscores that the governance advantages of this institutional form are perceived among 
practitioners (e.g., Bloom, 2003; Howe, 2003; Grueneberg, 2004).  
Arguably, it would seem that explicit and overt punishment of franchisors through 
councils is rarely (if ever) implemented. Yet, the effectiveness of institutions in enforcing 
behavior is inversely related to the number of applied sanctions (Greif et al., 1994: p. 746). 
Thus, infrequently effectuated sanctions should not be misinterpreted as an indicator for 
the irrelevance of councils guarding against franchisor misbehavior by threatening collec-
tive punishment. 
To test the proposition that franchisee councils serve to prevent the realization of fran-
chisor opportunism either through direct monitoring, participation, and/or collective sanc-
tions76, circumstances under which a council should be expected are identified below.      
3.2 Decision rights and the risk of franchisor opportunism 
From a property rights perspective, it is efficient to colocate decision rights with intangible 
(non-contractible) knowledge assets for this is a condition to maximize the residual sur-
plus. Windsperger (2003) found that in franchise chains, decision rights are allocated ac-
cording to the distribution of these assets between the vertical exchange parties. The higher 
the intangible knowledge of the franchisor, and therefore the more important his input in 
the production process, the higher his share of residual decision rights. This system-
specific knowledge of the business-format franchisor is an important motivational factor 
for individuals aspiring for self-employment to join a network (Kaufmann, 1999). 
Though franchisors may have knowledge advantages over franchisees in some key as-
pects, centralized decision-making authority may come at a cost for the outlets. That is, it 
potentially pays-off for companies to exploit their rights in ways which are in their own 
best interest but which are detrimental for the downstream partners. More discretion being 
assigned to the parent corporation especially exacerbates hold-up hazards (Arruñada et al., 
2001: p. 258). For instance, site-selection decisions made by the company may lead to ter-
ritorial encroachment of existing stores. Also, centralized system infrastructures increase 
the degree of asset-specificity and thus facilitate opportunistic action. As Shane (2001: p. 
141) explained: “Centralization makes it easier for the franchisor to hold up franchisees 
because centralization requires franchisees to make relationship-specific investments in 
franchisor inputs.” Fundamentally, franchisor opportunism is problematic since franchi-
                                                     
76 The proposed arguments are not mutually exclusive and all three might be relevant at the same time. The 
empirical tests do not seek to differentiate between these rationales.  
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sees’ investments are to a large degree specific to the relationship and would display little 
value in alternative uses. Quasi-rents resulting from these assets may then be redistributed 
ex post by the franchising firm.   
Having the franchisor make decisions also implies an incentive problem. The franchis-
ing firm may shirk its responsibilities by hiring little qualified personal, forego product 
development, and so forth. Franchisees then risk not receiving the expected assistance in 
operating affiliated units, especially in situations where obligations are not explicitly spelt 
out in detail (see, for the case of Avis Europe PLC, Jacobsen, 2004: p. 530). In this vein, 
Rubin (1978: pp. 228-229) identified control over specific operational aspects of the chain 
as an essential source of franchisor moral hazard. Revenue sharing alleviates problems of 
insufficient effort by the principal. As mentioned above, empirical evidence suggests that 
franchisors claim a larger fraction of the stores’ sales where headquarters’ effort becomes 
more important (e.g., Lafontaine, 1992; Sen, 1993; Vázquez, 2005). The company then 
participates in the success of outlets and has incentives to perform. However, the royalty 
rate simultaneously needs to assure franchisees’ incentives to put forth effort and thus pro-
vides only a partial remedy (Scott, 1995: p. 71).77 
In sum, in chains where the franchisor makes important decisions and hence his ongo-
ing performance is required, franchisees should be concerned about misbehavior and are 
expected to adopt, possibly in collaboration with the chain’s management, a franchisee 
council. Conversely, where the potential for franchisor malfeasance is low, channel mem-
bers should avoid the commitment of valuable time and financial resources to these institu-
tional bodies. Formally: 
H1: The more decision rights are allocated to the franchisor, the more 
likely is the appointment of a franchisee council in any chain.  
3.3 The moderating role of ownership 
3.3.1 Sales sharing 
Agency theory posits that franchisors’ incentives to shirk their responsibilities become 
attenuated as their interests in the ongoing success of franchised outlets increase. As al-
ready pointed out, one important incentive mechanism in this regard is the sharing of fran-
chisee revenues between the dyadic firms, as expressed by the share parameter (Rubin, 
1978). The share parameter indicates the fraction of monthly sales that franchisees pay to 
                                                     
77 See, on unfulfilled promises made by franchisors, Hunt (1977). 
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the company. The larger the share parameter, the higher the revenues foregone by the chain 
when store performance weakens.78 A high sharing rate should therefore provide assurance 
to franchisees that the franchisor will, given a level of decision rights, follow through with 
obligations.  
H2: The level of the share parameter will moderate the relationship be-
tween the extent of franchisor decision rights and the probability of a 
franchisee council being appointed: specifically, in chains with a high 
share parameter, the allocation of decision rights to the franchisor is 
less likely to lead to the set-up of a franchisee council than in chains 
with a low share parameter. 
3.3.2 Company ownership 
Taking a positive share in franchisees’ sales dilutes franchised outlets’ property rights. 
This lowers the incentive effects of store-owners and increases the costs of franchised op-
erations. To avoid these costs, Scott (1995) as well as Windsperger and Yurdakul (2004) 
argued that franchisors can substitute sales sharing through company ownership to more 
accurately meet their own as well as franchisees’ incentive constraints. Foregoing the pro-
vision of input to franchisees would diminish the value of the brand and reduce demand at 
all outlets, thereby also lowering profits at company outlets. Thus, the alignment of fran-
chisor decision rights with property rights, as expressed by a high proportion of company-
owned outlets, should make shirking more costly for the chain and therefore the appoint-
ment of a council less likely.  
H3: The proportion of outlets company-owned will moderate the rela-
tionship between the extent of franchisor decision rights and the prob-
ability of a franchisee council being appointed: specifically, in chains 
with a high proportion of outlets company-owned, the allocation of de-
cision rights to the franchisor is less likely to lead to the set-up of a 
franchisee council than in chains with a low proportion of company 
ownership. 
                                                     
78 The specification of initial fees is not sufficient to motivate the franchisor to live up to the outlet-owners’ 
expectations for a deterioration in the network’s reputation would have no immediate effect on his income. 
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4. Empirical tests 
4.1 Sample 
The hypotheses were tested on cross-sectional data from German business-format franchi-
sors using the same data source as in chapter B-I. (see above for details). Complete and 
consistent information on the variables employed here was available for 131 systems. In 
2003, approximately 830 business-format franchisors operated in the German market and 
hence the study covered about 15.8 percent of the population.  
Franchisors in the sample came from a variety of industries. Table 8 shows the distribu-
tion of chains across specific sectors:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 8. Distribution of chains across industry sectors (n = 131) 
4.2 Variables 
4.2.1 Dependent variable 
A dummy variable indicated for each chain whether a franchisee council was institutional-
ized (1) or not (0). 
4.2.2 Independent variables 
Franchisor decision rights. To capture the degree of centralization in any network, the 
same two measures were employed as in chapter B-I.: decision indices I and II. Recall that 
Industry sector % of chains 
in sample 
Automotive 6.1 
Business services 5.3 
Cosmetic products & services 15 
Eating places 12.2 
Education 6.9 
Health & fitness 3.1 
Maintenance 4.6 
Personal services 10.7 
Real estate 3.8 
Recreation 2.3 
Rental 1.5 
Repair 3.8 
Retail 37.4 
Travel 0.8 
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decision index I is a perceptual measure of the degree to which decisions were made by the 
company centrally. Decision index II is a summated variable which counted the number of 
decisions made by the franchisor (see above for details).  
Share parameter. The share parameter measured the percentage of monthly sales that 
franchisees paid to the franchisor. Following previous work (Lafontaine, 1992: p. 269; Sen, 
1993: p. 176; Agrawal and Lal, 1995: p. 218), the share parameter included the royalty rate 
plus the advertising fee. Where franchisors indicated a range of values, the average was 
used. Flat figures were divided by the monthly sales level of an average outlet of the sys-
tem to obtain percentage values (see Shane, 2001: p. 146). Since it provides incentives to 
franchisors, the share parameter was expected to be negatively related to the incidence of a 
franchisee council being in place.   
Proportion company-owned. The proportion company-owned was calculated as the 
number of company-owned outlets over total outlets (franchised plus company-owned out-
lets) in any sampled system in the year 2003. Since company-owned outlets provide a per-
formance bond to franchisees, the proportion company-owned was expected to be nega-
tively related to the existence of a council.  
4.2.3 Control variables 
In order to strengthen the empirical analyses, variables were controlled which may, in ad-
dition to the independent variables, influence the scope for franchisor opportunism and 
hence the incidence of a franchisee council being adopted.  
An important role of the franchisor is to continuously preserve the value of the net-
work’s brand name. The more valuable the brand, the higher the fraction of franchisees’ 
sales it generates and the more important it becomes to involve the company in maintain-
ing the brand (Sen, 1993: p. 180). Outlets should therefore be keen on controlling the fran-
chisor through councils in the presence of stronger brands. Following Lafontaine (1992: p. 
273), three proxies for the value of the brand name were employed.  
Age of the chain. The trade name is assumed to be more valuable for established fran-
chisors and so the age of the chain in years was included in the regression models.  
System size. As the value of the brand increases with the number of outlets that display 
it, the total number of outlets (franchised plus company-owned in 2003) was used as an-
other control variable.  
Percentage time not franchising. The franchisor’s role in keeping the value of the brand 
name up should be positively related to the percentage time not franchising, calculated as 
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the difference between the year the first franchise was sold and the founding year of the 
parent company, divided by age of the chain. Accordingly, it is assumed that more valu-
able business concepts are more time-consuming and expensive to develop. 
Another essential role of the franchisor is to monitor the quality delivered at individual 
outlets and to provide assistance in the day-to-day business. These functions are more ef-
fectively carried out, the more staff the company payrolls. The following proxy for the 
franchisor’s diligence in carrying out these tasks was used.79  
Number of franchise consultants. The span of control and intensity of support was 
proxied by the number of headquarters’ franchise consultants per franchised outlet (see, 
relatedly, Shane, 2001: p. 147). Since a high ratio of consultants per unit may signal that 
the firm is following through with obligations, this variable was expected to be negatively 
related to the existence of a council.  
4.3 Methods and results 
Table 9 shows descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for the variables of this study. 
About 50 percent of all sampled chains had a franchisee council in place (for similar find-
ings, see McCosker et al., 1995: p. 4). Cross-sectional variance in the existence of a coun-
cil across observations set the necessary condition to test the hypotheses. Significant and 
positive bivariate correlations between the measures of centralization and the council 
dummy provided preliminary support for H1. Because of correlations between the control 
and independent variables, multivariate regression techniques were however necessary. 
                                                     
79 Evidence suggests that insufficient staff at headquarters is a common source of franchisor shirking (see 
Altmann, 1996: p. 85). 
 
 
 
 
 
B-III. Institutions and Collective Punishment  
 
100 
 
 
 
 Table 9. Pearson correlations and descriptive statistics (n = 131)
Variable mean s.d. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) Franchisee council 0.50 0.50        
(2) System size 77.40 175.78 0.13       
(3) Age of the chain 19.54 15.81 0.10 0.32***      
(4) % time not franchising 35.88 28.44 -0.14 -0.07 0.40***     
(5) No. of franchise consultants 0.30 0.55 -0.29** -0.15 -0.01 0.36***    
(6) Share parameter 5.80 3.20 -0.13 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.14   
(7) Proportion company-owned 0.20 0.23 -0.34*** 0.23** 0.09 0.37*** 0.33*** 0.17   
(8) Decision index I 4.21 0.52 0.18* 0.04 0.12 -0.09 0.00 0.15 -0.09  
(9) Decision index II 7.32 2.59 0.18* 0.14 0.11 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.06 0.46***
n = 131. Significance levels (two-tailed): *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
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Table 10. Logit regression results (decision index I)
 Dependent variable: 
Franchisee council (0 = no; 1 = yes) 
Model 1
Exp(b)
 
 
2
Exp(b)
 
 
3
Exp(b)
 
 
Constant 0.153
(1.723)
* 2.570
(0.468)
* 
 
1.461
(0.583)
* 
 
System size 1.002
(0.001)
 
 
1.002
(0.001)
 
 
1.002
(0.001)
 
 
Age of the chain 0.998
(0.016)
 
 
0.995
(0.017)
 
 
0.998
(0.016)
 
 
% time not franchising 2.750
(0.958)
 
 
2.759
(0.952)
 
 
2.747
(0.959)
 
 
No. of franchise consultants 0.067
(1.356)
* 
 
0.049
(1.455)
* 
 
0.067
(1.358)
* 
 
Share parameter 0.940
(0.064)
 
 
0.942
(0.065)
 
 
0.940
(0.065)
 
 
Proportion company-owned 0.024
(1.270)
** 
 
0.024
(1.269)
** 
 
0.024
(1.273)
** 
 
Decision index I 2.042
(0.403)
† 
 
1.948
(0.408)
† 
 
2.035
(0.419)
† 
 
Decision index I × 
Share parameter 
 0.864
(0.031)
  
Decision index I × 
Proportion company-owned 
  0.936
(2.105)
 
 
n 131.00 131.00 131.00 
Chi2 37.78*** 38.91*** 37.79*** 
-2 Log likelihood 143.81 142.69 143.81 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.33 0.34 0.34 
Correct classification 69.50% 69.50% 69.50% 
Significance levels (two-tailed): *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 
0.10. Interaction variables have been mean centered in order to circumvent
problems of multicollinearity. 
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Table 11. Logit regression results (decision index II) 
 
 Dependent variable: 
Franchisee council (0 = no; 1 = yes) 
Model 4
Exp(b)
 
 
5
Exp(b)
 
 
6
Exp(b)
 
 
Constant 0.889
(0.789)
* 0.110
(1.491)
* 
 
1.121
(0.506)
* 
 
System size 1.002
(0.002)
 
 
1.002
(0.002)
 
 
1.002
(0.002)
 
 
Age of the chain 1.000
(0.016)
 
 
0.994
(0.017)
 
 
1.000
(0.016)
 
 
% time not franchising 2.432
(0.945)
 
 
3.044
(0.959)
 
 
2.445
(0.949)
 
 
No. of franchise consultants 0.048
(1.403)
* 
 
0.033
(1.489)
* 
 
0.048
(1.406)
* 
 
Share parameter 0.968
(0.064)
 
 
0.969
(0.064)
 
 
0.967
(0.065)
 
 
Proportion company-owned 0.022
(1.289)
** 
 
0.015
(1.345)
** 
 
0.022
(1.288)
** 
 
Decision index II 1.175
(0.083)
* 
 
1.178
(0.085)
* 
 
1.173
(0.086)
† 
 
Decision index II × 
Share parameter 
 0.949
(0.031)
† 
 
 
Decision index II × 
Proportion company-owned 
  0.971
(0.472)
 
 
n 131.00 131.00 131.00 
Chi2 38.47*** 41.42*** 38.48*** 
-2 Log likelihood 143.12 140.18 143.12 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.34 0.36 0.339 
Correct classification 68.70% 68.70% 68.70% 
Significance levels (two-tailed): *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 
0.10. Interaction variables have been mean centered in order to circumvent
problems of multicollinearity. 
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Binary logistic regressions were used as a multivariate technique. The results using de-
cision index I and II are displayed in Table 10 and 11, respectively. The tables show the 
transformed logit estimates reflecting the marginal effects on the odds of a franchise chain 
being classified in the higher category of the dependent variable (i.e., franchisee council in 
place) at the exclusion of the lower category (i.e., no council in place) corresponding to a 
unit change in the independent variable (Liao, 1994). 
Of the control variables, the number of consultants per franchised outlet (p < 0.05) and 
the proportion company-owned (p < 0.01) came out significant across all models. The 
higher the franchisor’s span of control for monitoring franchisees, the lower was the prob-
ability of a council to exist. Equally, the higher the proportion of outlets company-owned – 
and therefore the franchisor’s incentives to perform –, the lower was the probability of a 
council being in place. Though the directional influence of the share parameter was as ex-
pected, it did not emerge as a significant predictor of the existence of franchisee councils.80 
Equally, none of the brand name variables displayed a significant influence on the prob-
ability of a council being appointed. 
Turning attention to the independent variables, both scales capturing franchisor decision 
rights emerged as significant determinants of the existence of a franchisee council. In 
Model 1 (decision index I), the odds of a system having a franchisee council in place were 
2.042 times higher with a one-unit increase in franchisor decision rights (p < 0.10). In 
Model 4, using decision index II, the odds were 1.175 (p < 0.05). Likelihood ratio tests 
indicated that the estimated models were highly significant (p < 0.001). In sum, H1 was 
supported by the data. 
Whereas Model 2 showed no support for H2, the coefficient of the interaction between 
decision index II and the share parameter was marginally significant (p < 0.10) in Model 5, 
with a negative directional influence as expected. Among chains with a relatively high 
share parameter, the allocation of decision rights to the franchisor was less likely to be as-
sociated with a council than among channels with a low share parameter. However, Ai and 
Norton (2003) suggested that for nonlinear models, tests for the statistical significance of 
interaction effects must be based on the estimated cross partial derivates, not on the coeffi-
cient of the interaction term. The reason is that the interaction effect in nonlinear models 
depends on other covariates and may therefore vary in magnitude and significance across 
the range of predicted values (i.e., probabilities of a franchisee council in place). To ac-
                                                     
80 Vázquez (2005: pp. 455-456) also found a negative and non-significant relationship between these two 
variables.   
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count for these concerns, the inteff command in Stata 8.0 was used after running the logit 
model (Norton et al., 2004). The mean interaction effect across predicted probabilities was 
still negative but somewhat smaller in magnitude (b = -0.009) compared to the uncondi-
tional interaction coefficient (b = -0.050, corresponding to Exp(b) = 0.949 in Model 5). 
Figure 3 shows that the interaction coefficient was negative across almost all predicted 
probability values.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Interaction effects after Logit 
In terms of the significance of the interaction effect, Figure 4 shows that for the left- and 
right-hand groups of franchise chains, i.e., whose predicted probabilities are smaller than 
0.20 and higher than 0.80, significance of the interaction term did not reach acceptable 
thresholds. 
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Figure 4. z-statistics of interaction effects after Logit 
In sum, since the interaction coefficient across observations was negative but only mar-
ginally significant (though over a large range of values of the predicted probability), H2 
was weakly supported, using decision index II as a proxy for the degree of franchisor con-
trol. 
Models 3 and 6 estimated the coefficients for the interaction between franchisor deci-
sion rights and the proportion company-owned. The influence of these interaction terms 
was not significantly different from zero. Again, the magnitude and significance of the 
interaction effects across predicted probabilities were verified. All of these investigations 
confirmed that H3 was not supported.   
5. Discussion 
5.1 Findings and null findings 
One of the two purposes of this chapter was to clarify the theoretical grounds on which to 
infer that franchisee councils reduce opportunism on the principal’s side. It was argued that 
councils potentially achieve this aim by enabling direct monitoring of franchisors, by fos-
tering channel members’ participation in chains’ decision processes, and, most impor-
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tantly, by setting incentives through the threat of collective punishment. The second objec-
tive was to empirically test whether the existence of franchisee councils was – consistent 
with these three rationales – systematically related to the risk of franchisor misbehavior. 
The empirical results confirmed this presumption and showed that a cross-sectional in-
crease in the scope for malfeasance, as expressed by the extent of companies’ decision 
rights, increased the probability of a council to exist.   
This chapter also submitted that the incidence of a franchisee council would be less 
likely when property rights create strong monetary incentives for franchising firms not to 
abuse their discretion. The empirical results were only in partial agreement with this claim. 
Weak support was found that the existence of franchisee councils was less likely for chains 
in which franchisor decision rights were accompanied by high shares in franchisee sales. 
However, the appointment of a council was no less likely at every given level of franchisor 
authority among systems with a high proportion of outlets company-owned than among 
those with a low proportion. One plausible explanation for this null finding might be that 
demand is imperfectly correlated across outlets – possibly due to repeat customers – such 
that franchisors can selectively cheat on franchisees without simultaneously damaging 
revenues and therefore the profit potential in company outlets. Company ownership cannot 
then serve as a collateral bond for store-owners that franchisors will behave properly.  
5.2 Implications for managers 
This research has important implications for practitioners. First, contract design decisions 
could usefully incorporate the ideas presented in this chapter. Basically, the results provide 
some support for the claim that institutional (i.e., franchisee councils) and monetary con-
tractual (i.e., sharing of franchisee revenues) elements can be substituted to provide fran-
chisors incentives not to abuse their discretion. The same implication does not hold, how-
ever, for the relationship between institutional arrangements and company ownership. In 
consequence, it does not seem that “the franchisor can accomplish the same thing as it 
would through raising the royalty rate by owning and operating outlets itself” (Scott, 1995: 
p. 80). Shares in sales and company operations should therefore not be considered com-
pletely equivalent incentive devices.  
Second, this chapter introduced a new perspective on the mechanisms by which franchi-
see councils may privately enforce – through collective punishment – franchisor obliga-
tions given that decisions made by these bodies are legally non-binding and chains’ obliga-
tions are only incompletely specified in the written agreements. The analysis outlined sev-
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eral elements which should be considered by practitioners for collective punishment to be 
successful. Most importantly, franchisees should accept the leadership of their council rep-
resentatives and follow issued recommendations. In addition, outlet-owners are advised to 
conceive of effective communication structures with peers, thereby allowing for informa-
tion exchange and coordination of actions.  
Third, the study provides new insights into the trade-off between the risk of franchisor 
and franchisee opportunism involved in assigning decision rights. It has been pointed out 
that in most franchise chains the business-format provider owns more decision rights than 
the downstream parties (e.g., Hadfield, 1990). This uneven contractual allocation has been 
attributed to the risk of opportunistic franchisee action while the scope for franchisor moral 
hazard would be constrained by his reputation capital (Arruñada et al., 2001). The results 
of this chapter imply that in franchising networks, reputation itself may not suffice to as-
sure franchisees of the company’s ongoing performance. Instead, institutionalized interest 
groups seem to be necessary for effective enforcement of chains’ obligations. Therefore, 
this study should encourage chains which are reluctant to appoint franchisee councils to 
consider these institutions rather as means of self-commitment to the long-term viability of 
the system than as vehicles by which power is unnecessarily shifted to the periphery (see, 
on such concerns by some chains, Mendelsohn, 1992: p. 155). Also, ex ante signaling of 
cooperative intent through franchisee councils may aid in attracting productive franchisees. 
Finally, though the nature of the analysis performed here was positive rather than nor-
mative, chains which setup franchisee councils in the face of extensive franchisor discre-
tion should perform better, especially when franchisor property rights are diluted, than 
those networks foregoing institutional arrangements.  
5.3 Limitations 
This study is subject to several limitations. First, but one of many institutional arrange-
ments typically found in franchised channels of distribution was considered (see Hartmann, 
1997). Experience and specialized working groups as well as mediation boards are other 
means to group franchisee interests and to confront the franchisor in a collective manner. 
These alternative institutions may offer mechanisms to reduce franchisor opportunism 
similar to those described herein. Yet, the mere existence of these different forms suggests 
that there might be differences – besides those with respect to the task performed by each 
group – concerning the particular interests represented, the mechanisms and the effective-
ness of enforcement.     
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Second, the empirical analyses focused only on the probability of a franchisee council 
to exist in each chain. While this approach is a useful first step to test the empirical rele-
vance of institutional arrangements in the presence of franchisor malincentives, it did not 
allow shedding light on the extent of formal and/or informal rights of these councils to 
govern the behavior of channel members.  
Third, the empirical tests were confined to German franchise chains. A recent study by 
Pfister et al. (2004) demonstrated the implications of variance in legal traditions, labor 
regulations, and trademark protection across countries for the organization of franchise 
channels. It may thus well be that across countries, the need for institutional solutions to 
protect franchisees may fall apart and/or that differences in the legal status of such ar-
rangements makes them more powerful in some jurisdictions than in others. Therefore, 
implications of this paper should only carefully be generalized to an international setting. 
Finally, the regressions included only ownership rights set up as residual income rights 
as moderator variables. However, ownership rights in franchised channels of distribution 
may also take the form of ownership surrogates such as lease controls and exclusive deal-
ing clauses (Windsperger, 2003).   
6. Conclusion         
In this chapter, I have attempted to theoretically explore how councils protect franchisees 
against opportunistic action emanating from the franchisor. Also, empirical tests on ante-
cedents of the appointment of franchisee councils were reported. The results show that 
monetary incentives specified by the contract are not the only instruments amenable to 
induce franchisor obligations but that institutions within the franchising organizational 
form equally deserve attention. However, the precise mechanisms by which these ar-
rangements function to guard against misconduct are little understood. Though the argu-
ments based on ease of monitoring, participation, and enforcement by collective punish-
ment are intuitive, I do not claim them to be complete. While economic rationales may be 
appropriate to explain the incidence of such institutions in light of exchange hazards, in-
sights derived from research in organizational behavior, for instance concerning collective 
identity and action (e.g., Hardy et al., 2005), might be equally useful to understand the 
underlying mechanisms at work once a council is in place. 
  
 
IV. A LEARNING PERSPECTIVE ON FRANCHISE CONTRACTING 
1. Introduction 
Franchising relationships are a form of collaboration in which an upstream firm, the fran-
chisor, sells the right to market its products and/or services using a proven business con-
cept to legally independent entrepreneurs, the franchisees. Economists have since long 
emphasized that formal contracts play an essential role in safeguarding these exchanges 
against disturbances emanating from inconsistent objectives between the vertical partners 
(e.g., Rubin, 1978). Direct evidence on contract design affecting the survival of franchise 
chains substantiates this view (Azoulay and Shane, 2001; Shane, 2001). Despite the docu-
mented relevance of appropriate contract structure, research has neglected to address 
whether and how franchising firms learn about the governance of their relationships to 
franchisees using legally-binding agreements.  
This lack of research effort may partially result from the dominant theoretical perspec-
tives applied to the analysis of franchising. Incentives-based theories relying on agency 
reasoning, in particular, fully capture the notion (often implicitly) of franchisors correctly 
anticipating and adjusting to exchange hazards ex ante – with the future holding no sur-
prises. Suboptimal agreements are then not drafted in the first place or, if accidentally so 
(Alchian, 1950), quickly become selected out by the environment. This equilibrium ap-
proach allows testing hypotheses about the functionality of specific provisions and other 
policy variables, such as the mix of franchised and company-owned outlets within any 
chain (e.g., Lafontaine, 1992). Moreover, it helps to explicate the conditions under which 
efficiency can be improved through the assignment of pecuniary incentives and decision 
rights (e.g., Arruñada et al., 2001). As a drawback, however, this framework obstructs the 
view on potentially underlying learning processes associated with contracting (MacLeod, 
1995; Mayer and Argyres, 2004). Gaining knowledge of these processes is not only a pre-
requisite to better understand observed contract structures at any point in time, but also to 
derive normative implications for applied contracting.  
As an entry to issues of learning in franchise contracting, this chapter explores the evo-
lution of formal contracts used by three chains from the restaurant, hotel, and retailing in-
dustry. Instead of focusing solely on the monetary aspects (Lafontaine and Shaw, 1999), 
the analysis considers the entirety of clauses in the written agreements. The minimum time
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series investigated across the sample firms was eight, the maximum 18 years. Additional 
data were drawn from interviews conducted with representatives of each franchising com-
pany, thereby permitting insights on the motivations for specific changes. The results show 
that the contracts altered frequently in material ways over a wide range of dimensions, in-
cluding termination and monitoring rights. The interviews revealed that major modifica-
tions were not triggered in anticipation of changes in the magnitude of exchange risks (e.g., 
horizontal externalities) or as a result of changes in the business-format. They rather ema-
nated as incremental responses to actual franchisee misbehavior in the day-to-day busi-
ness.81 Though the observed modifications can be rationalized ex post using agency-
theoretic reasoning as steps to address obvious incentive misalignments, the backward 
looking nature of solving these problems was more consistent with theories of organiza-
tional learning, especially those emphasizing local experimentation (Cyert and March, 
1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982). That is, franchisors continuously updated their contract-
ing routines to incorporate the results of local search efforts triggered by actual problems 
encountered. Also, some evidence for vicarious learning from second-hand experience 
(e.g., Huber, 1991) was found, suggesting that embeddedness within a web of industry 
participants may be critical. Over time, then, contract structure in each chain increasingly 
reflected outcomes from past learning rather than anticipated design-outcome linkages as 
efficient contracting theories would imply.  
In addition to offering a description of the nature of learning in the sampled chains, this 
chapter makes the following contributions. First, focusing on the franchising setting, this 
study contributes to the understanding of the reasons for agreements not being set up once-
and-for-all. Since drafting contracts with independent entrepreneurs is the very task the 
franchisor is rewarded for (Shane, 2005: p. 189), the findings presented here corroborate 
the claim that boundedly rational actors cannot fully address exchange hazards ex ante, 
even if they expanded considerable search effort (Azoulay and Shane, 2001: p. 339). This 
explanation concurs with arguments based on excessive opportunity costs in allocating 
extensive attention to thinking about potential hazards and addressing these through con-
tracts (Mayer and Argyres, 2004: p. 403). Second, this chapter identifies factors which 
determined the pace of contractual evolution. The role of new management and the influ-
                                                     
81 Note that there was also evidence in the data that franchisees learned how to better assure fair dealings of 
the franchisor. Hence, both principal and agents in franchising relationships may gain better knowledge over 
time how to safeguard their interests. However, in this entry to issues of learning to contract in franchising, 
interviews were only conducted with the franchise companies and not with representatives of the local stores. 
Therefore, the analysis is conducted primarily from the franchisor’s perspective.    
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ence of franchisee councils are discussed in this regard. These factors may serve as starting 
points for future deductive analyses of learning processes in structuring franchising rela-
tionships. Third, implications for contracting theories are derived. The data indicate that 
bounded rationality and adjustment costs may hold explanatory power for the stickiness of 
different contractual variables. Also, the data imply that firms may learn about the effec-
tiveness of private and public enforcement and ultimately choose between them. It also 
emerged from the case studies that parties not only care about the wording of provisions in 
terms of their enforceability in the courts. Rather, the terms of the agreement need to pre-
vent opportunistic behavior by signaling severe punishment while at the same time guard-
ing against a loss of credibility when it is not in the interest of the company to apply threat-
ened sanctions ex post.  
The chapter is structured as follows. First, efficiency-based perspectives on contracting 
are briefly sketched out (2.). Then, prior evidence on learning effects in drafting agree-
ments is reviewed (3.). In the subsequent section (4.), the evolution of contracts in three 
chains is discussed. Next, I interpret the data using learning perspectives in particular (5.). 
After discussing the determinants of change (6.), implications for contracting are derived 
(7.). The last section concludes and draws attention to issues for future research (8.).  
2. Efficient contracting theories  
Transaction costs, property rights, and agency theory offer rationales to understand con-
tractual design. These theoretical lenses situated within the efficiency branch of organiza-
tional economics unanimously maintain that the structure of legal documents reflects 
economizing purposes (see Kim and Mahoney, 2005). That is, contracts are drafted in such 
a way as to address specific exchange risks following from self-interest seeking, if not op-
portunism, including a failure to supply effort (shirking), misrepresentation of quality (ad-
verse selection), insufficient contribution to the quality of outputs (cheating) and expro-
priation of rents from a partner’s relationship-specific investments (hold-up).  
Central to these positive, efficiency-based theories is the assumption that most people 
are farsighted in the sense that hazards are foreseen and factored back into the design of 
inter-organizational agreements. This assumption is thus also underlying analyses of incen-
tives in franchise contracting, which are often framed in agency-theoretic terms (e.g., 
Brickley, 1999; Arruñada et al., 2001). In essence, rational principals are assumed to be 
aware of individual contract terms’ specific governance functions and to correctly antici-
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pate the costs and benefits from their adoption. Since trading risks are solved in the best 
possible (i.e., efficient) way upfront, agreements never need to be revised given that ex-
change attributes do not change. 
Though the emphasis is clearly placed on farsighted anticipation of malincentives, effi-
ciency frameworks also acknowledge that not all contracts emerge in optimal forms, i.e., as 
theory would predict. Individuals and/or organizations may not be equally able to structure 
complex agreements, thereby creating variance even in the presence of identical exchange 
conditions (Williamson, 1991: p. 78). From the perspective of efficiency theories, subop-
timal arrangements are then presumed to be quickly selected out by the environment (e.g., 
Jensen, 1983: p. 331). In equilibrium, only firms with appropriately designed contracts are 
observed in the marketplace (see, for evidence, Shelanski and Klein, 1995; Lafontaine and 
Slade, 1997) since those unfortunate enough to have selected bad practices do not survive 
for long. As a result of this strong emphasis on competitive pressures fostering efficacious 
selection, little room is provided for the analysis of adjustment processes triggered by 
learning.  
Yet, slack financial resources may be one reason why firms are able to sustain ineffi-
cient structures for some time without being forced out of the market. Also, since feedback 
by the environment often relates to an aggregate performance measure rather than to the 
appropriateness of individual elements of the system (Winter, 1988: p. 177), such as single 
contract clauses, firms have leeway to adjust to past mistakes in future periods.82 Efficient 
designs may then not only be observed because suboptimal agreements are selected out by 
market pressures, as claimed by efficient contracting theories, but also because initially 
flawed agreements can be readjusted over time. This does not mean, however, that allow-
ing for adjustment categorically excludes failure. Path-dependencies may prevent a frac-
tion of the population starting from unattractive initial conditions to reach an optimum 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Selectively, firms will also not be able to detect the sources 
of poor performance (Meyer, 1982). But what is important to note is that adjustment, re-
gardless of the final outcome, may be observed where selection is not immediate. 
In the next section, prior evidence on contractual adjustments which point to learning 
effects will be reviewed. 
                                                     
82 This leeway is likely to be greatest during pre-shakeout periods of the industry life cycle (Argyres and 
Bigelow, 2004). 
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3. Prior evidence on learning to contract 
Along with the persistent surge of inter-firm collaborations as a way to organize economic 
activity (e.g., Teece, 1992), organizational learning literature has been increasingly con-
cerned with how partnering firms make progress in managing their exchange relationships 
over time. These efforts have been especially directed towards strategic alliances (e.g., 
Doz, 1996). Several studies have accumulated empirical support for prior alliance experi-
ences with the same and/or other firms to increase returns to collaboration (Anand and 
Khanna, 2000; Zollo et al., 2002; Sampson, 2005). The findings suggest that repeated par-
ticipation in alliances enhances the allying firms’ skill sets to effectively coordinate activi-
ties and to govern potentially conflicting business objectives. It thus appears from this lit-
erature that own past experiences made in the governance of between-firm relationships 
are an important source of organizational learning potentially translating into increased 
performance. 
Contract design may be one mediating factor between acquired experience of how to 
work together and improved collaborative gains. Learning perspectives emphasize that 
contracts evolve over time not in response to changes in the underlying exchange risks per 
se (asset specificity, risks of free-riding on brand name, etc.), but rather in the course of 
observing behavior and perceiving effective incentive misalignments. Though the univer-
sality of this phenomenon across various settings, especially in franchising, remains to be 
systematically explored, some studies hint to the existence of learning effects in contract-
ing. For instance, in the railroad industry, Pittman (1991) studied the evolution of several 
hundreds of agreements for the construction of sidetracks between the main line, owned by 
a railroad company, and the plant of shippers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury. The author reported substantial changes in these contracts over time and pointed out 
that they occurred in response to opportunistic behavior and recurring litigations among the 
parties. Gompers and Lerner (1996) provided further evidence for contracting parties to 
learn about agency costs. In a work on the use of covenants in venture partnership agree-
ments, they found that more severe restrictions on the deployment of investors’ funds by 
venture capitalists were included as the market became more mature and experienced.83 
Reuer and Ariño (2002) studied the incidence of contractual change in an alliance context 
and reported that the likelihood of modifications was positively determined by governance 
misfit. Mistakes in the alignment of transactions with discrete structural governance alter-
                                                     
83 For recent evidence on learning in venture capital contracting, see Cumming (2005).  
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natives (i.e., equity vs. non-equity) were corrected once frictions became manifest. Simi-
larly, Ryall and Sampson’s (2003) analysis of technology alliance contracts revealed that 
these became more detailed with firms’ alliance experience, reflecting learning to draft 
more complete contracts.84 The most conclusive evidence on the nature of such learning 
processes was delivered by Mayer and Argyres (2004). Tracing a time series of 11 con-
tracts between two partner firms from the personal computer industry, they observed in-
cremental learning effects with respect to communication between the firms, codification 
of past experiences, and governance of opportunistic behavior. Instead of anticipating 
many problems, management had to experience adverse outcomes before addressing them 
in a new contract version; with the new clauses bringing about unanticipated side effects in 
turn. This gradual and slow learning on contractual design is consistent with evolutionary 
accounts stressing an incremental updating of routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982) as well 
as with concepts of problemistic search (Cyert and March, 1963). Actual problems experi-
enced thus explained a great deal of contractual design at every given time. It is not clear, 
however, whether these contracting patterns generalize to franchising – the setting of this 
study – since franchising firms are usually considered experts at structuring their relation-
ships to independent entrepreneurs.  
Though the nature of learning processes in franchise contracting is unexplored, some 
evidence on the evolution of franchise agreements exists, especially with respect to mone-
tary terms. Lafontaine and Shaw (1999) found in a large sample of franchise chains that the 
most important elements of the fee structure, namely the royalty rate, are basically invari-
ant over time. Seaton (2003) corroborated these findings with data from the U.K. and addi-
tionally reported little changes in contract duration over the years. Finally, Azoulay and 
Shane (2001) documented from interviews with 16 founders of new franchise systems that 
some which had initially ignored the provision of exclusive territories adopted them later 
on. These authors also noted that while the stability of monetary contract terms has been 
subject to careful examination, “unfortunately, there is no evidence on the stickiness of 
other policies” (p. 341).85 However, besides monetary terms, various other provisions such 
as those surrounding monitoring and termination are important governance instruments in 
franchising relationships (e.g., Arruñada et al., 2001). With the detailed data presented in 
                                                     
84 See, for the influence of repeated interaction between the same trading partners on contract structure, Corts 
and Singh (2004) and Kalnins and Mayer (2004b). 
85 Some evidence on changes in non-monetary provisions can be found in Dnes (1992: pp. 284-286). Detailed 
case study data from 19 networks showed that some implicit aspects of the dyadic relationships were later 
formalized. Yet, since the author’s main objective was to explain the functioning of franchise contracts from 
a static perspective, no systematic analysis of the entirety of changes was provided. 
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the next section, I seek to further the understanding of dynamic aspects in franchise con-
tracting.  
4. Longitudinal evidence on franchise contracting 
4.1 Methodology and research design  
In order to gain insights of rich detail into the evolution of franchise contracts, a multiple 
case study approach was adopted (Eisenhardt, 1989b). As is well known, there are impor-
tant drawbacks to case research. Problems include limited generalizability of findings and 
questionable validity of cause-effect relationships. Large sample questionnaire-based tech-
niques would overcome these shortcomings. Conversely, however, they do not permit to 
gather information on theoretical constructs which are not well understood, as is the case 
with learning to contract in franchising. In the past, case studies have thus provided much 
of the data on contracting generally (e.g., Masten, 1996) and franchising specifically 
(Dnes, 1992; Bradach, 1997; Jacobsen, 2004). In this vein, Dnes (1996: p. 320) called for 
further case study research on franchise contracting. 
Three Germany-based franchise chains were selected as the units of analysis. To en-
hance the generalizability of results, chains from different industries were sampled. Piz-
zaBox (fictitious name) is a chain active in the home delivery of pizzas. SleepWell (ficti-
tious name) is a chain of middle-class hotels. The third chain, HardTail (fictitious name), is 
a computer hardware retailer. These industries are theoretically interesting since problems 
of free-riding on the brand name are generally accepted to be severe as a result of a large 
fraction of nonrepeat customers (e.g., Brickley and Dark, 1987). A high emphasis should 
therefore be placed on issues of vertical coordination and formal safeguards.  
Within these industries, PizzaBox, SleepWell, and HardTail were chosen specifically 
since they met the following two criteria. First, the three chains started franchising more 
than 10 years ago (as of 2005). A decade of experience laid the foundation to track the evo-
lution of sequentially issued contracts over a relatively long time period such that adjust-
ments at various points in the life cycle could potentially be observed.86 Second, and relat-
edly, these chains displayed steady growth in the number of franchised outlets. This crite-
                                                     
86 Franchising involves sequential contracting on nearly identical exchanges with the chain’s multiple entre-
preneurs, with the latter differing mainly by location and marginally by size of the outlets. The contract ver-
sions studied do not mirror repeated contracting between any pair of dyadic partners. 
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rion assured that new contracts potentially varying in their design were continuously is-
sued.  
Table 12 provides descriptive information on the sampled firms. PizzaBox operates ex-
clusively in Germany and is privately held. It sold the first franchise in 1987, just two years 
after it had been founded. By 2005, it operates 63 franchised outlets and no company-
stores. SleepWell is the German master-franchisor of a U.S.-based hotel chain. By 1986, 
the first license was granted to a hotel in Germany. No company-owned hotels are operated 
while 70 franchised hotels exist by 2005. HardTail gained its first franchisee in the same 
year (1991) as the company was founded. By 2005, it operates 104 franchised stores in 
Germany (and some abroad) and is publicly quoted at the national stock exchange since 
1999. No company outlets are operated. All three chains survive as of 2005. 
Table 12. Descriptive information on sampled franchising firms  
The different contract versions employed by each franchisor at least once over the years 
were the primary sources of data. A time series of 12 versions since the first contract in 
1987 up to the most recent in 2005 was made available by PizzaBox.87 Five different issues 
covering the years 1994 through 2003 built the basis for the analysis at SleepWell.88 
SleepWell had no access to earlier versions itself since ownership of the master-franchise 
for Germany changed in 1994. The first contract from HardTail dates back to the year 1997 
while the last was used in 2005, reaching four in total.89 HardTail was not willing to pro-
vide the early agreements for reasons of ongoing litigation with franchisees. Though the 
                                                     
87 The different contract version are referred to in the following as: PB#1987; PB#1989; PB#1990; 
PB#1991.1; PB#1991.2; PB#1998; PB#2000; PB#2002.1; PB#2002.2; PB#2003; PB#2004; PB#2005. One 
contract, issued to a multi-unit franchisee, was excluded. Since the incentive structure of franchisees owning 
more than one outlet is different from those of single-unit owners (e.g., Garg et al., 2005), contracts could 
differ between these groups and bias the analysis.   
88 These are denoted SW#1994; SW#1998; SW#1999; SW#2002; SW#2003. 
89 HT#1997; HT#1998; HT#2000; HT#2005 
Company Activity # of franchised  
units (in 2005) 
Year of  
founding 
Year first  
franchising  
PizzaBox Pizza home delivery 63 1985 1987 
SleepWell Hospitality services 70 1986 1986 
HardTail Retailing of PC hardware components 104 1991 1991 
Source: Company interviews 
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focus was on the formal contracts per se, the standard operating manuals were also consid-
ered as additional sources of information.  
Furthermore, data were obtained from interviews conducted with chains’ representa-
tives during the summer and fall of 2005. At PizzaBox, I interviewed the CEO of the com-
pany who declared to be the sole responsible for any issues concerning the written con-
tracts. The CEO started his career as one of the first franchisees of the chain. He later be-
came a regional store checker (quality control, management advice, etc.) for account of the 
company. By the end of 2001, he bought out the former owner of the system. With his 
track record, the CEO was fully aware of any issues regarding the network’s evolution, 
including contracting. At SleepWell, the person responsible for contractual changes in the 
German office was interviewed. In addition, I interviewed two employees responsible for 
contract design with the U.K. master-franchisor. The U.K. office channeled communica-
tion of European offices with the U.S. parent company whose legal department had the 
final approval rights for all contracts worldwide. At HardTail, interviews with several peo-
ple were necessary for knowledge about specific changes was dispersed throughout the 
company. In total, four (non-owner) employees of the chain were interviewed. Though no 
interviews were conducted with franchisees, the data should paint a large part of the fran-
chise contracting picture. This is because agreements are seldom subject to bargaining but 
are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.  
The interviews were semi-structured. A standardized case study protocol (Yin, 2003) 
for all three chains was employed (see Appendix E). It covered the background of the 
company, reasons for franchising, means of contract enforcement, as well as sources of, 
and solutions to, conflicts. Specific questions were tailored to the contract changes in each 
chain and solicited descriptions of events leading up to each modification. Combining in-
terviews with written documents helped to ensure the validity of findings (Jick, 1979).  
4.2 Contractual evolution at PizzaBox, SleepWell, and HardTail  
Analyses of the contracts revealed significant changes from one version to another for all 
three chains in the sample. Major modifications fell into the categories termination and 
non-renewal (4.2.1), monitoring (4.2.2), payment of fees (4.2.3), exclusive dealing (4.2.4), 
sources of supply (4.2.5), vertical price controls (4.2.6), other vertical restrictions (4.2.7), 
as well as training (4.2.8). The evolution of the fee structure (4.2.9) and of contractual 
complexity more generally are also discussed (4.2.10). Table 13 displays selected changes 
in each category.  
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Table 13. Selected contract modifications
Contract clause Company Adopted in version 
Termination   
Contract duration of five years PizzaBox PB#2002.1 
Missing official registration of business PizzaBox PB#2005 
Non-compete covenant PizzaBox PB#1998 
Provision of severance payments to harmed party SleepWell SW#1998 
Monitoring   
Deadline for transmission of franchisees’ monthly sales reports  PizzaBox PB#2002.1 
Deadline for transmission of franchisees’ monthly sales reports HardTail  HT#2005 
External auditing of yearly income statement required HardTail HT#1998 
External auditing of yearly income statement required SleepWell SW#1999 
Franchisor right to approve regional advertising  SleepWell SW#2003 
Payment of fees   
Non-payment defined as two monthly fees being due PizzaBox PB#2002.2 
First royalty payment due for opening month HardTail HT#1998 
Stipulation of average expected franchisee sales SleepWell SW#2003 
Exclusive dealing   
Explicit prohibition to sell other than listed products PizzaBox PB#2002.1 
Sources of supply   
Period of three weeks to match non-listed suppliers’ offer PizzaBox PB#2002.1 
Prohibition to purchase from black-listed suppliers HardTail Standards and Guide-
lines 1994, 1998, 
2001, 2005 
Vertical price controls   
Right to set maximum resale price  PizzaBox PB#2002.2 
Other vertical restrictions   
Cooperation preamble PizzaBox PB#1989 
Affirmation about validity of rooms indicated SleepWell SW#2003 
Restriction to transfer Internet domain SleepWell SW#2003 
Duty to exercise brand rights personally with full effort SleepWell SW#2003 
Maintenance of software at own costs SleepWell SW#2003 
Installation of luminous advertising at own costs SleepWell SW1998 
Training    
Duty to attend national gatherings PizzaBox PB2002.1 
Duty to attend management trainings SleepWell SW#1998 
Duty to attend meetings SleepWell SW#2003 
Duty to participate in yearly written exam  HardTail HT#2005 
Source: Franchisors’ contracts 
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4.2.1 Termination and non-renewal 
Termination rights serve to enforce franchisees’ obligations without relying on the courts 
of law for interpretation of behavior (e.g., Arruñada et al., 2001: p. 261). Contract duration 
is also important in this regard since mid-agreement termination is severely constrained by 
German law (see B-I.). Franchisors therefore have to rely on the threat of non-renewal – 
which is more immediate the shorter is contract duration – to punish and therefore deter 
opportunistic behavior (e.g., free-riding on the brand-name). Contracts issued by PizzaBox 
displayed major modifications concerning termination over time. The observed changes 
reflected efforts to enhance enforceability of appropriate downstream operations. For in-
stance, after realizing that the threat potential of a 10 year contract was relatively low, Piz-
zaBox reduced the duration to five years (PB#2002.1). As the CEO explained: “With a 10 
year contract, I have no means to put someone in his place”.90 More recently, PizzaBox 
reserved the right to terminate the agreement if franchisees fail to officially register their 
business with state authorities (PB#2005). This clause was triggered by a court case in-
volving another chain. Since no statutory franchise law exists in Germany, a missing offi-
cial registration of the business allowed a franchisee to be classified as an employee. In 
consequence, he was granted severance from the company upon bankruptcy of his own 
outlet. 
PizzaBox also changed the conditions prevailing after the contract had expired or been 
terminated. In particular, a non-compete covenant was put in place (PB#1998) after two 
former franchisees left the chain to compete in the same product market. Each of these 
former channel members founded their own network with either ultimately growing bigger 
than PizzaBox in terms of the number of outlets. At SleepWell, adverse litigation experi-
ences led not only to the stipulation that the contract can be unilaterally terminated in case 
of misconduct, but that franchisees also have to compensate the company for any harm 
caused (SW#1998). Ultimately, this clause increases the costs from being terminated and 
thus makes deviations less attractive. 
                                                     
90 This observation lends further support to the notion of self-enforcement in franchising (Klein, 1995; Lafon-
taine and Raynaud, 2002). It is in contrast, however, with Bradach (1998: p. 218) who found that termination 
– or the threat thereof – was rarely used in franchising (see Blair and Lafontaine, 2005: p. 269 fn. 309 for a 
reconciling view). 
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4.2.2 Monitoring  
Monitoring rights are essential for franchisors to control whether, as well as to assure that, 
outlets follow through with obligations (e.g., Arruñada et al., 2001: p. 261). Management 
at the three sampled firms modified a number of these rights over time. Specifically, it 
emerged as a cross-case pattern that the firms were continuously improving the effective-
ness of existing monitoring processes. At PizzaBox, a clause asking for monthly transfer of 
sales data from franchisees to the company was complemented (PB#2002.1) to then in-
clude the precise deadlines at which the transfer had to take place. Fixing precise deadlines 
in the contract allowed management to exert more pressure on those running chronically 
late with transmission. A similar observation was made for HardTail. As of HT#2005, 
stores had to report sales for the previous month until the third day of the following month. 
No exact deadline had been fixed in earlier contract versions, providing leeway to postpone 
transmission and thus payment of fees. To assure that the transmitted information was ac-
curate, HardTail (HT#1998) and SleepWell (SW#1999) also included requirements for 
franchisees to let approve their yearly income statements by an external auditor.  
Franchisors were also expanding the scope of their monitoring rights over downstream 
operations. For instance, SleepWell claimed the right to approve regional advertising and 
promotion as of SW#2003 after experiencing that control over these downstream activities 
had been too low. At one instance, the master-franchisor changed the appearance of logos. 
This modification brought about costs for franchisees. Some hotels were thus reluctant to 
adhere to the new policy. As a response, the contractual right to enforce such requests via 
approval of advertising (which includes logos) was designed. 
4.2.3 Payment of fees 
Franchisors earn most of their revenues from royalties on outlets’ gross sales. It is there-
fore crucial to design mechanisms which assure accurate and timely payment of fees 
(Shane, 2005: p. 88). The data shows that chains were making steady progress as to the 
effectiveness of these mechanisms. PizzaBox experienced over time that “some people 
think that other issues [besides payment of royalties] are more important” (Interview 
07/26/2005). The fraction of people repeatedly delaying payment was considerable and 
amounted to nearly a quarter of the chain’s franchisees. As a result, the company had to 
devote considerable resources to writing reminder notices and negotiating. Even though 
refusal to pay was a cause for termination since the first contract version in 1987, it was 
only as of 2002 that contracts addressed the issue more specifically. As of PB#2002.2, 
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non-payment was defined as two monthly fees being due. Since non-payment was lacking 
a proper definition prior to that, franchisees could always negate a case of non-payment by 
promising payment for the near future. Similarly, only as of 1998 did HardTail explicitly 
state that royalty payments are due as of the very first month after store opening 
(HT#1998). SleepWell was equally exposed to difficulties in collecting fees. One hotel, for 
instance, refused to supply monthly sales reports which build the basis for calculating roy-
alties. The case was eventually disputed in court. As a result of this experience, contracts 
henceforth (SW#2003) stipulated an average expected sales level. This figure serves as the 
basis for calculation in case the hotel refuses to supply sales figures.    
4.2.4 Exclusive dealing  
Exclusive dealing of products and services of the franchisor by the outlets ensures chains’ 
incentives to invest in the trade name for returns do not additionally accrue to other brands 
(Shane, 2005: p. 87). PizzaBox demanded exclusive dealing as of the first contract 
(PB#1987). It specified that the right to use the brand name was tied to the products listed 
by the company in the addendum, which figured the restaurants’ menu. However, the pro-
hibition to sell other goods was not explicit enough from the outset and “people started to 
sell (…) ice cream and other things” (Interview 07/26/2005). To clarify this issue, the 
company added a clause to one of the recently issued contracts (PB#2002.1) stating that 
“other than the listed products must not be sold by the franchisee”.  
4.2.5 Sources of supply  
Controlling sources of supply is a key policy variable to guarantee quality standards at the 
outlets (Shane, 2005: p. 86). Though PizzaBox was aware of the importance to limit the 
choice of franchisees’ inputs, it had not always been particularly successful in enforcing 
these limits. In the contract, a list of approved suppliers was mentioned. To accommodate 
legal requirements, restaurants had the possibility to purchase with other suppliers if these 
were to offer a better priced product of comparable quality. PizzaBox had a two-week pe-
riod to match the non-listed supplier’s offer. This, management thought, would provide 
leeway to effectively control every input used. Yet, the company recognized that two 
weeks were too short a time period to match offers. Eventually, the period was extended to 
three weeks (PB#2002.1). 
HardTail equally experienced problems in effectively controlling sources of supply and 
repeatedly changed the prohibition to purchase resources from black-listed suppliers enu-
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merated in the standards and guidelines section of the agreement. For instance, Standards 
and Guidelines (1994) specified that “partners attracting attention through purchases of 
such kind cannot expect to get the full support of HardTail.” The next version (Standards 
and Guidelines, 1998) was more explicit with respect to the consequences of such pur-
chases: “No business must be done with these [suppliers]. Violation of this stipulation will 
trigger a contractual penalty.” In the Standards and Guidelines (2001), then, reference to a 
contractual penalty was omitted again and replaced by: “In no case, do make purchases 
with these suppliers, regardless of the attractiveness of their offers.” This formulation was 
kept in the Standards and Guidelines (2005) but was complemented with the warning that 
“you risk a contractual penalty”. These contractual changes are further explored below. 
4.2.6 Vertical price controls 
Vertical price controls allow franchisors to solve disagreements with franchisees about 
price levels to their advantage and to limit the price dispersion within the chain (Blair and 
Lafontaine, 2005: chapter 7). Generally, franchisees (maximizing the profits of their outlet) 
seek to set prices which lie above the level desired by the franchisor (interested in maxi-
mizing outlets’ sales). This was precisely the case at PizzaBox as outlets in one region of 
Germany continuously raised price levels over an extended period of time. To deal with 
the high price levels and to limit the dispersion in prices across stores, PizzaBox manage-
ment modified the contract (PB#2002.2) thereof reserving the right to set a maximum re-
sale price on specific products.   
4.2.7 Other vertical restrictions 
The analysis of contracts provided by PizzaBox and SleepWell also revealed changes re-
garding terms not falling in either of the categories above. For instance, very early on in 
the life cycle of PizzaBox, litigation between the company and a franchisee triggered the 
adoption of a preamble stating the following: “Despite a dynamic relationship subject to 
tensions, the parties always seek to balance their interests” (PB#1989). Preambles can be 
used by courts as starting points to judge about the nature of the relationship between the 
parties (Schanze, 1991: p. 94). A similar clause requiring honest dealings was introduced 
by SleepWell in SW#2003. This version of the agreement explicitly asks franchisees to 
affirm that the number of rooms indicated in the contract corresponds to the facts. The 
company added this provision since some hotels under-reported the number of rooms oper-
ating under the brand. 
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Concerning protection of this brand, SleepWell lately included a restriction on the trans-
fer of brand elements to other uses. Specifically, the transfer of system-specific Internet 
domain names was restricted as of SW#2003 after a franchisee was unwilling to abandon a 
site containing the trade name of the chain upon contract expiration. Also, a duty for the 
franchisee to exercise brand rights personally and with full effort was added (SW#2003). 
This latter stipulation is an important device to reduce franchisees’ opportunity costs of 
effort investments in the business (Brickley, 1999: pp. 750-751).  
The company also intended to clarify the distribution of costs between hotel-owners and 
the company more clearly by requiring that the reservation system software be maintained 
and updated at the expense of the franchisees (SW#2003). Furthermore, some hotels were 
reluctant to install luminous advertising at the exterior of the building. In response, Sleep-
Well specified in the contract (SW#1998) that these ads had to be installed at own costs by 
franchisees. 
4.2.8 Training  
Trainings, seminars, and meetings are vehicles to transmit the franchisor’s tacit knowledge 
about operations to franchisees and/or to foster socialization within the network (Shane, 
2005: pp. 106-111). A common skill set across channel members is also necessary for uni-
formity in production. Since the associated costs are often charged to the downstream part-
ners, these may, however, be unwilling to attend seminars and meetings to the extent de-
manded by the company. There are not only direct (e.g., travel expenses) but also opportu-
nity costs (e.g., lost business) involved. At PizzaBox, a majority of franchisees repeatedly 
failed to attend national gatherings organized by the company. In response to high rates of 
absenteeism, management specified participation in meetings as a contractual duty as of 
PB#2002.1. In a similar vein, obligations to participate in management trainings 
(SW#1998) and meetings (SW#2002) have been introduced by SleepWell. After conflict 
about the allocation of costs, the chain later included a specific clause specifying franchi-
sees to bear the costs from seminars (SW#2003). HardTail recently added a provision re-
quiring franchisees to participate in a yearly written exam (HT#2005). Outlet-owners 
should thus have a higher incentive to invest in education (foregoing adverse effects from 
failed exams) thereby contributing to the reputation of the chain.  
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4.2.9 Fee structure  
There were also changes with regard to the fee structure. PizzaBox, for instance, started 
with a royalty rate based on a percentage of sales. In the mid-nineties, all of the chain’s 
outlets were experiencing declining sales and the CEO decided to fix a flat monthly pay-
ment. After the new CEO came in, he reverted to a percentage-based sales royalty again. 
Thus, these modifications were triggered by changing economic conditions rather than by 
experience of how to work together.  
PizzaBox experimented with its income structure more generally. Initially, the chain 
leased the buildings and sub-leased to franchisees. Restaurant-owners were paying more 
than the company did to the landlord. The franchisor considered income from the lease an 
important building block of the business model until a court decided that the sub-lease 
must be in a fair proportion relative to the lease. It basically meant for PizzaBox that it 
could not earn enough from the sub-lease to make up for the risk of continued lease pay-
ments in case the franchisee abandoned the business.91 These learning processes were not 
obviously related to the governance of exchange hazards but rather concerned the way Piz-
zaBox earned money.  
4.2.10 Contractual complexity  
Though the extensive changes documented above suggest that the legal documents became 
more complex over time, the data does not support this claim when using conventional 
measures of complexity, such as the number of contract pages (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 
2002: p. 717). Figure 5 shows that the length of the contracts remained fairly stable over 
time. The figure excludes addendums since the modifications discussed above did show up 
in the main body of the agreements. While important for incentive alignment, the changes 
were thus marginal in terms of contractual complexity. However, it should be noted that 
the number of appendices at all three chains increased with new contracts. For instance, 
while SW#1994 contained two appendices, SW#2003 had eight. These were supplemen-
tary agreements surrounding, for instance, the central reservation system. 
                                                     
91 The interviews suggested an additional rationale for abandoning sub-leases. If the franchisor controls too 
many aspects of franchisees’ business, courts are generally reluctant to consider franchisees as independent 
entrepreneurs. This is because, then, outlets do not have much leeway to influence their fait by own deci-
sions. As a result, the franchise company must assume responsibilities for the stores and franchisees are 
treated similar to employees with all accompanying rights (e.g., severance in case of bankruptcy). This ex-
ample illustrates how the existence or absence (as in Germany) of statutory franchise laws shapes franchi-
sors’ business models and the structure of contracts – a promising area for future research (see, also, Pfister et 
al., 2004).  
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Figure 5. Evolution of contractual complexity 
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5. Interpretations of the data 
5.1 Learning about efficient contracting 
The prior section revealed that the sample firms modified the structure of the written 
agreements over a wide range of different contracting dimensions. The elements which 
were redesigned, added, or removed clearly served the aim of reducing the costs, mainly 
for the principals, from inconsistent objectives. Modifications to monitoring and termina-
tion rights, but also to sources of supply and modes of fee payment followed from this ra-
tionale, as were the precise specifications on the allocation of costs for training, seminars, 
maintenance of software, etc.92 Any version of the legal documents reflected the focal fran-
chisor’s knowledge about efficient contracting at that time. As viewed from an evolution-
ary economics perspective (Nelson and Winter, 1982: pp. 17-18), franchisors continuously 
embodied the fruits from prior experiences into the routines used in contracting. Contract-
ing routines were retained or adapted based on their actual success. As incentive misalign-
ments became apparent, the companies addressed these issues in later versions of the 
agreement.93 The objective of change then was clearly to more effectively govern franchi-
see behavior in the future. Because uniform selection criteria (e.g., Jambulingam and 
Nevin, 1999) assure that downstream channel members within any network are quite simi-
lar in terms of management skills, business objectives, incentive responsiveness, and so 
forth, knowledge from contracting practices with prior outlet-owners could easily spill over 
to prospective candidates.  
The speed at which experiences changed contract structure was fairly incremental. 
Problems within present relationships were addressed one-by-one in the agreements con-
cluded with subsequent franchisees. Reflecting a pattern of problemistic search (Cyert and 
March, 1963: pp. 120-121), encountered frictions triggered a local search for specific solu-
tions which then resulted in learning about these solutions. As a result of searching locally 
                                                     
92 The companies also made progress how to coordinate business activities with the outlets more generally 
(communication via intranet, etc.). But the contracts did not come to embody, e.g., for repository purposes 
(Mayer and Argyres, 2004: pp. 405-407), this knowledge. The function of contracts as knowledge reposito-
ries of how to work together may be less important in franchising than in other inter-organizational relation-
ships, such as in learning alliances set up in an ad hoc-fashion (e.g., Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Generally, 
basic roles and responsibilities of the upstream and the downstream firms follow closely from the standard-
ized nature of the franchising organizational form. The main purpose of franchise contracts therefore seems 
to be their governance function.  
93 It is not obvious from the data that chains perceived franchising in the course of these experiences to be-
come less attractive compared to company ownership of outlets since they continued to rely exclusively on 
franchised stores. 
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in areas highly related to existing practices, the parties did not always find immediate solu-
tions to some of the incentive problems.94 For example, though HardTail realized the need 
to restrict purchasing from black-listed suppliers, management searched quite unsuccess-
fully for the right wording in the standards and guidelines (see below). In fact, none of the 
chains reached stable provisions even after a decade of franchising practice. Thus, as fran-
chisors issued new versions of the agreement, contract structure could increasingly be un-
derstood as a result of trials and errors and decreasingly reflected cognitive foresight about 
design-outcome linkages. Contracting at these chains sharply contrasts, therefore, with 
predictions derived from efficiency-based theories about ex ante once-and-for-all contract-
ing. Corroborating earlier evidence (Mayer and Argyres, 2004), these findings, I suggest, 
hint to processes of experiential learning associated with contracting.  
Previous research has pointed at excessive opportunity costs involved in allocating time 
to thinking about potential contingencies to explain the gradual nature of contractual adap-
tation processes (Mayer and Argyres, 2004: p. 403). In franchising, however, the opportu-
nity costs of searching for efficient contract design should be relatively low. First, contract-
ing with local entrepreneurs is the very task of the franchisor for which he is ultimately 
rewarded.95 Second, exchange hazards in distribution channels are well known (e.g., free-
riding) and discrete contract clauses which address these problems at least partially are 
easily drafted (exclusive territories, restrictions on sources of supply, etc.). The data rather 
suggest that “entrepreneurs (…) do not necessarily know what they are ignorant about” and 
what information they would need to search for to draft better contracts (Azoulay and 
Shane, 2001: p. 355). For instance, it is likely that obvious practices such as stores selling 
ice cream were detected by PizzaBox management prior to effectively requiring exclusive 
dealings in PB#2002.1 (see above). But the brand diluting effect of stores selling third-
party products was apparently not perceived for a relatively long time. Hence, the data 
make a strong case for bounded rationality to be a main reason for the incremental learning 
processes observed. That is, managers seem to only slowly acquire information necessary 
to assess the variety of adverse outcomes with observed behavior.  
Although the vast majority of modifications resulted from own experiences, managers 
also profited from those made by others – a form of knowledge acquisition referred to as 
vicarious learning (e.g., Huber, 1991: p. 96). PizzaBox requiring franchisees to officially 
                                                     
94 This observation is in line with empirical evidence on the local nature of search efforts found in other con-
texts (e.g., Podolony and Stuart, 1996). 
95 As a franchisor, Shane (2005: p. 189) argued, “you are in the business of franchising, not in the business of 
serving customers in the industry in which your franchisees provide a product or service”.  
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register their businesses as of PB#2005 resulted from this type of learning (see above). The 
CEO of PizzaBox learned about the court case which motivated this clause through per-
sonal acquaintances in the industry. This suggests that the diversity of contacts within a 
web of industry participants (competitors, consultants, etc.) may play an important role to 
gain fine-grained information relevant for efficient contracting. Substantiating this proposi-
tion, McEvily and Zaheer (1999) documented that the embededdness in a network of ex-
ternal ties is a critical source of firms’ competitive capabilities. SleepWell, in turn, profited 
strongly from the experiences of the group’s other master-franchisors across Europe and 
the U.S. The company incorporated elements of the contracts from the U.K. and made ad-
justments for specificities of German law. Though chains acquired some information 
through second-hand experiences, modifications did not follow from blind imitation of 
successful competitors or common practice in the industry (see Haunschild and Miner, 
1997).96 As opposed to the U.S., where the Federal Trade Commission has demanded dis-
closure of franchise contracts since 1979, agreements are not publicly available in Ger-
many and are therefore difficult to copy.97  
5.2 Alternative theoretical explanations 
At first sight, orthodox theories applied to contracting might offer an explanation unrelated 
to learning for the observed evolution of the agreements: Contractual modifications were 
only implemented when a new unit was added to the existing network (i.e., the data do not 
reflect repeated contracting between any pair of dyadic partners). Enlarging the network 
increases the importance of horizontal externalities rendering free-riding on the brand more 
profitable for franchisees. As a result, franchise companies would be expected to impose 
more severe restrictions on the dealers’ behavior – as actually displayed in the data – by 
claiming more monitoring and termination rights, specifying constraints on sources of sup-
ply, and so forth. Empirical studies have found strong cross-sectional support for this posi-
tive relationship between system-size and vertical restrictions (e.g., Bercovitz, 2000; Arru-
ñada et al., 2001). Yet, this incentives-based theory would imply that franchisors add fur-
ther restrictions to each new contract without experiencing problems with existing outlets 
because externalities increase only after the new outlet has gone operational. Basically, 
                                                     
96 Interviews revealed that the companies also did not use experiences acquired in contracting with third-
parties (e.g., suppliers) in the design of the franchise agreements. For an analysis of how the structure of 
franchise contracts may be affected by transactions undertaken by the franchisor with other firms, see 
Azevedo and Silva (2005).   
97 At the same time, missing requirements for disclosure may foster contractual adaptation processes since no 
transaction costs in filing new contracts with authorities are incurred. 
B-IV. Learning to Contract  
 
129
existing perspectives on contracting would predict that franchisors know about system size 
as a parameter shifting the risk of downstream opportunism and adjust to these hazards ex 
ante. The contracting pattern in the data suggests, however, that modifications were intro-
duced after insufficient incentive alignment had become apparent. This process is clearly 
inconsistent with efficient contracting theories as articulated above. This is not to say that 
incentives-based theories relying on agency reasoning cannot ex post rationalize specific 
terms added to the agreements. But the notion of learning is still required to explain how 
the necessity of some specific terms came to the mind of management. 
Another rationale which might be invoked to explain the pattern in the data follows 
from property rights theory (Grossman and Hart, 1986). From this perspective, the ob-
served tendency towards broader franchisor control rights over time (e.g., the right to ap-
prove regional advertising introduced by SleepWell in SW#2003) might reflect increases 
in the importance of the franchisor’s effort. Specified control rights restrict franchisees’ 
residual rights from outlet ownership (see, generally, Elfenbein and Lerner, 2003: p. 358). 
Specific rights thereby protect the franchisor’s relationship-specific efforts (expenditures 
for screening applicants, management assistance to outlets, investments in partner-specific 
trust, etc.) to be deployed in ways countering the company’s business objectives. As a re-
sult, firms have an increased incentive to commit these resources in the first place. How-
ever, the interview data did not unambiguously support the claim that franchisors’ inputs 
became more important over the sampling period. In any case, the clear association of ad-
verse experiences in prior relationships with the remedies introduced in subsequent ver-
sions of the contracts does not conform to the assumptions made in property rights theory, 
namely that the parties correctly anticipate the downside of different allocations of residual 
control rights (Hart, 1995: p. 32). 
5.3 Modifications of business-formats 
Over the study period, there were no significant modifications of the business-formats used 
by the chains which could have affected the relationship between the companies and their 
franchisees. Of course, the product line at HardTail was keeping pace with technological 
innovations. Shifts in technology did not, however, influence the distribution of basic roles 
and responsibilities in the channel. HardTail was also changing its selection strategy. 
Whereas the franchisor relied on existing retail outlets in the beginning, it sought franchi-
sees with no experience in hardware retailing later on. These modifications in selection 
policy did affect contract structure to some degree. For instance, since relying on non-
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experienced outlet-owners necessitates more training, the required initial training days ex-
tended from four (in HT#1997) to 11 as of 2005. It emerged from the interviews that no 
other contractual elements were impacted. No fundamental changes were occurring at the 
other two chains.  
6. Drivers of contractual change 
6.1 The role of new management 
An interesting finding is that new management was driving contractual change, both at 
PizzaBox and SleepWell. Figure 6 shows that the highest number of modifications at Piz-
zaBox was observed in PB#1989 (relative to PB#1987). The interview data suggest that 
management made intense adverse experiences with the first contract (PB#1987) and ad-
dressed problematic issues in the next version of the agreement (PB#1989). As of then, 
however, the number of modifications steadily declined (PB#1991 interrupting this trend) 
until no changes were eventually made to PB#2000 (relative to PB#1998). By the end of 
2001, the new CEO, a long-time franchisee of the chain, bought out the former owner of 
the brand rights. The figure shows that in the first year following the buyout, the number of 
changes suddenly surged again. During the interview, the new CEO explained that „as I 
took it [the business] over in 2002, I made a true cut” (Interview 07/26/2005). After 2002, 
the figure displays a similar decline in the number of modifications as observed in the 
years following the first “big wave” of changes in PB#1989. 
Figure 6 also shows a sudden increase in the number of changes for SW#2003 (relative 
to SW#2002). In 2001, responsibility for negotiation with prospective franchisees was 
delegated to an employee joining the German office at that time. The interviews revealed 
that the importance of contract design came to the new employee’s attention when first 
engaged in negotiation with a new hotel in 2002. Fundamental questions arose as to differ-
ent parts of the agreement. In an effort to clarify the issues, the agreement was compared to 
the contracts used by the master-franchisor in the U.K. While still designed to accommo-
date the German legal requirements, a host of stipulations was effectively copied into the 
national agreements (e.g., prohibition to participate in central reservation systems of third-
parties). The German master-franchisor thus built on experiential wisdom from other 
members of the group. In an interview, a representative of the U.K. office explained that 
most of these provisions copied to SW#2003 were already in use in the U.K. for a long 
time. 
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Figure 6. Contractual modifications over time 
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Though the legal department at the U.S. headquarters required contracts to be updated and 
compared to each other regularly, employees in the German office were not following 
through with this obligation. When interviewed about the reasons for this omission, the 
new responsible forwarded reasons which are well captured by agency theory’s notion of 
effort-aversion.  
Incentives of the new management at PizzaBox to search for better design are obvious. 
The new CEO bought the chain since he thought it was under-valued under the former 
management. He made use of his long-time experience as a franchisee of, and store 
checker for, the chain to redesign, add, or remove a number of clauses. Changes to the con-
tracts were thus part of an effort to increase the value of the whole network. As owner of 
the brand rights, all surpluses directly accrued to the CEO thus providing motivational in-
centives. From an agency-theoretic perspective, it is less clear, however, why the new re-
sponsible for contract design at SleepWell engaged in the search for solutions to a larger 
extent than the predecessor. Strictly speaking, agency theory would imply that incentive 
systems had changed – which they did not. Yet, another factor directly shaping the propen-
sity to act is stressed by organizational learning literature, namely the awareness of alterna-
tive solutions (e.g., Miller and Chen, 1994: p. 3). It may thus be argued that new manage-
ment shifts the cognitive frame – i.e., beliefs about action-outcome linkages – applied to 
contracting, thereby also enhancing subsequent adaptation because attention is paid to as-
pects which were neglected under the previous cognitive representation (Gavetti and 
Levinthal, 2000). The observed effect of such shifts resounds Williamson’s (1985: p. 130) 
description of how inefficiencies are removed where market pressures do not operate 
quickly: “Where incumbent managements are not pressed to adopt the new procedures by 
economic events, successor managements, often in conjunction with the appointment of a 
new chief executive, commonly will”.98 New management may thus play an important role 
in favoring post-birth adaptation of contracts thereby weakening the effects of initial condi-
tions on organizational survival (e.g., Hannan and Freeman, 1977).  
6.2 The influence of franchisee councils 
One major reason for the lack of attention given by literature to contractual evolution in 
franchising might stem from the assumption that companies cannot differentiate between 
the terms governing the relationship to franchisees joining the system at different points in 
                                                     
98 See Jensen (1993) on the role of buyouts in driving out inefficiencies. 
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time. Accordingly, uniform provisions across all outlets accommodate concerns for equity, 
economize on transaction costs in customization, and reduce the risk of franchisor moral 
hazard (e.g., Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine, 1995). Indeed, one of the chains studied, 
namely HardTail, was seeing a need to set up homogeneous agreements with all franchi-
sees of the chain, independently of when they entered the network. As one representative 
explained, restricting rights of one outlet more than that of others would “create dispute 
and quarrel within the group” (Interview 07/07/2005). In an effort to prevent governance 
differentiation (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999), HardTail updated, subject to renegotiation, 
existing contracts to then incorporate the conditions agreed upon with new franchisees. 
This process of renegotiation was intensely mediated by the chain’s franchisee council. 
 Even though contractual modifications at HardTail were not impossible, they were, I 
conjecture, more difficult to effectuate than without a franchisee council in place. Institu-
tionalized bodies may, through their collective bargaining power (see B-III.), negotiate 
more favorable terms than would be reached if the parent corporation made a simple take-
it-or-leave-it offer to prospective outlet-owners while renegotiating existing contracts bi-
laterally. Within this logic, Stanworth (1995: p. 170) concluded from his study of four 
franchise companies that “some franchisees believed the effect of the association had been 
to achieve a more favorable contract than would have otherwise been the case”. Hence, 
councils might impede the franchisor’s ability to unilaterally incorporate learning effects 
into new agreements.99  
Given that franchisee councils may prevent firms from effectively carrying out contrac-
tual changes they deem necessary, the question arises why councils are allowed by the 
principal. It could be argued that firms do not anticipate the shifts in bargaining power as-
sociated with these bodies. This explanation is unsatisfactory, however. In the interest of 
the network’s long-term viability, franchisors are often deeply involved in the set-up of 
councils in order to self-commit to honest behavior (see B-III.). Thus, franchisee councils 
may be initiated and financed by chain headquarters – which they often are –, precisely 
because of anticipated shifts in bargaining power to favor the downstream partners. If 
companies are aware of these shifts, it can be speculated that they invest more resources 
                                                     
99 The above argument assumes that if the company applies uniform versions throughout the chain, then 
franchisee councils moderate the extent to which the company can incorporate changes in the agreement. 
This is because by collectively confronting the franchisor, councils increase the bargaining power of the 
downstream firms. Another perspective suggests that councils are also an antecedent to uniformity require-
ments in the first place. For instance, the institutionalized information exchange between outlet-owners via 
councils may promote equity considerations. This rationale does not, however, affect the qualitative conclu-
sion that these bodies make it harder to incorporate learning effects into the agreements over time. 
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upfront to draft contracts which need less revision in the future. However, the learning per-
spective outlined above suggests that the need for revision resulted primarily from bounded 
rationality, not from opportunity costs in initial contracting. Then, franchisee councils may 
slow the evolution of agreements because contractual changes undergo intense negotiation. 
But it should be noted that franchisee councils may also filter contractual changes pro-
posed by the company and differentiate between efficiency-enhancing learning and oppor-
tunistic action. 
7. Implications for contracting  
7.1 The stickiness of contracts: Bounded rationality vs. adjustment costs 
The observed importance of new management for contractual adjustments, presumably 
towards greater efficiency, sheds light on the reasons for the stickiness of misaligned 
agreements – an unresolved issue which has been raised for further research (see Shane, 
2001: pp. 156-157). The sudden increase in modifications with the advent of the new CEO 
at PizzaBox, for instance, suggests that contracts were not fully moving to an optimal de-
sign prior to that for reasons of bounded rationality. As mentioned above, the new CEO 
had considerable experience as a franchisee of the chain. In addition, he had worked as a 
store checker for the chain. He thus disposed of deep insights about franchisees’ incentives 
and de facto behavior in the daily business. Based on these experiences, he could later ef-
fectively assume the principal’s position and design appropriate governance mechanisms. 
Former management certainly did not dispose of this extensive, partly tacit, knowledge 
base. Hence, it appears that the former CEO’s ignorance precluded more comprehensive 
contracting. This explanation for the stickiness of certain variables contrasts with rationales 
based on excessive adjustment costs (e.g., Wernerfelt, 2004). These, goes the argument, 
disallow changing terms while the need for adaptation is perceived by management.  
But the interview data also revealed that adjustment costs provided a good explanation 
for other changes which did not occur even though they were intended. For instance, 
HardTail, which offers a 10 year contract, realized the value of a shorter duration to more 
effectively enforce proper franchisee behavior by threatening more immediate non-
renewal. However, the company was unable to cut duration to five years for the banks fi-
nancing outlets opposed to it. This result is consistent with transaction costs theory (e.g., 
Brickley, 2003). Accordingly, contract duration must be long enough to assure a normal 
return on the sunk investments. Shorter contracts would not permit this rate of return be-
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cause franchisees are exposed to a risk of hold-up by the franchise company. This implies 
that in this case, excessive adjustment, in form of transaction, costs inhibited change.  
In summary, it follows that bounded rationality and adjustment costs might hold ex-
planatory power to explain the stickiness of different contractual variables. 
7.2 Choosing between public and private enforcement 
Literature generally distinguishes between public and private enforcement mechanisms 
(Klein, 1995: p. 17). Whereas the former relies on the legal system to ensure proper fran-
chisee behavior, the latter enforces obligations through rewards and punishments designed 
and decided upon within the relationship (see A-II.). The interview data indicated that 
franchisors may choose between these two modes, an observation which existing theory 
still fails to consider (Arruñada et al., 2001: p. 281). At PizzaBox, for instance, there has 
been an unambiguous shift towards greater reliance on private ordering as of the buyout 
through the new CEO. Most transparently, the reduction in contract duration was intended 
to more effectively exert pressure on deviant franchisees without relying on the legal sys-
tem (see above). The CEO of PizzaBox also explained during an interview that “in former 
times, much more communication [between the company and the outlets] was channeled 
through lawyers” (Interview 07/26/2005).  
Private enforcement necessitates some degree of impartiality of the franchisor, in turn 
safeguarded by concerns to attract productive franchisees in the future (see, in a related 
context, Arruñada, 2000). Otherwise, prospective franchisees would discount the risk from 
franchisor opportunism and pay a lower price for the rights to use the business-format. 
While reputation for fair dealings is a necessary condition to private ordering, it cannot 
fully explain the sudden shift towards extra-legal ordering with the advent of the new 
owner at PizzaBox. Reputation effects were likely to be present before, but the former 
CEO continued to rely on the legal system (i.e., lawyers) to threaten franchisees and settle 
disputes. Thus, at least in this instance, the enforcement mechanism in use seemed to be a 
decision variable. However, it must be noted that private enforcement was facilitated by 
the new CEO’s background as a franchisee. This background may have added to his deci-
sions being accepted by the outlets. Indeed, at the time, the CEO’s store was the most suc-
cessful in terms of revenue in the chain. Persuasion of the local entrepreneurs in the sense 
of altering their perspective on focal issues (Dant and Schul, 1992: p. 38) may thus have 
been supported by the CEO’s prior career. 
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The new CEO’s preference for private ordering might have resulted from his long-time 
experience as a franchisee of the chain and the insight that communication through lawyers 
makes disputes worse instead of solving them. Supporting this argument, Boyle et al. 
(1992) found that strategies adapted by manufacturers to influence the behavior of auto-
mobile dealers based on legalistic pleas reduced the cooperative climate in the channel. In 
addition, Bies and Taylor (1993) reported that the quality of interpersonal treatment of em-
ployees by their employer in case of dispute was inversely related to the probability of em-
ployees suing the employer in the courts of law. Hence, relying on lawyers and foregoing 
interpersonal communication may escalate conflicts.  
In sum, franchising firms may learn about the effectiveness of private and public en-
forcement as they accumulate experience and then choose between them. 
7.3 Contract terms and the reputation for credible threats 
Existing analyses of contract design are usually based on the assumption that explicit pro-
visions are discrete, i.e., they either exist or are absent (Zenger et al., 2001: pp. 8-9). But 
the case studies revealed that parties also care about the specific wording of provisions. 
The wording does not only seem to be important in terms of enforceability in the courts. 
More importantly, it needs to simultaneously curb deviation from contractual duties by 
signaling severe sanctions while preventing a loss of credibility when it is not in the inter-
est of the company to carry out these sanctions ex post. The effects of discrepancies in an-
nounced and effectuated punishment may be important. Not following through with pun-
ishment threatened in the agreement imposes a cost on the franchisor. This cost comes 
about in form of reduced credibility of future punishments in the face of franchisee misbe-
havior. Anticipating that the principal will behave similarly in other situations, store-
owners may feel encouraged to ignore the behavioral constraints imposed by the formal 
contract. Conversely, if the franchisor has a reputation for staying true to his word as out-
lined in the agreement, even very extreme threats, which may be necessary on other occa-
sions, will be taken seriously by the outlets (see, generally, Malhotra, 2005: p. 5).100  
                                                     
100 The rationale according to which a credible reputation for retaliatory action affects the behavior of other 
players is well known from industrial organization research (e.g., Caves and Porter, 1977) but has not been 
considered in contracting studies. 
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The interview data indicated that this logic was underlying the frequent modification of 
restrictions on sources of supply at HardTail.101 If stating that “violation of this stipulation 
[restriction on purchase with black-listed suppliers] will trigger a contractual penalty” 
(Standards and Guidelines, 1998, emphasis added), then the franchisor “has to bite” (Inter-
view 07/07/2005) in case of deviation. However, the company may not always want to 
severely punish such deviations as announced. For instance, a once non-cooperative fran-
chisee may be one of the most successful outlets, and additionally an opinion leader, with 
whom it pays to maintain good relations. At the other extreme, HardTail’s warning that 
“partners attracting attention through purchases of such kind cannot expect to get the full 
support of HardTail” (Standards and Guidelines, 1994) is an example of a threatened pun-
ishment which may be credible but not costly enough for franchisees in its consequences – 
a major reason why the wording had been changed eventually. Against the backdrop of the 
trade-off described above, the wording adopted by the time of this writing can be rational-
ized. By stating that “you risk a contractual penalty” (Standards and Guidelines, 2005, em-
phasis added), the franchisor has an option to severely punish any deviation.102 It provides 
a clear signal to agents that there might be negative consequences. At the same time, the 
franchisor does not completely loose credibility if not effectuating sanctions. 
8. Conclusion  
The case studies presented in this chapter add further evidence on the existence and the 
nature of learning to contract. The data show that acquiring experience about effective 
safeguards is also an important phenomenon in a franchising context, where high levels of 
professionalism in initial design would be expected. The observed processes underlying the 
design of agreements were by and large inconsistent with efficiency theories and asserted 
claims that “the features of contracts are not continuously refined in order to obtain an “op-
timal contract”” (Ménard, 2004: p. 8). Though the content of the modifications can be ra-
tionalized ex post with incentives-based theories, the way by which franchising firms came 
to recognize the need for specific safeguards is more neatly described by theories of local 
experimentation (e.g., Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982). As franchisors 
matured, contract structure was increasingly a result of trial and error learning and differed 
                                                     
101 The company changed the wording in the Standards and Guidelines, which is the document referred to in 
the day-to-day business. But the contracts per se did not change at all with respect to this issue over the sam-
pling period. Enforceability of these restrictions was, therefore, not affected. 
102 Note that the precise penalty was not defined ex ante. 
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sharply in many respects from the agreements designed in the early days of chains’ life 
cycle.  
By studying learning to contract in the franchising setting, further insights on the 
sources of ex ante imperfect contracting were derived. Basically, the results imply that 
bounded rationality, i.e., a lack of awareness of the importance of certain safeguards, holds 
strong explanatory power. Furthermore, this study revealed new management and franchi-
see councils as factors potentially determining the pace of contractual change. It was also 
argued that bounded rationality and adjustments costs may hold explanatory power for the 
stickiness of different contractual variables. In addition, the evidence points to issues in 
contracting which have been given little attention so far, especially the choice between 
public and private enforcement, but also the need to maintain a reputation for credible 
threats.  
The observation that the companies in the sample expanded considerable effort to con-
tinuously improve the design of contracts, including costly renegotiation of existing 
agreements, substantiates the importance of legal documents in governing franchising rela-
tionships. Following Macaulay’s (1963) seminal work, the importance of contracts for the 
ongoing relationship between legally independent parties has, at times, been downplayed 
in the literature. It has been argued instead that formal agreements are similar to constitu-
tions, providing merely a frame for the assignment of basic roles and responsibilities and 
general codes of conduct (e.g., Macneil, 1974). Insufficient attention to formal contracting 
may be an important source of costly experiences. As a prime example, recall the severe 
effects for PizzaBox of failing to restrict post contract competition.    
This study suggests further research in several directions. First, the locus of contract de-
sign capabilities in franchising should be systematically explored. The role of lawyers and 
specialized consultants deserve further attention within such an analysis (see Argyres and 
Mayer, 2004). Second, this study points to a principal-agent problem in contracting which 
has been ignored by theory. It is usually assumed that a principal contracts with an agent. 
But only at PizzaBox did the principal (i.e., the owner-CEO) directly contract with the 
agents (i.e., franchisees). At SleepWell and HardTail, the task of contracting with franchi-
sees was delegated to non-owner employees, introducing an incentive problem within the 
company. Future research could shed light on the effects of these principal-agent layers 
within franchising firms for the evolution of agreements but also for their enforcement 
(e.g., public vs. private). For instance, non-owner employees may not be willing to put 
forth costly effort to learn about past mistakes unless they are compensated adequately. 
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Third, legal requirements to disclose franchise contracts, as in the U.S., might importantly 
affect the nature of learning. The role of imitation may become more central relative to 
own past experiences. However, there are also clear limits on successful imitation when 
complementarities between provisions exist (Shane, 2005: pp. 101-102; see, generally, 
Rivkin, 2000). Finally, attention should be paid to the factors which determine the speed at 
which franchise organizations learn to contract. In general terms, the answer may depend 
on how well the company organizes feedback processes. More specifically, the frequency 
and intensity of monitoring franchisee behavior should positively relate to the detection of 
suboptimal structures and therefore to contractual learning, with bounded rationality poten-
tially moderating this relationship. 
  
 
PART C 
I. SYNOPSIS OF MAIN FINDINGS  
This thesis opened with a quotation from John Love, a journalist who studied the McDon-
ald’s system in depth. To recall:  
”The real secret to McDonald’s successful operating system is not in its 
regimen but in the way it enforces uniform procedures without stifling 
the entrepreneurship of franchisees.” (Love, 1986: p. 150) 
This short statement summarizes, I believe, key success factors of the world’s most 
popular franchise chain. First, the company leverages franchisees’ unique capabilities. 
These are specific knowledge about local markets and incentives, induced by residual 
claims, to capitalize on that knowledge. Second, McDonald’s simultaneously secures fran-
chisees’ cooperation with the chain. Specifically, the assignment of decision leeway to 
outlets does not lead to excessive costs from misbehavior (i.e., free-riding on the brand 
name), an important concern in contractual distribution channels. In short, McDonald’s 
realizes the upside of (partly) decentralized decision structures and effectively contains the 
downside. Though this suggests that only the parent corporation is concerned about the 
abuse of decision rights by agents, the reverse is true as well. But franchisees also derive 
major benefits from centralized franchisor discretion over important parts of the system. 
Networks which are viable in the long run therefore assure that control by the parent cor-
poration is not abused to the detriment of the local stores. In summary, success demands 
taking advantage of the parties’ capabilities by allocating decision rights accordingly while 
safeguarding against potential frictions.  
In this dissertation, I raised the question of how franchising firms achieve this twin ob-
jective. I argued that they provide for decision rights in the written contract while ensuring 
cooperative behavior, informally defined in relational contracts, through private enforce-
ment mechanisms. The focus on private ordering resulted from the rationale developed in 
PART A, that formal contracts – the only alternative form of enforcement between legally 
separate entities – cannot achieve this goal since linking actions to future states of the 
world is infeasible. According decision rights can then lead to misbehavior which is non-
verifiable by the courts. In the first three chapters of PART B, the interplay between the 
allocation of decision rights and three specific forms of private enforcement was analyzed:
C-I. Synopsis  
 
141
(1) the self-enforcement mechanism, (2) relational governance, and (3) collective punish-
ment. In the fourth chapter, the processes by which franchising firms learn about appropri-
ate contractual rights assignment and effective private enforcement over time were investi-
gated through case studies. Taken together, the empirical insights from these four modular 
studies can be summarized as follows: 
 
? Franchising firms do, indeed, rely on private enforcement mechanisms to pre-
vent opportunistic abuses of decision rights. This is evidenced by the following 
empirical relationships:  
- The less effective is private enforcement (i.e., the self-enforcement mecha-
nism) in a cross-section of franchising firms, the more are franchisees’ deci-
sion rights restricted through the formal contract (see B-I.). 
- The higher is a franchisee’s autonomy in a cross-section of outlets within a 
chain, the more emphasis is placed on private enforcement (i.e., via rela-
tional governance) by the corporate parent. And, in the face of downstream 
autonomy, private enforcement becomes more important, the weaker a fran-
chisee’s incentives are aligned with the principal (see B-II.). 
- The more extensive is the franchisor’s control over the system in a cross-
section of firms, the higher is the likelihood that franchisees rely collec-
tively on private enforcement (i.e., through councils) to assure proper be-
havior by the principal. In addition, private enforcement becomes more im-
portant in light of centralized control, the weaker are the principal’s incen-
tives for fair dealings induced by the formal contract (see B-III.).          
? Rights assignment and private enforcement are not trivial and subject to learning 
processes. Thus, at least some economic actors dispose of limited rationality and 
are not able to set up efficient configurations from the outset (see B-IV.). 
    
Overall, these findings provide empirical corroboration of theoretical conjectures in the 
literature that “informal aspects, especially relational contracts, are important to the suc-
cess of (…) nontraditional organizational forms” (Baker et al., 2002: p. 71) such as fran-
chising arrangements. However, the results do not only bear implications for the manage-
ment of chains as emphasized throughout the main chapters, but may also explain, I argue 
below, the incidence of these hybrid organizational forms. 
  
 
II. IMPLICATION FOR THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 
Combining the insights from the cross-sectional and longitudinal data, I finally derive a 
tentative implication for the core question raised by the theory of the firm (see Garrouste 
and Saussier, 2005: p. 179): What determines the boundaries of the firm; or, equivalently, 
which activities are not executed within unitary firms? My concern here is specifically 
with the range of activities organized through hybrid forms. Franchising is but one type of 
arrangement in this broader class of hybrids. Other varieties include collective trademarks, 
partnerships, cooperatives, and alliances (see, on regularities among these forms, Ménard, 
2004: pp. 6-10).  
Transaction costs theory situates these modes on an intermediate position between pure 
market exchange and coordination through hierarchies (Williamson, 1991). Under hybrid 
arrangements, resources are pooled through long-term contracts from legally separate enti-
ties who remain independent residual claimants. As discussed further above (see A-II.), 
separate ownership rights create strong incentives which would be considerably weakened 
under hierarchical coordination.103 On the other side of the spectrum, markets would not 
efficiently bundle the parties’ relationship-specific resources (e.g., knowledge, production 
facilities). But still, with the parties remaining legally independent and incomplete formal 
contracts governing the relationship imperfectly, significant vulnerabilities to trading haz-
ards remain in hybrid forms. The findings of this dissertation show that these hazards can 
be mitigated through privately enforced relational contracts. 
I forward therefore that the effective use of private enforcement mechanisms may act as 
a shift parameter, making hybrid forms more attractive for some firms than for others. This 
rationale mirrors a recent proposition in the literature that the ability to structure formal 
contracts increases the attractiveness of inter-firm collaborations, relative to hierarchies 
(Mayer and Argyres, 2004: p. 408). Two complementary observations from the different 
research approaches in this dissertation motivate my argument: 
 
(1) The cross-sectional approaches suggest that relational contracting between le-
gally separate decision-makers with high-powered incentives is efficient. This 
conclusion is reached by assuming the efficiency principle to hold. Accordingly, 
                                                     
103 See Baker et al. (2001) for limits on incorporating market-like elements in firms. 
C-II. Implication  
 
143
gains can be realized by economic actors from changing inefficient policies such 
that efficient business practices – here related to the adoption of private safe-
guards against exploitative uses of decision rights – should be more frequently 
observed than suboptimal arrangements. The set-up and enforcement of rela-
tional contracts is thus an important function of management (see, on this role of 
management, Baker et al., 2002: p. 73). 
(2) The learning effects documented in the longitudinal case studies revealed that 
not all firms are equally able to structure the exchange in which they participate, 
including the use of relational contracts (e.g., recall the shift towards more effec-
tive private enforcement at PizzaBox with the advent of the new CEO, see B-
IV.).  
  
Hence, firms with strong capabilities to use relational contracts may organize transac-
tions through hybrids over a broader range of asset specificity levels. Put differently, the 
level of asset specificity at which transaction costs economics predicts firms to be indiffer-
ent between hybrid and hierarchical coordination may be higher for firms capable of en-
forcing cooperative decision-making through private ordering than for firms with weak 
such capabilities, all else equal. This rationale is similar to the contention that non-
integration is favored over integration when reputation effects assuring fair dealings are 
high (see Garvey, 1995). In the argument advanced here, high reputation effects corre-
spond to strong relational contracting capabilities.  
 
To conclude, though this dissertation is subject to several limitations as outlined 
throughout the main chapters, I feel that it demonstrated the relevance of private enforce-
ment mechanisms for understanding how inter-firm economic exchange is governed.   
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APPENDIX A: FACTOR MATRIX FOR DECISION INDEX I  
1 factor extracted (Eigenvalue > 1); Kayser-Meyer-Olkin-criterion: 0.622; Bartlett’s 
test of spherity: Chi2 = 122.08, df = 3, p < 0.001. 
Factor Eigenvalue % of var.  
1 1.708 56.949  
Factor matrix   Decision index I  
(a)   0.779  
(b)   0.675  
(c)   0.803  
  
APPENDIX B: DETAILS OF CONSTRUCTS AND MEASURES 
Construct Description of measures Cronbach’s  
alpha 
1 Multi-unit ownership Do you own more than one franchise outlet? (no = 0; yes = 1) 
 
 
2 Age of the relationship In which year did you join the franchise system?  
 
 
3 Competition The number of franchised outlets has exceeded a reasonable size. 
(disagree-agree, 7-point scale) 
 
 
4 Success a Within another activity and with the same level of effort I could 
realize an income which is … (higher-lower, 7-point scale). 
b Compared to the average development of sales in my industry I 
would rate my last period’s sales as being… (lower-higher, 7-
point scale). 
c Compared to my expectations my last period’s income was… 
(lower-higher, 7-point scale). 
d Compared to my last period’s sales objectives my last period’s 
sales were… (lower-higher, 7-point scale). 
 
0.83 
5 Relational governance Harmonization of conflict 
a My franchisor understands my problems and concerns. (disagree-
agree, 7-point scale) 
b My franchisor seeks compromises to accommodate conflicts. 
(disagree-agree, 7-point scale) 
c Disputes are not typical for the relationship between me and my 
franchisor. (disagree-agree, 7-point scale) 
 
Cooperation 
d When making decisions which concern me, my franchisor takes 
into account my opinion. (disagree-agree, 7-point scale) 
e My franchisor asks me for participation in his long-term planning 
process. (disagree-agree, 7-point scale) 
f I receive information from my franchisor on time. (disagree-
agree, 7-point scale) 
 
Trust 
g My franchisor does not exploit my dependency. (disagree-agree, 
7-point scale) 
h My franchisor’s trust in me is high. (disagree-agree, 7-point 
scale) 
i I can follow the recommendations of my franchisor without any 
hesitation. (disagree-agree, 7-point scale) 
 
0.87 
6 Autonomy a The franchisor’s standard operating procedures do limit my 
autonomy… (agree-disagree, 7-point scale) 
b I am free to implement own ideas. (disagree-agree, 7-point scale) 
c I am my own boss. (disagree-agree, 7-point scale) 
d As franchisee I feel more like an entrepreneur rather than like an 
employee. (disagree-agree, 7-point scale) 
0.64 
Items have been translated from German to English by a bilingual researcher.  
  
APPENDIX C: FACTOR MATRIX FOR RELATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
1 factor extracted (Eigenvalue > 1); Kayser-Meyer-Olkin-criterion: 0.885; Bartlett’s test of spherity: 
Chi2 = 826.47, df = 36, p < 0.001. 
Factor Eigenvalue % of var.  
1 4.698 52.205  
Factor matrix   Relational governance  
5a)   0.652  
5b)   0.765  
5c)   0.785  
5d)   0.804  
5e)   0.696  
5f)   0.635  
5g)   0.808  
5h)   0.752  
5i)   0.577  
Absolute values less than 0.3 were suppressed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX D: FACTOR MATRIX FOR SUCCESS AND AUTONOMY 
 
2 factors extracted (Eigenvalues > 1); Kayser-Meyer-Olkin-criterion: 0.761; Bartlett’s test of spherity: 
Chi2 = 556.42, df = 28, p < 0.001. 
Factor Eigenvalue % of var. cum. % of var.  
1 3.191 39.893 39.893  
2 1.660 20.747 60.640  
Factor matrix    Success Autonomy 
4a)    0.633  
4b)    0.855  
4c)    0.880  
4d)    0.850  
6a)     0.645 
6b)     0.778 
6c)     0.762 
6d)     0.664 
Absolute values less than 0.3 were suppressed. 
 
 
  
APPENDIX E: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
1. Company & interviewee background 
? Company history 
? Reasons for franchising  
? Career of interviewee at company 
2. Governance of relationship to franchisees 
? Instruments (contracts, handbooks, etc.) 
? Implicit agreements  
? Sources of conflict 
? Mechanisms for dispute resolution 
? Communication procedures with franchisees 
? Monitoring (types, frequency, etc.) 
3. Contract changes – general 
? Design of first contract 
? Decision-makers on contractual changes in the company  
? Process of a typical contractual change (initiation, approval, etc.) 
? Costs of changing contracts 
? Changes in implicit agreements 
? Changes regarding selection criteria of franchisees 
4. Contract changes – specific 
? Which events/experiences led to the adoption/removal/change in
wording of clause X in contract version Y? 
5. Open questions 
 
6. Further contacts in the company 
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